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The Enlargement of the European Union: The Case of Cyprus

Dr. Yannis A. Stivachtis *

International Studies Association
41st Annual Convention
Los Angeles, CA.
March 14-18, 2000



Although it has not crossed yet the finish line of the European Union (EU) membership, the accession of the Republic of Cyprus seems that has entered into the final straight. Given the complexity of the situation, many things may happen which could postpone the entry of the said state into the EU that is currently expected to take place sometime around the year 2003. Factors that could affect the entry date may be related to developments in the relations between Greece and Turkey as well as developments within the island of Cyprus, within the EU and the international community as a whole.

Despite the uncertainty that surrounds the future of Cyprus, at this particular moment in time the entry of the Republic of Cyprus into the EU appears to be a definite event. However, the process of arriving where we are now has not been a straightforward one. Membership of the EU has from the very beginning been an extremely complicated issue. To understand this complexity, one needs to go through the recent political history of Cyprus.

The present paper will advance the following arguments. First, the issue of the entry of the Republic of Cyprus into the EU is strongly related to the resolution of the Cyprus problem. This means that the membership process should be seen as a part of a much larger historical and political context relevant to the Cyprus question. The political parameters of this context have determined and will continue influencing the membership process which has, in turn, added and will continue adding new parameters to the political context.

Second, the EU’s policy towards Cyprus has not been consistent. In fact, since the time of the Cyprus’ application for accession to EU, the latter has taken two diametrically opposite stances on the issue. EU positions on Cyprus have been determined by factors related to the Greek-Turkish relations in the post-Cold War era.

Third, although the EU has intended to put its policy towards Cyprus in line with that of the UN, the logic of the European integration process runs into conflict with the ideas concerning the political settlement of the Cyprus question advanced by the UN. In this sense, the approaches of the two international institutions mentioned above are not complementary, as they were intended to be, but rather conflicting. Therefore, the decision of the EU to begin accession negotiations with Cyprus has further complicated the resolution of the Cyprus question.

Fourth, the resolution of the Cyprus problem has become extremely difficult due to the existence of two fundamentally different views of ‘ideal settlement’ pursued by the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot sides respectively and endorsed by Greece and Turkey. Both the EU and the UN have failed to answer with any degree of clarity whether a new political settlement in Cyprus should be in accordance or not with the settlement provided by the Treaties of Zurich (1959) and London (1960). While the interested parties have tried to use the institutional frameworks of the EU and the UN to pursue their own ‘ideal settlement’, the EU and the UN have left the disputing parties themselves to determine the nature and structure of any future political settlement in Cyprus. Among other things, this has led the interested parties to pursue opportunistic policies which have further complicated the resolution of the Cyprus problem.

Fifth, the issue of the entry of the Republic of Cyprus into the EU is strongly related to the relations between Greece and Turkey as well as the acceptance of Turkey as a prospective member of the EU. Thus, the issue of Cyprus’ accession to EU has been and will continue being affected by policies pursued by Athens and Ankara. Moreover, the same issue has been and will continue being a subject of inter- and intra-communal politics in Cyprus.

The purpose of this paper is to provide a narrative account of the political developments related to Cyprus question. The purpose of such an endeavour is to place the issue of membership into the larger historical and political context relevant to the Cyprus problem. This narrative will be accompanied by a critical examination of the official argumentation of all parties concerned as well as a discussion of the implications of the policies pursued by those parties. To obtain a clear idea of how we have come to where we are now, one needs to go back to the history of the island.



Cyprus: From Ottoman Rule to Independence

The origins of the current problems related to the candidature of the Republic of Cyprus for accession to the EU can be traced back in the decades of the 1950s and 1960s. Events during these decades, however, were nothing more than the expression of the realities existing on the island for quite long time.

Historically speaking, the island of Cyprus has been the homeland of mainly two ethnically distinct people: the Turkish-Cypriots and the Greek-Cypriots. People from other ethnicities have also lived on the island but their numbers have been sufficiently low so to allow one to speak of the existence of two basic ethnicities. Nevertheless, during history, the majority of the population living in Cyprus was of Greek origins. The population issue is of great importance because it touches the essence of the Cyprus question and affects not only the resolution of the Cyprus problem, but also the entry of the Republic of Cyprus into the EU. Therefore, this issue will be discussed in more detail later on.

Although it is the Greeks who have been historically related to the island of Cyprus, when the modern state was established at Westphalia (1648), the island fell legally into the Turkish sovereignty and remained under the Turkish rule for more than 300 years. In 1878, according to an agreement signed at the Berlin Congress, Britain leased the island of Cyprus from the Ottoman Empire. This lease was the result of a process related to the declining power of the Ottoman Empire. Specifically, the Ottoman Sultan, facing the growing weakening of his empire, decided to cede the island to Britain as an indication of appreciation for the political support that the latter had provided in assisting him to maintain the territorial integrity of his state. On the other hand, because of its geo-strategic location, the island was of significant importance for Britain and thus pressure was put on the Subleme Porte to transfer Cyprus into British hands.

In 1914, Britain annexed Cyprus but it obtained complete sovereignty as a result of the 1923 Lausanne Treaty by which Turkey unconditionally renounced any claim on Cyprus. British colonial administration continued until 1960 when the Republic of Cyprus was founded by the Treaty of London signed by Great Britain, Greece and Turkey, which acted as the guarantor powers, as well as the leaders of both the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot communities in their separate capacities.

The passage from the British authority to independence was the result of a struggle against the British rule initiated and successful completed by EOKA; an organisation composed entirely by Greek-Cypriots. Turkish and Turkish-Cypriot peoples do not all agree whether EOKA represented a liberation movement or a terrorist organisation. But they all agree, as the Greeks and the Greek-Cypriots also do, that the main purpose of EOKA was the unification of Cyprus (enosis) with Greece.

In an effort to deal with EOKA’s political targets, the British Government sought to apply the realist principle of ‘divide and rule’ thereby planting and exploiting the differences between the Greek-Cypriots and the Turkish-Cypriots. In doing so, the British managed to make the Turkish-Cypriots targets of the EOKA’s activities. Thus, the events of the 1950s offered the fertile ground for the development of hostility and mistrust between the two communities living on the island. Nevertheless, Britain did not succeed in keeping Cyprus under its sovereignty and conceded to the independence of the island.



From Independence to Intra-state Conflict

The Zurich and London Treaties reflected the British idea of collective self-determination. In fact, Britain made clear in 1956 and 1958 that two co-owner peoples share the island and that “exercise of self-determination should be affected in such a manner that the Turkish-Cypriot community, no less than the Greek-Cypriot community, shall, in the special circumstances of Cyprus, be given the freedom to decide for themselves their future status”. 1

According to the said treaties, neither of the two main communities on the island was to be allowed to proceed to the unification of the whole or part of the island with their respective motherlands: Greece and Turkey. The treaties created a political partnership between the two national communities and were designed to enable them to share power. To this end, they defined the necessary checks and balances.

