Cyprus-Forum.com

[purdey]

If the British had no use for British bases in Cyprus why are they there? No need for in depth discussion about the pro's and cons of why the British need them.
Simple answer,if they were of no use the British would leave...

[pantheman]

If the British had no use for British bases in Cyprus why are they there? No need for in depth discussion about the pro's and cons of why the British need them.
Simple answer,if they were of no use the British would leave...

Amen, and thats coming from a Brit. (no offence Purdey mate)

[CopperLine]

Nikitas,
Let me say that I invariably like your posts but I actually think that this last way of thinking is dangerous insofar as it gives heart (no doubt unintended) to the ultras.

"The geo-strategic significance of Cyprus for intel purposes is radically overstated" . Then why do the British go to such lengths to safegurad their bases in Cyprus? They even inserted a clause in the EU draft constitution to protect the status of their Cyprus bases. British experts have said that the intelligence gathered from the Dhekelia signals base is unique because that is the only plce they can pick up radio signals from central Asia and southern Russia.

What you write about Cyprus being a not so valuable miliary base is almost precisely what General George Grivas wrote in his memoires. Cyprus has no significant ports, etc. But the British disagreed with him too.

The US did not want Makarios because they assumed he would give the Russians access to Cyprus.

Turkey wants to control the island because it threatens its "soft underbelly" should it fall in enemy hands. So it went ahead and made 750 000 GCs its permanent enemies.

This base/strategic value thing is confusing.

Various points :

1. 'Soft underbelly' ? What 'soft underbelly' ? When was the last time Anatolia was invaded through the 'soft underbelly'' ? Never in modern times and neither, I believe, in Ottoman and pre-Ottoman times.
2. 'Soft underbelly ? For whom ? Which potential invader ? Cyprus ? Any credible argument about the military vulenrability of a 'soft underbelly' has got to have a credible source of threat. It is inconceivable that any party is going to invade Turkey from the south !!!
3. 'Soft underbelly' ? For what ? Who is going to land an army in southern Anatolia for goodness sake ?!? And where has this invasion fleet come from ? And how is this invasion fleet to be be supplied and supported ?
4. 'Soft underbelly' ? For what purpose ? Is there a single territorial or other political claim which contests southern Anatolia ? No, not one. There is absolutely no causus belli.

5. The issue was the market value of intelligence that could be gathered from Cyprus' purported strategic location. I would not argue that it has no value but I did argue that this intelligence value was overstated. Yes the British have retained bases but that was an effectively costless decision for the UK govt : UK govt knew that Cyprus was never going to allow the SBA issue to preclude its entry to the EU. That is, Cyprus was never going to say 'return the bases or else we don't join'. To that extent the geo-strategic significance of the SBA to the UK is not as high as it might first appear.

6. Loathe though I am to say this, Grivas might have been right in his assessment on this point. The original rationale for British geo-strategic interest in Cyprus rapidly diminished following the opening of the Suez Canal and, especially, after effective British control of Egypt. Both Rhodes and especially Crete were substantially more important to Britain than Cyprus ever was during times of war. The loss of the former two were the last British 'disasters' of the second world war, during which Cyprus figured neither prominently nor substantially as a naval base nor as an air base. As far as the twentieth century is concerned Cyprus is on the road to nowhere in geo-strategic terms. So, the actual historical record - notwithstanding the continuation of the SBA, is that the British did in fact concur with Grivas' assessment. What irony. (I agree that the bases thing is confusing, though. It is difficult to find reason for their continued presence).

7. Whatever the position with Makarios and the Russians I suspect the truth is that had he given the USSR meaningful access to Cyprus then (a) he would have been removed from power through a coup (!!!) and/or (b) a generalised superpower conflict would have been unleashed. USSR navies in the Med ? Never.

8. The thread arose from the question of demilitarisation and yet turned into an arms race. People post their ideas about how to buy more weapons, get better weapons, sell more intelligence, make Cyprus militarily more significant .... even increase the defence budget hundreds of times over to get some kind of parity with Turkey. (The irony again of ultras like GR wanting to mimic Turkey's militarism !). And all for what purpose ? To increase the security of Cyprus. And yet that knee-jerk reaction of saying that bigger military = greater security has been repeatedly shown to be wrong, misleading and ultimately destabilising and self-defeating.

Cyprus could advertise its difference, its distinctiveness, its novel approach to peace by not repeating the idiocies of twentieth century arms racing and demilitarise instead. Lead by example.

[Andros]

I also agree that the island must be demiliterised as part of any future unification agreement, not that I agree with it now of course. In my opinion, that also includes the complete remove of foreign troops and British Bases. If President Christofias and Turkish Cypriot leader Talat even remotely agree to any military on the island, then I would suggest them both no to waste the time of their respective citizens and choose a different approach entirely, as I will not spend the rest of my years travelling to a "Resolved" unified Cyprus with foreign troops stationed there.

I personally believe that President Christofias and Mr Talat have a mountain of persuading to do in front of, and against, Turkish and British personal interests.

[Nikitas]

Copperline,

The "soft underbelly" is not my invention, it was borrowed from Turkish general staff opinions I came across in the past. Having read "On the Psychology of Military Imcompetence" which you recommended I find the concept ridiculous, but that is how military men are trained to think.

In every post above I do stress that it is a hypothetical approach. What I am saying is that a determined and organized effort to deal with the situation militarily is possible if, and it is a big IF, there is a willingness to look at the situation in totally new ways and use new means. But then, if we did have the ability to change perspective so radically in military matters we would also have radically new ways to deal with other means to solve the impasse.

[CopperLine]

Nikitas
I'm so glad that you got chance to read Dixon - fascinating stuff.

Your second paragraph speaks a certain truth.