Cyprus-Forum.com

[halil]

to get more information about 20/7 and 14/8 1974 read : 30 Hot Days.
http://www.cyprus-conflict.net/www.cypr ... 0Days.html


also you must read all the stories at :
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/p ... 13we45.htm

[observer]

I think that we can all agree that there was a coup on 15th July 1974. It was exclusively a Greek/GC affair to bring about enosis. I suspect the desire for enosis still existed among a larger proportion of the GCs than is now admitted, although many did not want enosis with the government that ruled Greece at the time.

TCs had been driven out of the government and its official forces long before 1974 so initial casualties were almost entirely Greeks and GCs. By 20th July the coupists were in control of all the major population centres and it can only be speculation as to what might have happened next had Turkey not intervened. With Sampson as president, TCs had every reason to suspect that their turn would come, and Turkey had every reason to fear that enosis would be declared. Sampson confirmed later that he would have done this.

In the 5 days leading to July 20th, the Turkish Prime Minister, Ecevit, had discussions with the British to persuade them to cooperate in a joint operation. The British would not help (N. Ireland was absorbing many British soldiers and there were fears for the safety of Britons on the Island). Greece, the other guarantor, was the main external force behind the coup, and already had too many soldiers on the Island according to treaty (and was sending more according to some sources).

Turkish troops landed on 20th July by parachute and landing craft. By 22nd July, when a ceasefire was declared, they had a beachhead in the Kyrenia area and a narrow corridor from their beachhead to the TC quarter of Nicosia. At the same time, the Greek officered National Guard and EOKA-B launched attacks on TC enclaves all over the island. The immediacy of the attacks on Turkish enclaves strongly suggests that the coupists felt themselves to be in control of the Island and had already sent soldiers and artillery pieces to start this work before the arrival of the Turkish Army. The international press (British, French, Italian, American) reported widely on these attacks. As an aside, the Turkish attempts to get the British involved and their willingness to halt with a narrow and precarious bridgehead and corridor to Nicosia should, at the very least, cast doubt on the GC claim that it was Turkey’s aim to divide the Island.

On July 23rd the government of Nicos Sampson fell and Clerides became RoC President in his place.

A meeting was called at Geneva between the three guarantor powers which declared on July 30th:
1. The areas in Cyprus that were controlled by opposition forces on July 30th, 1974, at 10 pm Geneva time, were not to be extended.
2. All armed forces, including irregular forces, were to desist from all offensive or hostile operations.
3. A security zone, closed to all armed forces except those of UNIFCYP, was to be established at the limit of the areas occupied by the Turkish armed forces.
4. All Greek and Greek Cypriot forces were to immediately withdraw from Turkish Cypriot enclaves which they had occupied.
5. All the Turkish Cypriot enclaves were to be protected by a security zone closed to all armed forces except those of UNIFCYP.
6. Military personnel and civilians detained as a result of recent hostilities were to be exchanged or released under the supervision of the International Red Cross within he shortest possible time.
7. Measures were to be elaborated within the framework of a just and lasting solution acceptable to all parties concerned and as peace, security and mutual confidence are established lead to a timely and phased reduction of the number of armed forces and amounts of armament, munitions and other war material stored on the island.
8. New talks, to begin on August 8th, were to be held to secure the restoration of peace in the area and the re-establishment of a constitutional government in Cyprus.
9. Representatives of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities were to be invited to participate in discussions relating to constitutional matters at the projected talks.
10. The three foreign ministers noted the existence in practice in the Republic of Cyprus of two autonomous administrations. That of the Greek Cypriot community and that of the Turkish Cypriot community, and the problems raised by their existence were to be considered at the projected talks.

At the second Geneva Conference which started on August 8th, Denktaş and Clerides had a series of informal meetings.

Denktaş issued the following report:

1. Mr Glafkos Klerides and Mr Rauf Denktaş, having met within the framework of the Geneva Declaration of 30th July from 10-12 August, agreed that a fundamental revision of the Constitutional structure of the Republic of Cyprus is necessary to ensure that the tragic events of the past should not repeat themselves, and in order to provide the minimum conditions in which the Greek and Turkish communities can permanently coexist together in the Republic in full confidence so that the security of each is safeguarded.
2. Bearing in mind the existence in practice in the Republic of Cyprus of two autonomous administrations, they agreed that this revision should result in the establishment of a federal system of government based on the following fundamental elements:
a. The Republic of Cyprus shall be an independent bi-national state.
b. The Republic shall consist of two federated states with full control and autonomy within their respective boundaries.
c. In determining the competence to be left to the federal government, the bi-national nature of the State shall be taken into account and the federal competence shall be exercised accordingly.
d. The area of the Turkish Cypriot Federated State shall cover 34% of the territory of the Republic falling north of a general line starting from the Limnitis-Lefka area in the west and running towards the east, passing through the Turkish controlled part of Nicosia, including the Turkish part of Famagusta and ending at the port of Famagusta.
3. Pending an agreement on the final Constitutional structure of the Republic, the two autonomous administrations shall take over the full administrative authority within their respective areas as defined above and shall take steps to normalize and stabilize life in the Republic and refrain from acts of violence, harassment and discrimination against each other.
4. Mr Klerides and Mr Denktaş further agreed:
a. At once to hold discussions between them in Nicosia, without the participation of the representatives of Greece and Turkey in order to elaborate as a matter of urgency the constitutional structures envisaged above, and,
b. To report to the Foreign Ministers of Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, at a further meeting to be held on 1st September 1974, on the conclusions reached.

Klerides issued the following report:

1. Mr Glafkos Klerides and Mr Rauf Denktaş, having conferred at Geneva between August 10 and 12, 1974, have concluded that a fundamental revision of the governmental system of the Republic of Cyprus is necessary to provide the conditions in which the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities will be able to coexist in peace in the Republic with an utter and mutual confidence that the security of all will be safeguarded. They have agreed that this revision will result in the establishment of a system based on the existence of two autonomous administrations within suitable boundaries, united under a central government. They have also agreed that these changes will be effected within the framework of a sovereign, independent and united Cyprus Republic.
2. Mr Klerides and Mr Denktaş have moreover agreed:
a. To hold discussions between them in Nicosia in order to elaborate, as a matter of immediate urgency, the constitutional structure envisaged in the above paragraph.
b. To report to the Foreign Ministers of Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, at a further meeting to be held on 1st September 1974, on the conclusions reached.

As an aside, this answers the often put GC question of why the Turkish Army didn’t just withdraw and allow the 1960 Constitution to be restored. It had arguably been defunct since 1963; it was undoubtedly a dead duck following 15 July 1974; and now both community leaders agreed that they didn’t want it back. The problem was to negotiate the details of what has become known as the BBF.

In the meantime, back in Cyprus, the situation was deteriorating. It is doubtful if the leaders ever had control over the armed bands that had built up during the 11 years of stand-off. GCs made little effort to withdraw from the enclaves save from those where Turkish troops were an immediate threat and many TC villages remained cut off with UNFICYP being unable to assist. Thousands of TCs still remained in captivity (ditto GCs). The Turkish army’s position was not deep enough to be considered defensible against determined attack.

Despite the promising start of the informal Klerides/ Denktaş meetings, when the Conference convened with the addition of the guaranteeing powers, the GC position hardened. Commentators have speculated that the UK backed Greece, and hence the GCs, in order to strengthen the newly restored democracy in Greece.

A commentator in The New York Times wrote:

In retrospect it seems that Turkey was determined from the beginning of these talks on August 8th to impose some kind of permanent political solution on the island with its hostile Greek and Turkish communities. It also seems clear that a new Greek civilian Government in Athens felt itself unable to accept a far-reaching solution now. It would have appeared to Greek public opinion as a capitulation, as yet another acknowledgement of military humiliation by the Turks, following on harsh cease-fire terms already accepted on July 30th.

It seemed to the TCs that the GCs were now backsliding with the encouragement of Greece. When the Greeks and GCs requested a 48-hour adjournment this was refused by the Turkish and TC representatives because it was feared that Greece would send Makarios back to the island and reinforce their troops there. Denktaş had also come to the conclusion that the GCs were hedging on the question of bizonality and talks collapsed. In a press conference reported in the Times (of London) on August 15th 1974 Denktaş said: “I think that Mr Clerides could have averted what happened by conceding one principal, namely that the Turks are entitled to full security and that this can only be provided by a geographical area”.

Following the break down of the Second Geneva Conference, the Turkish army resumed military actions to reinforce its own military weak position, relieve blockaded Turkish villages, and politically strengthen its bargaining position.

[denizaksulu]

I think that we can all agree that there was a coup on 15th July 1974. It was exclusively a Greek/GC affair to bring about enosis. I suspect the desire for enosis still existed among a larger proportion of the GCs than is now admitted, although many did not want enosis with the government that ruled Greece at the time.

TCs had been driven out of the government and its official forces long before 1974 so initial casualties were almost entirely Greeks and GCs. By 20th July the coupists were in control of all the major population centres and it can only be speculation as to what might have happened next had Turkey not intervened. With Sampson as president, TCs had every reason to suspect that their turn would come, and Turkey had every reason to fear that enosis would be declared. Sampson confirmed later that he would have done this.


