Cyprus-Forum.com

[halil]

Politics, Social Memory, and Identity in Greek Cyprus since 1974

This essay by Greek Cypriot sociologist Caesar V. Mavratsas engages many of the issues at the center of national identity. Mavratsas, a professor at the University of Cyprus, published an important book on Greek nationalism in the late 1990s.

http://www.cyprus-conflict.net/mavratsas.htm

Cheers.

[DT.]

Last night PIK 1 was showing a rally for Kasoulides, out of interstest I watched to see how many GC's were waving the flag of the RoC. The answer only ONE! There was at least 50 flags of Greece but only ONE flag of their own country. Just goes to show how much GREEK they are then CYPRIOT.

Party politics....DISY suppoerters always take greek flags ot rallies. AKEL supporters always take Cypriot flags to rallies.

Its idiotic. The Greek flag has now been banned from all official/govt buildings apart from schools. Te only 2 flags officially allowed to fly now are the Cypriot and the EU flag.

[halil]

below report might help for the discussing

Patterns of Cypriot Identity or Why Cypriotism doesn't exist
by Jan Asmussen (1)
Introduction
Cypriotism existed neither as a term nor as a concept of a shared identity before the tragic
events of 1974. Both communities defined themselves rather as Turks and Greeks
respectively. There has, however, been an element of commonness among especially left
wing organisations such as AKEL and PEO, but it is vital to emphasise that these
organisations referred to "the working classes" rather than to a "Cypriot nation" or culture as
patterns of a shared identity. Thus they automatically excluded members of other social
classes.
During the 1950's and early 1960's AKEL campaigns in ethnically mixed villages (i.e. Greek
Turkish) promoted "Greek Turkish friendship as implemented by Atatürk and Venizelos" (2).
Cypriot identity did not emerge as a fruit of the island's own philosophical gardens before the
two communities found themselves separated by a violent conflict which started in the late
1950's and resulted in the 1974 war. From the ruins of the Greek Cypriot dream of ENOSIS
new concepts emerged which were now emphasising the common elements of Greek and
Turkish Cypriot culture and history.(3)
Thus "Cypriotism" is not the result of a long process developed in centuries of identity
building, but rather a concept developed by intellectuals aimed to overcome a political and
social tragedy.
For almost 30 years the realities of the island have separated the communities even further.
New generations have grown up in ignorance of the true nature of their Greek Cypriot or
Turkish Cypriot neighbours. They don't speak the same language and had little chance to
interact. The intercommunal activities under the auspices of the UN, prepared by several
NGOs, were limited to a small portion of the Cypriot populace.
The 23rd of April 2003 has changed the fate of the island rapidly and hopefully irreversibly.
The opening of the borders for both Greek and Turkish Cypriots has made individual
interaction between Cypriots possible again. Thousands of Greek and Turkish Cypriots
already took this opportunity and surely more will take it in the near future.
The political implications of this development are not foreseeable, but the German
experience of 1989/90 showed us that such moves usually carry a dynamic which cannot be
controlled by self-interested political circles. It might rather result in a new movement by both
peoples in Cyprus, leading to a lasting settlement. Should such a settlement lead to a new
state in Cyprus (as envisaged in the Annan-Plan), the question of the common ground on
which this new state should be built must be raised again.
Having rejected the idea of an original common Cypriot social and historical identity we
should move on to ask for the patterns of identity the Cypriot communities might share or
which are at least similar.
Until the 1970's, Cyprus was mainly dominated by rural life. Consequently, an analysis of
historical and cultural similarities of Greek and Turkish Cypriots must concentrate on rural
rather than urban life.
Kyriacos Markides gave an excellent categorisation of Greek Cypriot identity which,
according to the authors own research, can be attributed to Turkish Cypriots alike: "The three
social categories with which a Greek [Cypriot] identifies himself most ready are family, the
community of origin and the nation. Family is by far the most important institution in their
lives." (4)
If we leave aside the categories family - though important, but not distinguishable between
Turks and Greeks unless it co-aligns with nation (see intermarriages below) - and nation, we
should regard the village as a special pattern of identity which might at a point of Cypriot
history have surpassed the principles of Greek and Turkish nationalism.
Once there were over 340 villages in Cyprus in which Greek and Turkish Cypriots lived,
