I bid you goodnight now, with Youli Taki's view on the subject. I think it is very appropriate:
ONE year on and Greek Cypriot society has yet to come to terms with the outcome of the referendum. Ambiguity and a lack of clarity predominate in conditions where sloganeering is substituted for real dialogue and debate. Of course this ambiguity has advantages. It has been common for many within our political elite to lay claim to the 76 per cent ‘no’ vote, in doing so hoping to win easy recognition of the moral superiority of their argument.
In short, the magic figure of 76 per cent is used as a crude political weapon which, it is assumed, confers legitimacy on those who seek to claim it as their own personal property. What is ignored is the obvious fact that the 76 per cent ‘no’ vote was neither homogeneous nor registered under ordinary circumstances.
There is a differentiation to be made between four general types of ‘no’ voters. Firstly, there were those who rejected a bizonal bicommunal federation.
Secondly, there were those who accepted a federal solution but wished to establish conditions where there would be no onerous regulations regarding the freedom of establishment, the purchase of property, the exercise of political rights and any issue that may be classified under the rubric of fundamental rights and freedoms. This category of voter generally accepted bizonality but not bicommunality. They were voters who rejected the principle of political equality since the removal of such regulations can only guarantee a Turkish Cypriot state in the north and the principle of political equality only in the short term. A third category was that identified by AKEL in its recommendation of April 10 last year. This bloc accepted a bizonal bicommunal federation, and all that this entailed, but sought to strengthen provisions of the Plan relating to security and implementation. A fourth category of voters appeared simply confused, an outcome of the poor information and frequently abusive political dialogue that was a hallmark of the period.
Considering that for decades the bizonal bicommunal federation had formed the agenda of the international community and the common objective of Greek Cypriots along with the traditional opposition in Turkish Cypriot society, then the following may be concluded. Confronted with a choice in the future, the first two categories of voters would opt for an agenda that cannot be fulfilled. A second best option for these voters may be negotiated partition. It has not been uncommon to hear such voters stating that unless their preconditions are met then they would rather see a wall built from one end of the island to the other.
The third category of ‘no’ voters potentially shares the agenda of the ‘yes’. Those who voted ‘yes’ would be unlikely to turn away from possible improvements on the security aspects of the solution. Finally, those who voted against the plan on the basis of being confused and therefore chose the safe option constitute the key constituency. Neither fundamentally for or against the Plan as such, they will decide the future. But on what basis will that decision be taken?
There is one fundamental discussion that has been and continues to be blocked at every turn and which reflects badly on society as a whole – we have yet to clarify what a bizonal bicommunal federation actually means.
Neither have the consequences which flow from this position been adequately explored. Failure to do this has created circumstances in which the Annan Plan has yet to be compared with our official position and the likely form a solution would necessarily take. This has created conditions within which it is almost impossible to evaluate those criticisms directed against the Plan and distinguish between those which are driven by a genuine effort to improve the proposed bizonal bicommunal federation and those which, by clear implication reject such a solution as a whole.
The responsibility for these continuing circumstances weighs largely on the shoulders of AKEL. Its decision at the referendum clarified that the Party was asking for the postponement of the referendum for two reasons. First there was a need for changes in relation to issues of security, implementation and for addressing other gaps. Secondly, it took issue with the inadequate quality of information that had reached the citizens.
According to Christofias, a vacuum was created while the party and others were still considering the Plan. This vacuum was “exploited by exponents of the ‘no’ ‘who presented in the darkest way the negative and only aspects of the Plan. There was hyperbola, distortion and misinformation.” According to this perspective, the public had been subjected to propaganda launched by those who “mobilised the negative aspects of the plan and used them as a pretext for firing against the federal solution itself. Nationalists of every colour found the opportunity to pour again the poison of nationalism-chauvinism.”
Under the circumstances, AKEL’s position was both rational and clearly put. Having made an evaluation of public sentiment, the party sought to secure the conditions under which approval of the plan would be forthcoming.
Twelve months on, the anarchic debate that evolved prior to the referendum has not been infused with new content. It does not appear that AKEL is particularly concerned to pursue the logic of the position adopted at the referendum. Quite the opposite, it remains silent in the face of “nationalism-chauvinism” and has failed to aid that significant part of the population who remain confused.
Where severe tensions have been experienced over the past year, these have been directly related to the absence of clarity, consistency and openness in public debate and party positions. Despite appearances, the real source of conflict has not been over whether we should publicise the changes we wish to bring to the plan. That issue has only served to obscure more substantive questions to be addressed. Just how far do we accept our own official position reiterated over many years? How far has this been something to which we have only paid lip service? In the absence of confronting these issues head on, we continue to cultivate a culture of non-commitment, neither committed to a bizonal bicommunal federation nor to negotiated partition. It is this that is the underlying source of conflict and deep polarisation within Greek Cypriot society which also contributes to unproductive tensions between the two major communities on the island.