The treaties were embodied in a unique Constitution which was based on equal political partnership between the two communities and which also prohibited annexation or union of Cyprus to any other country. The political equality of the two communities was expressed in the existence of a veto power that could be exercised by both the President and Vice-President of the Republic of Cyprus. Thus, the newly independent state could only survive and function if, and only if the two communities could agree on any issue.

The only way in which the said treaties took account of the population issue was in determining that the President of the Republic of Cyprus should always be a Greek-Cypriot and the Vice-President a Turkish-Cypriot. But because of the existence of the veto power such a condition hardly mattered. An additional evidence of the special political position given to the Turkish-Cypriot community by the Zurich and London Treaties is the fact that other minorities living on the island were not given a similar treatment.

The Zurich and London Treaties did not purport to create a Cypriot nation as many have advocated. Archbishop Makarios himself recognised that “The Agreements have created a state, but not a nation”. 2 In fact, the treaties in question made a clear distinction between the idea of a ‘state’ and the idea of a ‘nation’. They sought to create a state composed of two main nations. The idea was of having a state whose citizens could be Cypriots no matter of their ethnic origin. To be a Cypriot represented a relationship between the individual and the geographical place he/she was living in and not an idea related to the existence of a Cypriot nation. Whether such a settlement was a good idea is another issue, albeit important. Moreover, whether a Cypriot nation could be created in the long run is also another question but was not at all the issue in 1959-60.

As it was mentioned above, the issue of whether the Treaties of Zurich and London represented a realistic and viable settlement of the Cyprus question has been of great significance. Many allegations were made against Archbishop Makarios, the then leader of the Greek-Cypriot community, for having signed those treaties which, according to those advocating the unification of Cyprus with Greece, represented the betrayal of their cause. However, Archbishop Makarios was under extreme pressure both by the then Greek and British governments and had therefore little room to manouevre.

It has been argued that his logic for signing the Zurich and London Treaties was that independence could be a step towards unification. Although such an argument comes from different sides, it has been the main advocacy of the Turkish-Cypriots. The reason for that is related to the decision of the Archbishop Makarios to revise the Cypriot Constitution in 1963 and his actions in the aftermath of the constitutional changes. However, what happened in 1963 had been the result of what had happened between 1960 and that year.

Specifically, although the British efforts did not manage to satisfy the immediate British goals, they did manage to jeopardise the future life of the newly independent state. Mistrust was endemic and the slightest problem was able to undermine the foundations of the new state. Politics within the Republic of Cyprus and patronage from the motherlands made the political system devised by the Treaties of Zurich and London unworkable.

The Turkish-Cypriot side has argued that immediately after the creation of the independent state of Cyprus it became clear that the Greek-Cypriots did not intent to abide by the Constitution of the Republic and sought to find justification for altering it into their favour. As proof for its argumentation, the Turkish-Cypriot side has pointed to the ignoring of the Greek-Cypriots of the constitutional requirement for separate municipalities and the decision of the Supreme Constitutional Court of Cyprus when it ruled against them in April 1963. In fact, Archbishop Makarios himself recognised that “The Union of Cyprus with Greece is an aspiration always cherished within the hearts of all Greek-Cypriots. It is impossible to put an end to this aspiration by establishing a Republic”. 3

On the other hand, the Greek-Cypriot side has accused the Turkish-Cypriots for using their political offices and functions for purposefully jeopardising the orderly operation of the new state to pave the way for Turkey to actively involve in the affairs of Cyprus. It was in this context that the decision of Archbishop Makarios, President of the Republic of Cyprus, to revise the constitution formally provoked a long-lasting crisis between the two communities.

The political justification given by Archbishop Makarios for introducing constitutional amendments was that under the then given circumstances the government was unable to run the affairs of the country. His decision, however, was perceived by the Turkish-Cypriot side as a step towards achieving unification of Cyprus with Greece. This Turkish-Cypriot claim was later endorsed by the British House of Commons Selected Committee on Foreign Affairs that on 2 July 1987 reported that

“Although the Cyprus Government now claims to have been merely seeking to operate the 1960 Constitution modified to the extent dictated by the necessities of the situation, this claim ignores the fact that both before and after the events of December 1963, the Makarios Government continued to advocate the cause of enosis and actively pursued the amendment of the Constitution and the related treaties to facilitate this ultimate objective”. 4

Turkey, which for strategic reasons did not wish the unification of Cyprus with Greece and saw Makarios’ proposals as a step towards that end, immediately rejected them and the Turkish-Cypriot leadership followed suit.

Makarios’ actions produced a twofold problem. First, he proceeded on a unilateral basis without consulting all the interesting parties; and second, he ignored the opposition of the Turkish-Cypriot Vice-President who had the constitutional power and right to resist proposals coming from the President of the Republic. As the President of a sovereign and independent state, Archbishop Makarios thought that he had the right, under the given circumstances, to proceed unilaterally to a constitutional revision. Moreover, many have argued that if the President had to ask the permission of the guarantor states for any of his actions then, the Republic of Cyprus could not function as a sovereign and independent state.

This argument, however, is problematic for two reasons. First, not all decisions are of equal significance; and second, the revision of the constitution was an issue of highest importance because it was to alter the basic principles on which the Treaties of Zurich and London rested. To put it in another way: can a political body, whose actions constitutionally require the consent of another political body, not only ignore that consent but also dismiss that body through constitutional amendments unilaterally defined and undertaken? Even if the Turkish-Cypriot Vice-President was operating under the orders of Ankara, the unilateral revision of the constitution did not appear to be a politically and legally wise action to be undertaken by Archbishop Makarios whose one of the main functions was to protect and preserve the very constitution. Even if it was the Turkish-Cypriot Vice-President who with his actions undermined that constitution, this did not necessarily give the right to the President to do the same.

Given the then existing circumstances within and outside the Republic of Cyprus, the most prudent policy for Archbishop Makarios should had been to consult the guarantor states first. At least, in this way he could not be accused of proceeding unilaterally and without taking into account the interests of all parties concerned. The issue was whether political-legal correctness, even if the latter had been established in the mind of Archbishop Makarios, should had taken priority over political realities and necessities. Since the definition of what it was politically and legally correct for Archbishop Makarios to do was in itself problematic, political realities should had taken priority in his calculations.