As far as I remember, the above article does answer fully Umits question. However I am perplexed that some of our GC/G friends are insistent on believing that the coups aim was not indeed Enosis. That idea will take a lot of convincing. It was a badly made plan with a lot of underestimating by the coupists.

In the 5 days leading to July 20th, the Turkish Prime Minister, Ecevit, had discussions with the British to persuade them to cooperate in a joint operation. The British would not help (N. Ireland was absorbing many British soldiers and there were fears for the safety of Britons on the Island). Greece, the other guarantor, was the main external force behind the coup, and already had too many soldiers on the Island according to treaty (and was sending more according to some sources).

Turkish troops landed on 20th July by parachute and landing craft. By 22nd July, when a ceasefire was declared, they had a beachhead in the Kyrenia area and a narrow corridor from their beachhead to the TC quarter of Nicosia. At the same time, the Greek officered National Guard and EOKA-B launched attacks on TC enclaves all over the island. The immediacy of the attacks on Turkish enclaves strongly suggests that the coupists felt themselves to be in control of the Island and had already sent soldiers and artillery pieces to start this work before the arrival of the Turkish Army. The international press (British, French, Italian, American) reported widely on these attacks. As an aside, the Turkish attempts to get the British involved and their willingness to halt with a narrow and precarious bridgehead and corridor to Nicosia should, at the very least, cast doubt on the GC claim that it was Turkey’s aim to divide the Island.

On July 23rd the government of Nicos Sampson fell and Clerides became RoC President in his place.

A meeting was called at Geneva between the three guarantor powers which declared on July 30th:
1. The areas in Cyprus that were controlled by opposition forces on July 30th, 1974, at 10 pm Geneva time, were not to be extended.
2. All armed forces, including irregular forces, were to desist from all offensive or hostile operations.
3. A security zone, closed to all armed forces except those of UNIFCYP, was to be established at the limit of the areas occupied by the Turkish armed forces.
4. All Greek and Greek Cypriot forces were to immediately withdraw from Turkish Cypriot enclaves which they had occupied.
5. All the Turkish Cypriot enclaves were to be protected by a security zone closed to all armed forces except those of UNIFCYP.
6. Military personnel and civilians detained as a result of recent hostilities were to be exchanged or released under the supervision of the International Red Cross within he shortest possible time.
7. Measures were to be elaborated within the framework of a just and lasting solution acceptable to all parties concerned and as peace, security and mutual confidence are established lead to a timely and phased reduction of the number of armed forces and amounts of armament, munitions and other war material stored on the island.
8. New talks, to begin on August 8th, were to be held to secure the restoration of peace in the area and the re-establishment of a constitutional government in Cyprus.
9. Representatives of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities were to be invited to participate in discussions relating to constitutional matters at the projected talks.
10. The three foreign ministers noted the existence in practice in the Republic of Cyprus of two autonomous administrations. That of the Greek Cypriot community and that of the Turkish Cypriot community, and the problems raised by their existence were to be considered at the projected talks.

At the second Geneva Conference which started on August 8th, Denktaş and Clerides had a series of informal meetings.

Denktaş issued the following report:

1. Mr Glafkos Klerides and Mr Rauf Denktaş, having met within the framework of the Geneva Declaration of 30th July from 10-12 August, agreed that a fundamental revision of the Constitutional structure of the Republic of Cyprus is necessary to ensure that the tragic events of the past should not repeat themselves, and in order to provide the minimum conditions in which the Greek and Turkish communities can permanently coexist together in the Republic in full confidence so that the security of each is safeguarded.
2. Bearing in mind the existence in practice in the Republic of Cyprus of two autonomous administrations, they agreed that this revision should result in the establishment of a federal system of government based on the following fundamental elements:
a. The Republic of Cyprus shall be an independent bi-national state.
b. The Republic shall consist of two federated states with full control and autonomy within their respective boundaries.
c. In determining the competence to be left to the federal government, the bi-national nature of the State shall be taken into account and the federal competence shall be exercised accordingly.
d. The area of the Turkish Cypriot Federated State shall cover 34% of the territory of the Republic falling north of a general line starting from the Limnitis-Lefka area in the west and running towards the east, passing through the Turkish controlled part of Nicosia, including the Turkish part of Famagusta and ending at the port of Famagusta.
3. Pending an agreement on the final Constitutional structure of the Republic, the two autonomous administrations shall take over the full administrative authority within their respective areas as defined above and shall take steps to normalize and stabilize life in the Republic and refrain from acts of violence, harassment and discrimination against each other.
4. Mr Klerides and Mr Denktaş further agreed:
a. At once to hold discussions between them in Nicosia, without the participation of the representatives of Greece and Turkey in order to elaborate as a matter of urgency the constitutional structures envisaged above, and,
b. To report to the Foreign Ministers of Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, at a further meeting to be held on 1st September 1974, on the conclusions reached.

