Piratis isn't there a difference between what we do know and what we don't know ? Just as there is a difference between the quality of knowledge about things that we can know (i.e, are capable of ascertaining the truth of) and things that we can't know (i.e, are simply incapable of ascertaining the truth of ? For example, in principle you and I can ascertain the truth of the claim that the moon is made of cheese (by going to the moon and digging around); however you and I can't know for sure that the moon is not made of cheese because in all probability neither of us are likely to be going to the moon to check.
In the first case we know in principle how to test for the composition of the moon, although we might not be able to carry out the test ourselves. the problem with claimed knowledge about a claim about god is that we simply cannot know even what the test for god is, regardless of who carries that test out.
What we know (or what we think we know) is based either on personal experience or it is knowledge transfered to us by sources we trust. Each person receives knowledge from different sources (family, school, society etc) and each person filters the incoming information differently, e.g. some might apply a "(not so) common sense" filter more than others.
In your example about the moon, we know that it is not made of cheese because scientists (who we trust) have told us so, but also because the argument that the moon is made of cheese would not pass from our "common sense" filter. 10.000 years ago, finding out what exactly the moon was made of would not be any easier than finding out about the existence of God. Still, the argument that the moon is made of cheese would have logically failed even then.
Michaelis5354,
In your post above you identified at least two different basis for belief in god : the first was that belief in god gives one power, through the subconscious mind, to heal. Second was the belief that it was god, not the subconscious mind, that did the healing.
Thus, typically, we have two relatively straightforward propositions -
(i) the (human) mind can heal;
(ii) god heals.
On what basis does one determine whether (i) or (ii) is the better explanation ? Or indeed whether (i) and/or (ii) is bollocks ?
Here is a theoretical way to test it:
You get 3 very large groups of people with terminal diseases equally distributed.
You convert the first group to a religion which is certainly fake. For example you make the people believe that Piratis is the one and only God.
The second group are atheists.
The third group are strong believers in one of the usual religions.
Then you wait and see how many of those will be cured.
If all groups have the same results, that would mean that neither believing to a God heals, neither God heals. If the first and third group have better results, that would mean that believing in a God can heal, but God doesn't. If only the first group has better results that would mean I am a God