worked, loved, struggled, discussed, drunk and celebrated together.(5)
Most people living in these villages developed specific indigenous identities. Following
Markides categorisation these identities could lead to the following statements of identity:
"I'm Yorgos of the Panteli family, I'm a Potamian (from the village Potamia in the Nicosia
district), I'm a Greek Cypriot, and I'm a Greek."
"I'm Ahmet of the Özgür family, I'm a Potamian, I'm a Turkish Cypriot, and I'm a Turk."
The definition of identity as - first the village, then the nation - prevailed in Cypriot mixed
villages at least until the late 1950's, in some cases even beyond the violent period of
1963/63-67.
Which were the common elements then upon which a village identity, shared by both
communities, could be build on?
Work
Daily work in rural Cyprus was mainly a matter of agriculture, traditionally conducted by
families. In times of harvest, neighbouring families united their efforts to bring in the crops.
Only few households in Cyprus possessed all utilities necessary for the daily life and
economy. This resulted in the dependence of most of the villagers on the cooperation of their
neighbours. This strengthened again the social control within the village.(6) Ethnic or national
affiliations played no role in the selection of partners during this business.(7)
An even more intensive form of cross-family and cross-ethnical support constituted the Cooperative
movement. In 1955 there existed 788 co-operative societies in Cyprus of which
620 were Greek and 168 were Turkish.(8) No separate co-operatives were formed in mixed
villages, but the Turkish rsp. Greek minorities simply joined the Greek rsp. Turkish majority's
co-operative society.(9)
The co-operative movement was split up into separate ethnic sectors according to the
provisions of the Cyprus constitution in 1959; a move which met little resistance in the two
communities.
Spare time
The limited spare time which villagers had to spend was filled with politics, sports and feasts
of various characters.
The largest part of the social activities were not concentrated in the Mosque or Church, but in
the most important social institute of the village - the coffeshop.
A British survey from the 1920's provides us with an accurate image of an average coffeshop
as it could be found in Cyprus until the 1970's and as it - in many cases - still can be
identified in villages:
"The café is the centre of village life. Vendors of fruit, wine, grain and fuel, hucksters with
donkey-carts containing cloth, the local Police Trooper and Forest Guard on their rounds call
there; the Tax Collector sits there at the receipt of custom; in the evenings there is talk of
prices, rain, crops, birth and death. It is the habit of the villager to visit the café in the evening
after his work. In some villages visits are paid in the morning before work. To the casual
observer there always appears to be a certain number of men in the café at any hour of the
day and charges have been made in the local newspapers to the effect that cafés are the
ruin of the Island and the cause of much waste of time which would otherwise be profitably
spent in agricultural work. But an enquiry from such a group of men will often prove that
some are labourers who have been unable to find work on that particular day and are waiting
there in case anybody requires a labourer. Others may be on their way to another village,
one or two may be sick, one may be selling firewood or eggs, another may have left his shop
or carpentering for a few minutes' rest. [...] except for an occasional fair or marriage feast the
café is his only opportunity for recreation and exchange of news regarding market rates, crop
prospects, and other items of local interest."(10)
Politics
Village politics were naturally conducted in the coffeshops as well. Peter Loizos identified
four factors central for the understanding of [political] village life in Cyprus: the credit system,
the office of the Mukhtar (village head), the role of education and the teacher and the
influence of party politics.(11)
For mixed villages only the first factor was shared by both communities. Greeks and Turks
could be in debt to the same moneylender, who often was both the biggest landowner and
Mukhtar at the same time. Apart from that, mixed villages had separate Mukhtars, village
councils, schools and of course school teachers.
The last element (education) constitutes the most separating factor in mixed villages, since it
was the most powerful vehicle for the introduction of nationalism.(12)
Soccer
During the 1920's, football became a integral part of the sporting life in Cypriot cities and
became increasingly popular in villages as well.(13) By the 1940's, most villages had their
own football club. Mixed villages generally possessed only one team in which both Greeks
