Tim Drayton wrote:May I post a lenghty quote from Diana Weston Markides' book entitled "Cyprus 1957-1963 From Colonial Conflict to Constitutional Crisis", published by the University of Minnesota (pp 167-8).
"Although military intervention to partition the island was threatened regularly in the following years, Turkish policy, which once more concentrated on political leverage over the status of Cyprus, was directed by the principles that had dictated inistence on municipal partition since 1958. The extended Turkish municipalities and other predominantly Turkish areas, such as the town and environs of Lefka, which as a result of the intercommunal fighting had become defended enclaves, were now the basis on which Turkey would in the following decade seek to establish a federal system in the Republic of Cyprus. The Turkish Cypriot leadership, however, felt abandoned. The fact that Turkey failed to intervene, while at the same time insisting that the Turkish Cypriots remained isolated from the Greek Cypriot majority, had to some extent sacrificed the welfare of the Turkish Cypriots to the interests of the motherland. By keeping them as far as possible geographically and politically isolated from the Greek Cypriots, Ankara could, as long as the problem remained pending, rest assured that there would be no change in the status of the island. Furthermore, they could continue to argue for a federal solution and thus maintain a political foothold without disturbing Greek-Turkish relations. However, the policy inevitably entailed the Turkish Cypriots' isolation from the economic boom enjoyed by the Greek Cypriots between 1964 and 1974, and condemned them to a ghetto existence largely dependent on Turkish government subsidies. The Greek Cypriots once again assisted Ankara in this strategy by subjecting the Turkish Cypriots to undue harassment. Heavy-handed treatment by the Greek Cypriot police, constant humiliating searches, and the confiscation of Turkish buses that had to run the gauntlet of Greek Cypriot roadblocks between their villages and the town centers, had destabilized the way of life of many Turkish Cypriots, who consequently gravitated towards the enclaves. The Turkish government made little effort to bring about a change in this situation. After the hostilities of 1963-64, Turkish Cypriot security was a factor in the need for geographical separatism, but a continuing factor rather than the chief motivating force."
The Turkish Republic has pursued a long-term policy ever since the 1950's to partition Cyprus and gain the maximum amount of control over the island. It has used the Turkish Cypriots as a pawn to this end. To a large extent, Turkey has bided its time, waited for the Greek Cypriots to make a mistake, then exploited this mistake to the full. I really wonder if some of those who claim that it is the TCs themselves who desire partition have ever once in their whole lives talked to a Turkish Cypriot. I do not believe that this claim is true. I believe that most Turkish Cypriots feel their identity to be under threat and long for a just solution.
Markides makes the observation that "the Greek Cypriots once again assisted Ankara in this strategy". Surely the political lessons need to be learned from such mistakes. Yet, in this thread I see a desire to repeat these mistakes. The argument is: "Let's drive the TCs into as little territory as is possible, build a huge wall and to Hell with them!" Can't you see that such a policy is bound to drive the TCs into the hands of Turkey? If you were to push the TCs into a small area and totally isolate them, this community would then inevitably become totally dependent on Turkey. The last time the Greek Cypriots adopted a policy of driving the Turkish Cypriots into enclaves and saying to Hell with them, this policy came back to haunt them in 1974. The way to halt Turkish expansion is not to drive the Turkish Cypriot community into Turkey's hands.
Thank you for posting this,Tim....My sentiments exactly...