On the other hand, if Makarios’ design was to achieve unification with Greece sooner or later then, obviously his actions are not subject to the above problematique. In fact, there are clear indications that unification was indeed his end. He himself had stated that “Cyprus is Greek. Cyprus was Greek since the dawn of history and will remain Greek. Greek and undivided we have taken it over. Greek and undivided we shall preserve it. Greek and undivided we shall deliver it to Greece”. 5 Moreover, referring to the events of 1963, Ernst Forthshoff, the President of the Supreme Constitutional Court of the Republic of Cyprus declared that “Makarios bears on his shoulders the sole responsibility of the tragic events...His claim is to deprive the Turkish community of their rights”. 6

If unification of Cyprus with Greece was the case behind the constitutional amendments of 1963, one can easily understand the reaction of Turkey and the Turkish-Cypriot side which had signed treaties and supported a constitution which were to prevent unification or partition designs. If one understands and accepts the Greek-Cypriot efforts for unification with Greece, one should, at least, understand the partition schemes of Turkey supported by the Turkish-Cypriot leadership.

The constitutional amendments of 1963 introduced the majority-minority divide between the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot communities respectively. It is on this basis that all Greek-Cypriot governments since 1974 have sought to proceed in addressing and solving the Cyprus question. As a result of these arrangements, the Turkish-Cypriots lost almost all of their political power and leverage. It was, therefore, expectable that the constitutional changes could invite further conflict between the two communities.

The inter-communal conflict, which formally began in 1963, continued until 1974 with acts of brutality committed by both sides. The question of who started first is difficult to be answered with precision since one has to identify not only when exactly the first act commenced but also which exactly act had a counter-act as an effect. The truth, however, is that according to the UN reports, 7 the Turkish-Cypriots experienced difficult living conditions and their security required the intervention of the UN. Particularly, facing growing domestic upheaval and under the threat of a Turkish military intervention, the Cypriot Government brought the matter before the UN. The UN Security Council Resolution 186/1964 provided for the stationing of a UN Peace-keeping Force (UNFICYP) on the island and initiated UN mediation efforts to promote a peaceful solution and an agreed settlement, in accordance with the UN Charter. The size of this force, nevertheless, was insufficient to enforce order throughout the island.

The situation became even more grave when the Greek Government decided to send military troops in Cyprus to prevent a possible Turkish military intervention. Such an action increased the mistrust of the Turkish-Cypriots and invited the reaction of Ankara. It was in this climate that the inter-communal talks began for a negotiated agreement on a new constitutional system. Political changes in Greece followed by anti-Turkish rhetoric, in conjunction with the growing activities of the pro-enosis forces in Cyprus against the Turkish-Cypriots invited the Turkish reaction and led to the failure of the inter-communal talks, although some progress had already been made. Whether Turkey wished or not to partition the island, the actions of the pro-enosis forces provided a good pretext for any Turkish policy.

In sum, the period between 1964-74 was characterised by the growing fear of a Turkish military intervention that, although initially prevented due to political intervention of the United States, 8 eventually took place on 20 July 1974.

The term ‘military intervention’ is used here in an academic sense and implies the involvement of a third party in a dispute between two other parties. The type of means used during this involvement defines the latter’s nature. Since Turkey used military means in this involvement, its actions constituted a military intervention. Whether this military intervention was a ‘peace operation’ or a ‘military invasion’ is another matter.

Particularly, the Turkish-Cypriot side has argued that the Turkish military operation was lawful and sought to protect the Turkish-Cypriots from the acts of the Greek-Cypriot who on 15 July 1974 overthrew Archbishop Makarios and established themselves on power. This argument has been endorsed by the Consultive Assembly of the Council of Europe which on 29 July 1974 passed the Resolution 573 by which was

“Condemning the coup d’ etat carried out in Cyprus by officers owing allegiance to the Greek military dictatorship...Regretting the failure of the attempt to reach a diplomatic settlement which led to the Turkish Government to exercise its right of intervention in accordance with the article 4 of the Treaty of Guarantee”. 9

It is true that the coup d’ état of July 1974 was sponsored by the Greek Government and its aim was of achieving unification of Cyprus with Greece. The Turkish-Cypriot argument that their security was at stake is sound and was at that time endorsed by Archbishop Makarios himself who from the headquarters of the UN declared that due to the Greek involvement in Cyprus, the Greek-Cypriots and the Turkish-Cypriots were in grave danger. Thus, one may easily conclude that without the Turkish military operation the lives of the Turkish-Cypriots could had been under a serious threat.

However, one should be careful in making general judgements. First of all, it was only a small part of the Greek-Cypriot population which during those difficult years shared beliefs such as the ‘extermination’ of the Turkish-Cypriot population. The greatest majority of the Greek-Cypriots were, and still are against such ideas. Second, the coup d’ état of July 1974 did not aim only against the Turkish-Cypriots but also against any democratic Greek-Cypriot element; a fact that is also accepted by the Turkish-Cypriot side. 10 And third, whereas not many could argue against the fact that the Turkish intervention was in principle in accordance to the provisions of the Zurich and London Treaties, the question is whether the subsequent Turkish actions were also in accordance to the said treaties. But this is an issue that will be discussed later.

The important point is that intervention cuts both ways. This is because in political terms, intervention and non-intervention can be seen as being the same thing. In other words, when a third party intervenes, it determines the outcome of the dispute between two parties usually in favour of the weaker of these two parties. If not, it determines the outcome of the dispute in favour of the stronger party. So, Turkey had two choices, either to intervene in favour of the Turkish-Cypriots or not to intervene and place the latter into a delicate situation.



Cyprus-EEC Relations: 1972-1990

Before the events of 1974, contractual relations between the Republic of Cyprus and the then European Economic Community (EEC) were established. Specifically, in 1973 an Association Agreement was signed as a result of bilateral negotiations that concluded the previous year. 11

Interest of the EEC for Cyprus should be understood in the context of the EEC’s ‘Global Mediterranean Policy’. The aim of the latter was to establish close economic relations between the EEC and the countries of the Mediterranean region and the Middle East. 12 Although relations were to be based on economic, financial and commercial co-operation, the neo-functionalist approach of the EEC made clear that such issues were strongly related to the political interests of the EEC in the above indicated regions. In other words, economic co-operation was seen as a first step towards political co-operation. This is not to say that economic co-operation itself was not of significant importance for the EEC. What it rather means is that the crises in the Middle East had pointed out that the EEC could be seriously affected by upcoming crises both in political and economic terms. Co-operation with the countries of the region was, therefore, seen by the EEC as a means to predict and control events and avoid the impact of crises on its operation.

The Mediterranean policy of the EEC targeted not only at establishing loose and short-term bilateral economic co-operation with the countries of the Mediterranean region and the Middle East. In addition, it sought, whenever possible, to sign an Association Agreement which was to pave the way for a more comprehensive and longer-term co-operation between the interested parties.