Klerides issued the following report:

1. Mr Glafkos Klerides and Mr Rauf Denktaş, having conferred at Geneva between August 10 and 12, 1974, have concluded that a fundamental revision of the governmental system of the Republic of Cyprus is necessary to provide the conditions in which the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities will be able to coexist in peace in the Republic with an utter and mutual confidence that the security of all will be safeguarded. They have agreed that this revision will result in the establishment of a system based on the existence of two autonomous administrations within suitable boundaries, united under a central government. They have also agreed that these changes will be effected within the framework of a sovereign, independent and united Cyprus Republic.
2. Mr Klerides and Mr Denktaş have moreover agreed:
a. To hold discussions between them in Nicosia in order to elaborate, as a matter of immediate urgency, the constitutional structure envisaged in the above paragraph.
b. To report to the Foreign Ministers of Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, at a further meeting to be held on 1st September 1974, on the conclusions reached.

As an aside, this answers the often put GC question of why the Turkish Army didn’t just withdraw and allow the 1960 Constitution to be restored. It had arguably been defunct since 1963; it was undoubtedly a dead duck following 15 July 1974; and now both community leaders agreed that they didn’t want it back. The problem was to negotiate the details of what has become known as the BBF.

In the meantime, back in Cyprus, the situation was deteriorating. It is doubtful if the leaders ever had control over the armed bands that had built up during the 11 years of stand-off. GCs made little effort to withdraw from the enclaves save from those where Turkish troops were an immediate threat and many TC villages remained cut off with UNFICYP being unable to assist. Thousands of TCs still remained in captivity (ditto GCs). The Turkish army’s position was not deep enough to be considered defensible against determined attack.

Despite the promising start of the informal Klerides/ Denktaş meetings, when the Conference convened with the addition of the guaranteeing powers, the GC position hardened. Commentators have speculated that the UK backed Greece, and hence the GCs, in order to strengthen the newly restored democracy in Greece.

A commentator in The New York Times wrote:

In retrospect it seems that Turkey was determined from the beginning of these talks on August 8th to impose some kind of permanent political solution on the island with its hostile Greek and Turkish communities. It also seems clear that a new Greek civilian Government in Athens felt itself unable to accept a far-reaching solution now. It would have appeared to Greek public opinion as a capitulation, as yet another acknowledgement of military humiliation by the Turks, following on harsh cease-fire terms already accepted on July 30th.

It seemed to the TCs that the GCs were now backsliding with the encouragement of Greece. When the Greeks and GCs requested a 48-hour adjournment this was refused by the Turkish and TC representatives because it was feared that Greece would send Makarios back to the island and reinforce their troops there. Denktaş had also come to the conclusion that the GCs were hedging on the question of bizonality and talks collapsed. In a press conference reported in the Times (of London) on August 15th 1974 Denktaş said: “I think that Mr Clerides could have averted what happened by conceding one principal, namely that the Turks are entitled to full security and that this can only be provided by a geographical area”.

Following the break down of the Second Geneva Conference, the Turkish army resumed military actions to reinforce its own military weak position, relieve blockaded Turkish villages, and politically strengthen its bargaining position.

[Nikitas]

Observer, if this:

"I think that we can all agree that there was a coup on 15th July 1974. It was exclusively a Greek/GC affair to bring about enosis. I suspect the desire for enosis still existed among a larger proportion of the GCs than is now admitted, although many did not want enosis with the government that ruled Greece at the time. "

Is your starting point then you are WRONG. The coup was NOT about Enosis, the majority of GCs did NOT want Enosis in 1974, the coup once established did NOT declare Enosis. This is a Turkish myth to justify the invasion, partition and practical annexation of northern Cyprus. It is a cheap excuse!

[Nikitas]

"Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities will be able to coexist in peace in the Republic "

In the Republic!!!! Now we are talking about virgin birth and the abolition of the Republic. Slowly but surely the Turkish policy is unfolding and there are people who still harp on about the invasion being for the safety of TCs and all such manner of bullshit!!!! The dissolution of the Republic had been the goal all along. Enosis was just an excuse!!!