and Turks participated and which - whenever successful - contributed to the villages
pride.(14)
Feasts
The Greek-Orthodox Christians had 23 different religious feasts. Apart from the general
Christian feasts, like Christmas and Easter, local "Holy figures" and the Saints of the village
churches were celebrated. The Muslims celebrated special feast during nine days every year
(Ramazan, Seker Bayrami, Kurban Bayrami, Mevlid und Namaz).
Religious feasts were far from being a separate ethnical affair. Turkish Cypriots joined the
celebrations conducted around Christmas and Easter while Greek Cypriots were invited to
have Bayram cakes by their Muslim neighbours.
It was quite common amongst the Cypriots and especially the villagers to venerate Muslim
and Christian shrines alike. This sort of practise continued in many villages, even during the
1950's, despite the fact that the newly appointed Archbishop had held a plebiscite for Enosis,
and that the EOKA struggle had started.(15)
An originally Christian feast, the Feast of Mother Mary (Panajiri), became so popular that it
actually merged into a non-religious village feast held all over Cyprus. Both communities
equally took part in it and the Turkish Cypriots even adopted it in solely Muslim villages under
the name "Panayir".
During these and other village feasts, which were conducted on the occasion of the harvest
and family events (especially marriages), the rich song and dance culture of Cyprus
flourished. Identical dances which carried both Greek and Turkish names were conducted.
For example the Karshilima/Karchilamas dances: the Birinci, Ikinci, Üçüncü, Dördüncü or
Brodos, Thefteras, Tritos, Deftertos (first, second, third, forth). In addition, versions of the
following dances were to be found in Cyprus: Sirto/Sirtos, Mandira/Mandra,
Arabiye/Arabiyes, Zeybek/Zeybekiko, Susta/Sustahs, Garrotsari/Karrotseris,
Çifteelli/Chiftellis and the butchers' dance Kasap oyunu/ Kasabiko.(16)
Limitations of interethnic relations
Interethnic life in Cyprus can be qualified as a symbiosis, born out of the necessity for cooperation
to survive. Through a period of more than 400 years, both communities developed
mutual respect, shared elements of culture and, especially in mixed villages, a certain level
of common local identities.
The existence of many folk tales and songs dealing with love affairs between Greek and
Turkish Cypriots and especially the Romeo and Julia-type tales about "O Christofis tzi
Emine" indicate that nature was having its course in Cyprus like elsewhere in the world.(17)
However, it rarely came to intermarriages which are naturally the prerequisite for either
assimilation of one ethnic group into the other or the emergence of new ethnic groups
combining elements of the original ones.(18) By 1946 the rate of intermarriages was far
below 0.2 % of the entire population. The multifaceted reasons for this is a combination of
religious incompatibility, different dowry schemes and moral value systems of ethnical selfpreservation.
These limitations made nation-building in a traditional sense impossible in
Cyprus.
Conclusions
There is a remarkable set of cultural similarities, common heritage and shared local identities
detectable in the history of both communities in Cyprus, many of which either vanished
during the last forty to thirty years or which remained but were overshadowed by the
repercussions of the unsolved Cyprus conflict.
To which extend can cultural similarities help to find a new understanding between Greek
and Turkish Cypriots? The answer might be: As little as the repetition of historical accusation
about 1963/64 and 1974 can do!
A sound knowledge of both history and culture are of course vital for reconciliation between
the two communities once a solution is found for the political problems of the island.
However, after such a reconciliation is reached, both Turkish and Greek Cypriots have to find
new ways of co-operation.
Young Cypriots are usually not able to communicate in more than one of the traditional
languages of Cyprus. Unlike their grandparents and parents, young Turkish Cypriots have
little knowledge of Greek, while the knowledge of Turkish never has been widespread among
Greek Cypriots in the first place.
The opening of the borders has provided both communities with the chance to get to know
each other (anew). For the young generation, the means of linguistic and cultural
communication are set by globalisation. Not old values of Cypriot culture, but world culture as
manifested in the English language and (mainly) western culture, make them realise today
that their perceptions of life are not far apart from each other.
Combining these features with the framework of the institutions and values of the European
Union might pave the way for a new Cyprus, which leaves the burdens of the past aside and
recalls patterns of a shared Cypriot identity as an incentive to create new ones in the future.