The Association Agreement of 1973 provided for the establishment of a customs union in two stages. This agreement contained arrangements on trade and financial and technical co-operation which were to be applied for the benefit of the entire population of Cyprus. The first stage provided for the phased reduction of tariffs on industrial goods and agricultural products. This stage was due to expire in June 1977 but due to the subsequent events was extended until the end of 1987, by which deadline all the aims were achieved.

Neither Turkey nor the Turkish-Cypriots voiced any objection to the Association Agreement. Three reasons can explain this stance. First, the agreement was not considered as touching the core of, or affecting negatively the Cyprus problem; second, it was to benefit all Cypriots alike; and third, it was to determine trade and financial relations between Cyprus and an institution (EEC) with which both Greece and Turkey had also signed Association Agreements.

During the events of 1974 and up to 1990, the EEC, and the EU as its successor, played only a side-role in the Cyprus question. In fact, the member states brought their policies in line with the mediating efforts undertaken by the UN and provided political support for them.

Specifically, from 1974 and until the moment that the European Political Co-operation (EPC) came into being, the policy of the EEC was nothing more than the reflection of the individual policies of its member states. The latter acted in two ways. First, they sought to provide support for the relevant UN resolutions concerning Cyprus and called for negotiations between all interested parties in an effort to find a lasting solution; and second, they sought to continue working with the Cyprus Government towards the implementation of the 1973 Association Agreement.

After the establishment of the EPC, the position of the EEC members did not very much altered although three important developments occurred: the entry of Greece into the EEC in 1981, the creation of the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ in 1983 and the application of Turkey for accession to the EU.

Greece’s membership of the EEC made the partners to take account of the relations between Athens and Ankara in their foreign policy calculations. Because Turkey was seen as an important country for the European security and with which the EEC had an Association Agreement, the members states sought to avoid taking positions that could heart their relations either with Greece or with Turkey. Moreover, the EEC partners did not want Greece to bring its bilateral problems with Turkey within the EEC.

Nevertheless, the individual member states of the EEC and the EEC as a whole did not recognise in 1983 the creation of the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’. This policy was justified not on the ground that Greece was a partner state, but because it was in line with the relevant UN resolutions with which the creation of the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ was in direct contrast. Particularly, the EEC brought its policy in line with the UN Security Council Resolutions 541/1983 and 550/1984 which condemned the unilateral declaration made by the Turkish-Cypriot leadership as well as all subsequent secessionist acts, declared them illegal and invalid and called for their immediate withdrawal. These resolutions called upon all states not to recognise the purported state and not to facilitate or in any way assist the secessionist entity. The EEC sought to respond positively to the UN call. At the same time, the partners sought to pursue policies towards Cyprus that could equally benefit the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot communities.

The decision of the EEC not to recognise the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ had important consequences for the subsequent developments in the Cyprus question. First of all, the action of the EEC denied legitimisation to a separate Turkish-Cypriot international representation. By the same token, it recognised the Greek-Cypriot Government as the only legitimate representative of all people living in Cyprus. In this way, the EEC paved the way for a resolution to the Cyprus question which could be closer to the Greek-Cypriot interests thereby encouraging them to pursue policies that could lead to a state reconstruction in Cyprus according to the post-1963 archetype. Such a decision was obviously hurting the interests of the Turkish-Cypriots and was minimising the chances of returning to a political settlement similar to that provided by the Zurich and London Treaties.

In January 1988 the Protocol governing the transition to the second stage of the 1973 Association Agreement, the completion of a customs union, entered into force. This stage was divided into two phases. 13 The first phase, from 1988 to 1997 provided first, for the reduction by Cyprus of customs duties and quantitative restrictions on industrial products and on 43 agricultural products covered by the Association Agreement; second, the adoption by Cyprus of the Union’s Common Customs Tariff; and third, the harmonisation of accompanying policies of competition, state aids and the approximation of laws. The second phase, ending in 2002 or 2003 was to lead to the free and unrestricted movement of industrial and agricultural products and the adoption of accompanying policies required for completion of the customs union. In view, however, of the accession negotiations in March 1998 the negotiations for the second phase of the customs union have been for practical reasons postponed.

Meanwhile, in an effort to strengthen Cyprus’s infrastructure the European Union provided assistance through the signing of four financial protocols of a technical and economic nature covering the period 1979-1998. 14 Under the first two financial protocols all grants and European Investment Bank loans were used to finance infrastructure projects benefitting where possible the entire population of Cyprus. The Third Financial Protocol was used to promote the transition of Cyprus’ economy towards integration with the Union. The aim of the Fourth Financial Protocol is fourfold. 15 First, to promote the development of the Cypriot economy and the objectives of the EEC-Cyprus Association Agreement. Second, to facilitate Cyprus’ economic transition with a view to its accession to the EU. Third, to support participation of Cyprus in certain EU programmes. And fourth, to support efforts to promote a general settlement of the Cyprus problem.

During those years, relations between the EEC and the Republic of Cyprus were fallen within the framework of the ‘Renew Mediterranean Policy’ of the EEC. 16 This policy was an updated version of the ‘Global Mediterranean Policy’ and represented a more comprehensive effort of the EEC to establish closer relations with the countries of the Mediterranean region and the Middle East.

The EEC/EU decision to carry on with the 1973 Association Agreement did not invite the reaction of Turkey and the Turkish-Cypriot side until the moment that the EU accepted the Republic of Cyprus’ application for EU membership. Until that moment, Cyprus-EEC/EU relations were not seen necessarily as positive for the Turkish-Cypriot cause but neither were seen as extremely negative since the Turkish-Cypriot side was also benefited by the EEC/EU policies towards Cyprus. From the moment that Cyprus was accepted as a candidate state for accession, the EU began to be seen by Turkey and the Turkish-Cypriot leadership as involving actively in the Cyprus question in favour of the Greek-Cypriot side and acting against the resolution proposals put forward by the UN. Thus, Turkey and the Turkish-Cypriot leadership continued to search for a solution to the Cyprus problem within the framework of the UN as they had already done since 1975.

Meanwhile, another development had taken place which was to further complicate the relations between Greece and Turkey as well as the resolution of the Cyprus problem: the application of Turkey for accession to EU. Since Greece was already member of the EU, its stance on the matter could evidently affect the relations of the EU as a whole with Turkey.