[Nikitas]

Greek Forumer asks

"Do you you think Sampson had the forces to defeat Makarios if the Makarios forces had the support of the Republic of Turkey ? Why didn't Turkey help the Makarios forces defeat the coupists instead of killing 7000+ Greeks ?"

Your question is superfluous. You are dealing with one of the most cynical regimes on earth, the Turkish deep state. There was never any intention to return to the 1960 constitution, it was an opportunist attack to get what they wanted. Putting forth dialectic in this case is a waste of time. The events of 1974 and the developments in the Aegean since then, with daily violations of Greek air space, tell a story. Dealing with Turkey has nothing to do with the TCs. Turkey is a different thing altogether. They are using the TCs and if the TCs did not exist they would have invented some other excuse like the "grey areas" in the Aegean.

[halil]

Greek Forumer asks

"Do you you think Sampson had the forces to defeat Makarios if the Makarios forces had the support of the Republic of Turkey ? Why didn't Turkey help the Makarios forces defeat the coupists instead of killing 7000+ Greeks ?"

Your question is superfluous. You are dealing with one of the most cynical regimes on earth, the Turkish deep state. There was never any intention to return to the 1960 constitution, it was an opportunist attack to get what they wanted. Putting forth dialectic in this case is a waste of time. The events of 1974 and the developments in the Aegean since then, with daily violations of Greek air space, tell a story. Dealing with Turkey has nothing to do with the TCs. Turkey is a different thing altogether. They are using the TCs and if the TCs did not exist they would have invented some other excuse like the "grey areas" in the Aegean.

Nikitas,
we are not finding excuses . read above links again .......
we are all know that we are trying to establish new state or states .....
You asking us why we didn't help to stop the coup attemps or something else.... you all know the conditions of the TC's before 74 . TC's villages were enclaved by who ?
Who were serving at natinal guard ? why they were armed with Russion T34 tanks and heavy artilary guns ..... those guns are in display at the moment near the Kyreania . İf majority of the people didn't support the Enosis why they were carring those guns ? what for you were going to army before 74. Turkey wasn't occuping Cyprus that time .
By telling you this truth doesn!t mean that TC's doesn't want peace . pls stop saying that you were not supporting the Enosis at those times . İt wasn't majority of the popullation sayings are all well knowing tacticks ....
History is there and there is a plant documants for it . denying will not help. Read again Makarios letters.....

The National Guard, which is officered and controlled by Greek officers, was from the start the main supplier of both men and materials to "EOKA B", the members of which euphemistically called themselves "Enosists" and the "Enosist Array". ...... etc......etc........

[Kifeas]

Observer, if this:

"I think that we can all agree that there was a coup on 15th July 1974. It was exclusively a Greek/GC affair to bring about enosis. I suspect the desire for enosis still existed among a larger proportion of the GCs than is now admitted, although many did not want enosis with the government that ruled Greece at the time. "

Is your starting point then you are WRONG. The coup was NOT about Enosis, the majority of GCs did NOT want Enosis in 1974, the coup once established did NOT declare Enosis. This is a Turkish myth to justify the invasion, partition and practical annexation of northern Cyprus. It is a cheap excuse!

Nikitas, why do you feel you have to go all through that pain of trying to explain to every type of insincere pro-Turkish propagandist in this forum what exactly had happened back in 1974 or before that! Don't you realize that whatever you say, it is in vain, as these people do not really care or wish to know the truth, but only how to vindicate the Turkish invasion and occupation and justify why they should have the right to usurp from the GCs the entire northern part of our country! Why do you waste your time and energy with such people, whose main objective here is to reproduce the hilarious Turkish propaganda, rather than trying to understand the real facts and context of what has happened! My answer to all these people is very simple and straight forward. If Turkey had any, even the slightest faith that her actions were legal or legitimate in 1974, it would have accepted the RoC invitation to appear together in front of the ICJ in The Hague, in just one of the numerous occasions in which they were asked! Turkey simply refused and ignored all such calls. Instead, they are trying through the use of distorted and twisted facts and claims to manipulate international public opinion that all actions were reasonable and legitimate, paying millions of pounds, in fact about half a billion dollars every year, in that direction. Do I need to say more?

[halil]

Me too hoping one day ICJ will handle the events in Cyprus frm 1963 -1974 ..... that everything will be come out all the criminals will be charged and fined. Insallah......Insallah ..... Insallah

[Nikitas]

Kifeas,

Since 1974 as a nation we took the road of "peaceful resolution" and trying to solve our problem with dialogue and presentation of our case. I guess I got carried away by that national affliction and cannot resist the bait and put forth my angle. It often seems like playing poker with no money. But then, the alternative having been excluded, what else is there?