I did not even have to read the above to tell you that whom ever wrote that, is an IDIOT.

If you come from France, you are French,

If you come from Italy, you are Italian,

If you come from Germany, you are a German,

If you come from Cyprus, you are not Greek or a Turk, you are a Cypriot.

Now, put that in your pipe and smoke it.

Kikapu,
join this forum and talk with them.
http://dzforum.de/en/index.php

[Tim Drayton]

Last night PIK 1 was showing a rally for Kasoulides, out of interstest I watched to see how many GC's were waving the flag of the RoC. The answer only ONE! There was at least 50 flags of Greece but only ONE flag of their own country. Just goes to show how much GREEK they are then CYPRIOT.

OK, but be fair. I also saw footage on RIK of Chrisofias addressing the AKEL youth movement, and there was a sea of Cypriot flags in the audience and not one single Greek flag in sight.
Somebody in the GC neighbourhood where I live regularly flies the RoC flag from the roof of his house.

[halil]

another view.
"Cypriotism: Disrupted in History, Forgotten in Politics"
Arshi KHAN
The Cyprus question has not been answered so far in the manner in which both the
ethnic groups (operating as nationalities) could have expressed satisfaction over creating a
comman base for the singularity of the sovereignty. Ethnicisation of the politics of settlement
and negotiations has widened gap between the two ethnic groups who, despite sharing
many commonalties, have remained poje apart not only from the year 1974 but so an after
they began their experiment with the federal polity of shared rule and governance. The
historic sense which had prevailed over their agreements for working together in a
bi-cephalous federal polity was the most reasonable instrument of generating and
consolidating Cypriotism by mutual renunciation of enosis and taksim.
Cyprus continues to be the victim of historyand politics in which parties involved
pursued their respective ethnic narratives which really violated the basic principles on
which Cypriotism was to be constructed. This Cypriotism was the result of the historic
compromise reached under the Zurich and London Agreements. Thus this sentiment of
unity got disrupted in two phases. During 1960-1974, enosis became the dominant Greek
Cypriot idealagical orientation that fuelled inter-communal strife and exclusion of their
partners. The second phase includes Turkish interventian and declaration of the TRNC,
which symbolised taksim. Both of them enosis and taksim had been shelved by the
principles of Cypriotism. At the end, one can alsa mention the lack of genuine effort which
could have been made by the European Union and UN Security Council to have resolved
the Cyprus issue by ensuring all guarantees to Greek and Turkish Cypriots for security and
power sharing in the light of those basic structures which justified the claims of the two over
sovereignty, independence and governance.
To conclude, it would be important to find out the fact that determination of both
parti es to give primacy to their respective interests over the need of Cypriotism has stalled
all the constructive processes of reconciliation in the past. The destiny of Cypriotism has
never been rewarding in the sense that both parti es neither compromised with each other
in pre-1974 era nar they understood their respective demands Iater. Over three decades,
more particularlya fter 1974, new generationso n both sides have come up with their
different perspectiveas nd the task beforeC ypriotismh asb ecomet oo difficult. Moreover,
the new international order dominated by unipolarism and closer integration of European
countries again create positive and negatives situations for finding out space for Cypriotism.

[halil]

FORMS OF CYPRIOTISM IN THE TURKISH CYPRIOT COMMUNITY: OBSTACLES AND NECESSARY CONDITIONS (1)

Ahmet AN

I would like first to give you some examples and to explain what I mean with the word “Cypriotism”. It was at the beginning of the year 1927 when Ronald Storrs, the British colonial governor of Cyprus, wanted to use for the first time officially this term in the government offices instead of the term “native” which he thought could be degrading. He mentioned this decision in his report, dated 9 June 1932. Mr. Amery, the Minister of Colonies also wanted the subject of “Cypriot patriotism” to be taught at the Greek Cypriot schools in order to stop the dissemination of nationalism among the pupils. Mr. Amery also put the idea forward that the Cypriots should have a flag of their own and this new flag be introduced together with the liberal constitutional amendments in 1925. But the authorities at the Ministry of Colonies did not approve the idea of banning the use of the Greek flag in Cyprus.


The growing resentment of the Greek Cypriot masses against the British colonial regime which culminated in the formation of the Communist Party of Cyprus in 1926 also caused the reaction of the Greek Cypriot nationalists, who were alarmed by the policy of the Communist Party, which was against the policy of the nationalists. The British colonial administration was also alarmed that the communists could have wider support from the people and they could raise a struggle for the independence of the island. Although the Communist Party did not have a following among the Turkish Cypriot community, there were some contacts, for example the correspondence between the communist newspaper Neos Antropos and the Turkish Cypriot Birlik newspaper in 1925 or the organisation of the Turkish Cypriot workers in the common Labour Centre in Limassol in 1924.1 The colonialists were quick enough to turn their strategy of supporting Cypriotism into tolerating the nationalist propaganda, aimed at both communities.