Particularly, on 14 April 1987, Turkey submitted its application for EEC membership. After almost two years of deliberation, the European Commission responded negatively to the Turkish proposal. 17 The Commission maintained that demographical, political, economic, structural and social problems existing in Turkey in conjunction with the internal reshaping process of the EEC made for the time being the acceptance of the application impossible. However, the Commission worked out three conditions for Turkish re-application. First, political pluralism had to be re-established in Turkey and the country’s human rights record had to be improved considerably; second, Turkey should solve its bilateral disputes with Greece; and third, the Cyprus question had to be resolved. The Commission decided to assess Turkey’s status from time to time. The reluctance of the EEC to accept Turkey was maintained during the following years. 18

Overall, the Commission was extremely cautious in dealing with the Turkish application and did not want to bind itself more than was necessary. On the one hand, the integration of Turkey was seen as a very difficult task. On the other hand, the EEC did not want the Greek-Turkish problems and the Cyprus question to become EEC problems. Yet, Greece, seeing Turkey’s interest to join the EEC, thought that the Turkish application could offer a vehicle for exercising pressure on Ankara to solve the Greek-Turkish disputes, including the Cyprus problem. But Ankara, which saw Greece behind its rejection by the EEC, not only was not ready to make any concessions, but it even hardened its position towards Greece. Under those conditions the resolution of the Cyprus problem was impossible. When the Republic of Cyprus applied for membership in 1990, relations between the EU, Greece, Turkey and Cyprus became a difficult issue to be handled.

During the period 1983-90, the European Parliament also adopted several resolutions concerning aspects of the Cyprus problem, such as the 17 November 1983 Resolution which denounced the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’; the 15 December 1988 Resolution which condemned the destruction of the cultural heritage in the occupied territories and the 15 March 1990 Resolution which urged the Turkish Government to demonstrate the necessary volition and a spirit of co-operation with the view to resuming the inter-communal negotiations. 19



From Intra-state Conflict to Territorial Division

The Turkish military intervention of July and August 1974 produced a new type of order in Cyprus. While the Treaties of Zurich and London and the subsequent Cypriot Constitution provided for a bi-communal state with the two communities spread throughout the island, the Turkish intervention has produced a different arrangement. A bi-zonal entity has been created where the Greek-Cypriot population is concentrated in the southern part of the island and the Turkish-Cypriots in the northern. This division has been militarily supported by the presence of the Turkish troops and demographically by the immigration of Turkish population coming from Anatolia.

In the aftermath of the Turkish military intervention four issues became the subject of a heated debate between the two communities and their respective protectors. First, whether the Turkish intervention was lawful; second, whether the Turkish troops should be withdrawn; third, whether the status quo ante should be restored; and fourth, whether any future political settlement in Cyprus should be based on the principles of the 1960 Treaty of London. 20

Greece and the Greek-Cypriot side have considered the Turkish military intervention in Cyprus as unlawful and as an attack on a sovereign state. Five reasons have been advanced for explaining this position. 21 First, the right of intervention provided by the treaties of London (1960) and Zurich (1959) did not necessarily involve the use of force. Second, the UN Charter excludes the use of force. Third, it is maintained that Rauf Denktash himself characterised the events of July 1974 as an ‘internal affair’ of the Greek-Cypriots that it did not affect the Turkish-Cypriot community. Fourth, the Treaty of Guarantee provided for the consultations between the guarantor powers, but Turkey never entered into such consultations. Fifth, after the constitutional order was restored, the Turkish troops not only were not withdrawn but also proceeded to the second stage of their invasion, while negotiations were taken place in Geneva.

However, the above argumentation is very weak. First of all, going through the said agreements one can easily observe that neither the Zurich nor the London Agreement excluded the use of force. Second, although clearly stated in the UN Charter, the use of force is not entirely excluded in the international practice when this use conforms to the requirements of international law; and the Zurich-London Treaties constitute integral parts of the international legal order. Third, Archbishop Makarios himself recognised the fact that the coup d’ état of July 1974 threatened both the Greek-Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots and, using the pontium of the UN, asked the Guarantor powers to intervene to restore order. Fourth, following its obligations as stated in the Treaties of Zurich and London, Turkey entered into consultations with Britain. Specifically, a meeting took place in London between the Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit and the British Prime Callahan during which the latter made clear that Britain was not prepared to involve in the Cyprus problem. Thus Turkey, as the only guarantor power remaining, obtained the right to intervene unilaterally in order to restore order in Cyprus and protect the Turkish-Cypriots. Finally, after the Turkish military intervention of July 1974, atrocities against the Turkish-Cypriots living in the rest of the island continued and perhaps intensified as a result of the Turkish intervention. This provided a lawful pretext for the continuation of Turkish military operations in August 1974 since until that moment no agreement had been reached between the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot sides about the future constitutional status of Cyprus.

On the other hand, two arguments appear to have better merits. First, it has been argued that the Turkish military intervention became unlawful from the moment that Ankara decided to keep its troops in Cyprus. This is because the Treaties of Zurich and London specified that collective or unilateral intervention should aim at the re-establishment of constitutional order. In fact, the Turkish intervention did not lead to the restoration of constitutional order, but to a new type of order. The continuing presence of the Turkish troops on the territory of the Republic of Cyprus and the 1983 unilateral declaration of the independence of the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ both stand against the provisions of the said treaties. Second, from the moment that the Security Council Resolution 353/1974 and the General Assembly Resolution 3212/1974 demanded the withdrawal of the Turkish Army from Cyprus the presence of the Turkish troops began to lack legitimacy.

Nevertheless, even those arguments need to be critically seen in the light of the Turkish and Turkish-Cypriot counter-argumentation and the existing realities. Specifically, the relevant UN resolutions addressed the issue of the Turkish military presence but did not address other important questions. First, who could meanwhile protect the Turkish-Cypriots after the withdrawal of the Turkish forces? How much international involvement the provision of such a protection would require and at what cost? Who should bear this cost? Of what size the protection force should be and for how long should be there?

Second, the UN resolutions did not provide a clear answer to the question of whether the post-1974 Republic of Cyprus should be re-constructed according to the pre- or post-1963 Constitution. In other words, should the Republic of Cyprus be re-established according to the Zurich-London Agreements or not? If not, what could that mean for the right of the Turkish-Cypriot to self-determination? Those questions highlight the limitations of the UN system in dealing with the Cyprus question and seems to justify the Turkish position that in the absence of any guarantees the presence of the Turkish forces in Cyprus was, and still is the only means to assure the security of the Turkish-Cypriots.

Moreover, to justify the presence of the Turkish troops in the northern part of the island, Turkey and the Turkish-Cypriot side have advanced two arguments. First, they have maintained that the Treaties of Zurich and London are not applicable as long as the Greek-Cypriot side does not accept the principles embodied in those treaties. And second, they have argued that the main purpose of the Greek-Cypriot Army is to unify the island and put the Turkish-Cypriots under the Greek-Cypriot authority; a design that runs counter to the logic and wording of the Zurich-London Agreements.

Although the first argument makes sense the second one is very weak for two reasons. First, it has been the presence of the Turkish troops and the high degree of their combat readiness and capability that has invited the need for the reorganisation of the Greek-Cypriot Army. Second, if a war begins between Greece and Turkey then nobody can provide enough assurances that it could not be fought at all fronts including Cyprus. 22 As long as the island is divided and hostility between the two sides is growing, the possibility of a forceful unification of the island by either side remains open.

Moreover, an argument can be made that the Turkish policy of population transfer from Anatolia to northern Cyprus shows that the main purpose of Turkey is to maintain the political and territorial division of Cyprus, thereby settling the Cyprus problem by partition. 23 In this context, the presence of the Turkish troops can be seen as a means to that end and thus, this presence can be easily viewed as unlawful.

The issue of the territorial and political division of the island of Cyprus finds the Greek-Cypriot side better placed. The issue was initially addressed by the General Assembly Resolution 3112/1974 endorsed by the Security Council Resolution 365/1975. Both resolutions demanded the safe return of the refugees to their homes thereby opposing to the Turkish policy of territorial division of the island into two zones inhabited exclusively by Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots respectively. The question is how these resolutions were to be put into practice in the light of the then realities and how they relate and fit to the recent UN resolutions aiming at creating a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation.

The issue of whether the Treaties of Zurich and London represented a realistic and viable settlement of the Cyprus question still of great importance. Particularly, the Greek-Cypriot side, in alliance with Greece, maintains that any political settlement today should take account of the population element. This argument implies that, for the Greek-Cypriot side, any political settlement of the Cyprus problem should be based on the recognition of a majority (Greek-Cypriots) and a minority (Turkish Cypriots).

Turkey and the Turkish-Cypriot side, on the other hand, correctly maintain that what the Greek-Cypriots demand stands into a sharp contrast with the logic and requirements of the Zurich and London Treaties which established the independent Republic of Cyprus and provided the constitutional basis for this state. Thus, the Turkish-Cypriot side maintains that any political settlement of the Cyprus question should be based on the political equality of the two communities; a principle that rejects any division of the island into majority and minority.



The United Nations Mediation in Cyprus: 1975-1990

The UN mediation in Cyprus during this period is characterised by the complete absence of a clear idea of what the post-1974 political settlement should be. In other words, the UN did not manage to address questions like: should the Zurich-London Agreements be upheld? Did those agreements provide a viable solution to the Cyprus problem at the first place? If not, how could a new political settlement be justified and presented to the affected parties (Turkey and Turkish-Cypriots)? What guarantees could be given to the affected parties for future developments? How committed could the international community be in long-term in providing the necessary guarantees? If such commitments were not upheld by the guarantor powers and the rest of the international community during the events of 1974, why one could expect things to be different in the future?

Instead, the UN tried to bring the two communities of Cyprus together and let them find a solution themselves. But there were two problems that made the reaching of a settlement difficult. First, each of the two communities had different ‘ideal settlements’ in mind. While the Turkish-Cypriot side advocated a return to the Zurich-London principles, the Greek-Cypriot side maintained that a new arrangement should be found and that it should be based on the majority-minority divide. Second, if in the presence of a growing domestic upheaval the inter-communal had failed to produce any concrete results, the Turkish military intervention had, in fact, worsened the situation. Mistrust and hostility had grown to the point that it was impossible for the two sides to agree. Instead, encouraged by the UN stance, they sought to use different international fora to advance their cause and ‘ideal settlement’.

One of the developments that could assist the UN in its mediation efforts was that the idea of unification of Cyprus with Greece was abandoned by the Greek-Cypriot side. Two were the reasons for that. First, a rivalry arose between Athens and Nicosia due to the involvement of Greece in the coup d’ etat of July 1974 which led to the Turkish military intervention and the de facto division of the island. And second, abandoning of the unification idea was also seen as the only way for the Greek-Cypriot side to convince Turkey to withdraw its troops from the island and keep it outside the Cypriot internal affairs after a new settlement was reached. Although there are still Greek-Cypriots who advocate the idea of ‘enosis’, their number is too small to move things to that direction. Nevertheless, they provide a good pretext for the Turkish and Turkish-Cypriot policies.

The first effort of the UN to address the Cyprus problem through mediation, following the Turkish military intervention of 1974 and the failure of the subsequent negotiations in Geneva the same year, was undertaken in 1975. Then the UN Secretary General was entrusted with a good-will mission to bring the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot leaders together under agreed procedures and to facilitate negotiations on equal footing. The same year a population exchange agreement was concluded and implemented under UN auspices.

In 1977 and 1979, two high level agreements were reached between the two sides for seeking a federal solution. The implementation of the Makarios-Denktash (1977) and Kyprianou-Denktash (1979) Agreements, however, was subject to the political calculations of both parties and especially the Greek-Cypriot one.

Specifically, those agreements were more to the favour of the Turkish-Cypriot side than to the Greek-Cypriot. The reason for which the Greek-Cypriot leadership signed those agreements was that under the then existing conditions appeared to be no alternative. However, the Greek-Cypriot side did not attempt to implement the agreements immediately but instead it sought to gain time with the hope that a more favourable settlement could be reached in the future.

From that moment on, a period of ‘missed opportunities’ for the resolution of the Cyprus problem began and which still goes on. This period is characterised by the unsuccessful efforts of the Greek-Cypriots to obtain a settlement that favours their ‘ideal settlement’ and the hardening of the Turkish-Cypriot position. The Greek-Cypriot side, however, denies the fact that there have been ‘missed opportunities’ and argues that those opportunities could not serve the interests of the Cypriot people. Nevertheless, the recent acceptance by the Greek-Cypriots of the creation of a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation showed that they had come to accept a settlement that is closer to the ‘ideal settlement’ of the Turkish-Cypriots rather than theirs. At the same time, this reality explains why the Greek-Cypriot side sought to transfer the Cyprus issue from the UN to the EU.

The Turkish-Cypriot side, on the other hand, wants to achieve a political settlement that could put the two communities on equal footing. To this end, it has supported the establishment of a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation based on the political equality of the two sides. But when the Greek-Cypriot leadership attempted to use different international fora to advance its cause and interests, in conjunction with the worsening of the relations between Athens and Ankara, the position of the Turkish-Cypriot side hardened. The significant difference between the ‘ideal settlements’ of the two sides led to the collapse of the negotiation process.

Particularly, when the Greek-Cypriot leadership presented its cause before the UN General Assembly in 1983, the Turkish-Cypriot side reacted arguing that this action was not fair since they could not be present and therefore have a fair hearing. As a result and in conjunction with the worsening of the Greek-Turkish relations Rauf Denktash, the leader of the Turkish-Cypriots, proclaimed the same year the establishment of the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’.

In response, the UN with the Security Council Resolutions 541/1983 and 550/1984 condemned the unilateral declaration, declared it illegal and invalid and called for its immediate withdrawal. They also called upon states not to recognise the purported state and not in any way assist the secessionist entity. Finally, the UN General Assembly Resolution 37/253/1983 demanded the withdrawal of the Turkish army from northern Cyprus. Those resolutions were in favour of the Greek-Cypriot side, while non-recognition of the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ allowed the Greek-Cypriot Government to continue speaking on behalf of the whole population of Cyprus. This was unacceptable for the Turkish-Cypriots and relations between the two communities worsened as a consequence.

A series of UN Secretary General’s proposals, such as the Working Points (1984), the Integrated Documents (1985), the Draft Framework Agreement (1986), the Procedural Formula (1987), and the Outline of an Overall Agreement (1988), produced no results since each of the two parties had their own reasons for accepting them in word but not in practice.

Specifically, the Greek-Cypriot leadership adopted such a position for two reasons. First, in view of the determination of the international community not to recognise the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’, the Greek-Cypriot leadership thought that under continuous international isolation the Turkish-Cypriot side would sooner or later give up and would come to accept more and more their proposals. And second, the proposals put forward by the UN were still advocating equal footing between the two communities. Therefore, they were considered to be still quite close to the Turkish-Cypriot positions. The principle of ‘wait and see’ appeared to guide the Greek-Cypriot policy of the era.

The Turkish-Cypriot side, on the other hand, saw that despite its international isolation, the Greek-Cypriot side was unable to convince the international community to accept its own version of ‘ideal settlement’. Thus, hardening of its bargaining position could lead to further extraction of concessions from the Greek-Cypriot side. Yet, the hardening of the Turkish-Cypriot position can be partly explained by the isolation in which the international community had placed the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’. At the end of the day, the Turkish-Cypriot leadership could easily convince the Turkish-Cypriots that between isolation and security the latter was very much preferable.

At the end of the 1980s, the Greek-Cypriot side appeared frustrated by the approach of the UN and sought to transfer the issue to different international bodies. Various European fora were chosen to this end with the EU being one of them. Obviously, the Greek-Cypriots believed that those fora could serve better their interests than the UN. At the same time a rearmament campaign was undertaken by the Greek-Cypriots which further deepened the lack of confidence between the two sides and increased the mistrust between Athens and Ankara. Thus, the search for an agreed settlement was further complicated.

After viewing the situation, the Turkish-Cypriot leadership realised that the Greek-Cypriot side still wished to preserve the post-1963 status quo in Cyprus. They, therefore, began to stress that a federation could only be achieved between friendly units which wanted to come together on equal terms for their common benefit. Unlike what it had proposed previously, the Turkish-Cypriot leadership now suggested that this federation could only be established between two internationally recognised states. In other words, the Greek-Cypriots and the international community should first recognise the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ and then this state and the Republic of Cyprus could come together to create the Cyprus Federation. Moreover, the Turkish-Cypriot side argued that a fundamental change was required in the mentality and approach of the Greek-Cypriots before a new political partnership became a viable project.

The question, however, was, and still is, what guarantees can be given to the Greek-Cypriots that the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ would enter into a federation arrangement especially after having received international recognition and coming out from its current international isolation?

In October 1989, the Turkish-Cypriot side proposed a ‘Declaration of Intent’ whose purpose was to assist the two communities to give up the confrontation approach and begin to replace it with a non-adversarial relationship. This proposal was side-stepped by the Greek-Cypriot leadership but for the Turkish-Cypriot side continued to be the major requirement for giving any agreement on paper the chance to be implemented.

The New York Summit of 1990 began with the unsuccessful meeting between the leaders of the two communities with the UN Secretary General. From the Turkish-Cypriot point of view, this meeting was abortive because the Greek-Cypriot leader was unprepared to genuinely negotiate on the real issues which divided the two sides. Yet, the tensions which continued to rise in Cyprus during this period hardly promoted the right kind of atmosphere. The Turkish-Cypriot position remained clear: the two peoples of Cyprus have the unquestionable capacity to freely determine their political future. This required a freely negotiated and mutually accepted agreement to which the two communities will be in a position to express their consent through separate referenda on the two sides.

In his report to the UN Security Council on 8 March 1990, the UN Secretary General stated that “Cyprus is the common home of the Greek Cypriot community and of the Turkish Cypriot community. Their relationship is not one of the majority and minority”. 24 The UN Security Council Resolution 649 adopted on 12 March 1990 expressed some of the core interests and opinions of the Turkish-Cypriot side and was therefore welcomed by Rauf Denktash. It addressed the two leaders as political equals and it called on them to reach freely a mutually acceptable solution on equal footing. It defined the already agreed basis for the solution as a bi-communal and bi-zonal federation. It also called on the parties to refrain from any action that might aggravate the situation.

While accepting the resolution in principle, Greece and the Greek-Cypriot side took steps which contradicted the call for avoiding any action which could aggravate the situation. Particularly, the Government of the Republic of Cyprus applied for membership of the EU and Greece sought to provide the necessary political support to this end. Greece and the Greek-Cypriot side were not happy with the UN approach to the Cyprus problem but had to accept the UN resolution in principle in order to avoid to be termed as ‘inflexible’. The decision of the Greek-Cypriot leadership to apply for EU membership reflected its frustration with the political developments related to the UN mediation. Thus, it sought to find an indirect solution to the Cyprus problem with the EEC providing the necessary indirect channel.

Turkey and the Turkish-Cypriot side, on the other hand, reacted strongly to the Cyprus’ application for accession to the EEC and regarded the latter as not competent to act objectively because of the existence of Greece among its members. Thus, the Republic of Cyprus’ application for full membership in July 1990 brought all efforts for a negotiated settlement to the brink of total collapse.



The EU Factor

The most basic question that one can ask is: why did the Greek-Cypriot leadership seek membership of the EU? Although accession to the EU could provide Cyprus with significant economic and other benefits, the decision to apply for membership was purely political and was related to the resolution of the Cyprus problem.

Particularly, during the negotiations between the two communities in Cyprus two issues posed significant barriers for the Greek-Cypriot side to accept an overall settlement: that of ‘free movement’ and that of ‘free settlement’ within a prospective bi-communal and bi-zonal federation. To solve this problem, the Greek-Cypriot side thought that entry into the EU could directly settle the issue in favour of its position since both freedoms constitute the core of the EECs integration process. If Cyprus could become member of the EEC, the two issues could become irrelevant. On the other hand, the EEC could offer all the necessary security guarantees to the Turkish-Cypriots to join a unified Cypriot state. To this end, the Greek-Cypriot leadership sought to advertise to the Turkish-Cypriots the advantages and security guarantees stemming from EU membership. 25

Specifically, the Greek-Cypriot side has argued that the benefits to Cyprus as a whole from membership of the EU will be quite substantial, with the whole population of the island benefitting from political, economic, social, environmental and other advantages. This is because Cyprus is highly dependent on the EU and greatly affected by its decisions. One has to note, the Greek-Cypriot side has maintained, that 50% of the exports of the Government-controlled part of Cyprus and 64% of Turkish-Cypriot exports are to the EU, to realise how important the EU is for the island.

Yet, the Greek-Cypriot side has noted that a whole range of advantages are expected, covering most areas of business and life in general. The laws and standards will be upgraded and modernised. Social programmes will be brought into line with the high standards of the EU’s Social Charter, while there will also be a greater emphasis on improvement in the environment, safety standards and quality improvement. Overall, a significant improvement in the quality of life is anticipated, especially in the less developed parts of the island which will be eligible for massive EU assistance.

Economic advantages, according to the Greek-Cypriot side, would include first, access of Cypriot goods and services to a huge single market that is expected to lead to an increase of Cypriot exports to EU member states. Second, participation in the internal market will lead to a more efficient allocation of factors of production towards activities in which Cyprus possesses comparative advantages. This will have positive repercussions on growth and development. Third, share in the growth and development of the EU economy. Fourth, attraction of investment from the EU in activities in which Cyprus possesses comparative advantages, thus accelerating the transformation of Cyprus into a regional business centre. Fifth, participation in the European Monetary Union (EMU) would lead to lower inflation and lower interest rates, thus resulting in stronger confidence on the economic actors, increased investment and higher growth rate. Furthermore, participation in the EMU could boost Cypriot exports which will result from the abolition of both the exchange risk and the cost of converting the local currency to Euro in transactions with other members of the EMU. Sixth, widening of the choices of the consumer as far as goods and services are concerned. And seventh, increased financial assistance from the EU to Cyprus with most of the EU funding provided for agriculture and through structural funds.

Due to the nature of the Cyprus problem, the Greek-Cypriot side has highlighted the political advantages stemming from the entry of Cyprus into the EU. Those advantages include first, the improvement of relations between the Greek and Turkish communities by participating in the mechanisms developed by the EU. Cyprus would benefit from the experience gained in Europe after the WW II in building bridges between peoples and communities, as well as from participation in the European integration mechanisms.

Second, improved security for all population of Cyprus, which will derive from membership of a community of states that stresses its attachment to the principle of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law. The Union, according to the Greek-Cypriot argumentation, has the economic, political and eventually military power to act both as a deterrent to such violations and to force corrective action where violations occur.

Third, commitment to refer to the European Treaties and the body of the EU law in dealing with problems, thereby, having a reference point for the resolution of disputes and problems that goes beyond the narrow interests of political groups, communities and pressure groups.

Fourth, ability to participate as a voting member in the decision-making processes of the EU, so as to be able to influence decisions that affect Cyprus and the whole of Europe. The importance of Cyprus in the world, as the Greek-Cypriot side stresses, will be increased and the country will be able to influence EU policy and to co-operate with its EU partners in the implementation policy. Finally, all the citizens of Cyprus will be given the EU citizenship

[miltiades]

And your point Zan ?

[miltiades]

Are you perhaps suggesting that we should not take much notice of this : """ improved security for all population of Cyprus, which will derive from membership of a community of states that stresses its attachment to the principle of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law. The Union, according to the Greek-Cypriot argumentation, has the economic, political and eventually military power to act both as a deterrent to such violations and to force corrective action where violations occur. """

And perhaps opt for this :


The situation of honor killings in Turkey is hard to remove from a culture where it has been practiced since time immemorial. We reported in October of a survey conducted by a Turkish university in Diyabakir in the southeast of the country. Most of the 430 individuals polled were men. When asked what the appropriate punishment should be for a woman committing adultery, 37% of respondents answered that she should be killed. 25% thought that she deserved to be divorced, and 21% replied that her nose or ears should be amputated.

In December a delegation of Turkish MPs visited Diyabakir to investigate honour killings. They visited families where honor killings had taken place, and also visited prisons to talk to perpetrators of such acts. 60 people a year in Turkey are said to be killed in honor killings, but the true figure could be much higher. A March survey of Turkish national attitudes found the majority of the population were still in favour of "traditionalist" values.

[Kifeas]

Even though the above author might as well be of Greek origin, his analysis is flawed and biased on quite a number of areas and levels. There is hardly a single paragraph in which misrepresentation, omission of facts and bias against the GC side do not exist and which can be easily addressed and ruin most if not all of his conclusions. I do not find his analysis that sound, to be be taken too seriously! Give me any paragraph of what he said, and I will expose his bias and misrepresentation agenda in two minutes.

[zan]

Are you perhaps suggesting that we should not take much notice of this : """ improved security for all population of Cyprus, which will derive from membership of a community of states that stresses its attachment to the principle of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law. The Union, according to the Greek-Cypriot argumentation, has the economic, political and eventually military power to act both as a deterrent to such violations and to force corrective action where violations occur. """

And perhaps opt for this :


The situation of honor killings in Turkey is hard to remove from a culture where it has been practiced since time immemorial. We reported in October of a survey conducted by a Turkish university in Diyabakir in the southeast of the country. Most of the 430 individuals polled were men. When asked what the appropriate punishment should be for a woman committing adultery, 37% of respondents answered that she should be killed. 25% thought that she deserved to be divorced, and 21% replied that her nose or ears should be amputated.

In December a delegation of Turkish MPs visited Diyabakir to investigate honour killings. They visited families where honor killings had taken place, and also visited prisons to talk to perpetrators of such acts. 60 people a year in Turkey are said to be killed in honor killings, but the true figure could be much higher. A March survey of Turkish national attitudes found the majority of the population were still in favour of "traditionalist" values.

No mate...You got me all wrong and you missed out the rest of the article.........You should stop trying to sell me your crap stock and get some proper goods that do not entail you telling me horror stories and fairy tales to make me buy your crap...You have an informed customer now not the fools you are accustomed to selling to.....You can take your cheap knives from China and sell them to the tourists...Me no want to buy no matter how bad the ones from India are...I certainly do not want to buy your car bomb infested corrupt government thats for sure...Sell it to the Russians...Then they might forgive you for not being able to launder their mafia money any more...