The Turkish Cypriots had always been against the union of the island with Greece (ENOSIS) and since the beginning of the British administration in Cyprus, they raised their voice every year at the opening ceremony of the Legislative Council, where the Greek Cypriot representatives spoke about their demand for Enosis. But the nationalist attitude of the Greek Cypriot members of the parliament did not stop the Turkish Cypriot members from cooperating with their compatriots in economical matters. For example, Hafiz Ziyai Efendi and Dervish Pasha voted in June 1902 together with the Greek Cypriot members for the termination of the Tribute paid to the Ottoman Empire by the Cypriots, which should be paid only by the British. A government official went to the mosque and provoked the Turkish Cypriots to protest against this cooperation with the Greek Cypriots. Irfan Efendi and the deputy Mufti also spoke at the mosque and provoked the community against the Moslem members of the Legislative Council. The two Turkish Cypriot members of the Legislative Council were forced after this event to change their policy of cooperation with the Greek Cypriots at the parliament in order not to be accused of being pro Greek Cypriot. It is interesting to note that Irfan Efendi was appointed in February 1904 as the Turkish Cypriot delegate of Evkaf by the British colonial government.2


Sir Harry Luke wrote that when Britain declared the annexation of the island by the British Empire, it was his duty to bring the news to the Turkish Cypriot notables who were attending an engagement ceremony of Mehmet Munir’s daughter on 5 November 1914 at the house of Mufti Ziyai. They heard the news with “dignified resignation”.3


The Turkish Cypriot leaders visited the British High Commissioner and told him that they accepted the change of status of the island and that they would be loyal to the British administration. At the same time the chief kadi, Mufti, Irfan Bey and Sevket Bey sent a letter to the British authorities that they were against the demand of the Greek Cypriots for Enosis and instead of this, the island should permanently be a part of the British Empire. If enosis would be realized, it would be a disaster for the 60 thousand Muslims of Cyprus.4


As the Greek Cypriot nationalists raised their nationalist campaign for Enosis and disseminated the feelings of mainland Greek nationalism in Cyprus, a section of the Turkish Cypriot elite also started to import mainland Turkish nationalism into Cyprus. The deputy of the British High Commissioner in Cyprus, Mr. Stevenson, sent a secret report to Vicont Milner, dated 26 April 1919, that Young Turks were active in Cyprus and that Mehmet Esat, Dr. Huseyin Behic and Hasan Karabardak were the leaders of a party called “Union with Turkey”.5 They disseminated a rumour that the Greeks would attack the Turks during the Easter week, causing enmity between the Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots. The Turkish Cypriot members of the Parliament, Mr. Irfan and Mr. Hami were not involved in these activities. The main instigators of these events, those who provoked the Turkish Cypriots to make a rebellion, were arrested and imprisoned by the British.


According to the minutes of the Legislative Council, the Turkish Cypriot members of the parliament started to demand “the return of the island to the Ottoman Empire” more often during the period between March 1911 and June 1917.6


Because of the difficult years of the First World War, there was no publication of any Turkish Cypriot newspapers between 1915 and 1919, therefore two weekly newspapers, “Dogru Yol” (8 September 1919) and “Soz” (15 February 1921) started their publication in order to inform the Turkish Cypriots about the developments in the world, in Turkey and on the island. In 1922, there were twenty three newspapers published in Cyprus, six of them being in the Turkish language. The top-selling newspaper was the Greek Cypriot owned “Eleftheria” (1700-1800 copies) and the second in the row was the Turkish Cypriot owned “Soz” newspaper (1200 copies).7


Mrs. Beria Remzi Ozoran, the daughter of the owner of the newspaper “Soz”, gave the following information about the subjects dealt with in the Turkish Cypriot press of those years:


“In these newspapers and journals, there were articles dealing with what the Turkish Cypriots should do, in order to continue the existence of the Turkish presence on this green island and in order to live on these territories with dignity. Struggle against illeteracy, organisation of the Turkish Cypriot community, economic development, the establishment of a national bank were necessities. The majority of the intellectuals who were civil servants and the teachers were under difficult conditions, because of the high cost of living and the Turkish Cypriot farmers were in crisis because of their debts. The Turkish monuments in Cyprus should be preserved. The Turkish Cypriots should come together and form companies so that they could have a strong economy in order to survive under a foreign administration.


The Turkish Cypriot press followed the liberation struggle in Anatolia step by step and collected money for the victims of the disaster in Anatolia through solidarity campaigns. The Turkish Cypriot newspapers did not hesitate also to defend the rights of the Turkish Cypriots against the Greek Cypriots’ demands for Enosis.” 8


The publication of the “Soz” newspaper was followed in Ankara with great interest and it received many years financial support from the Turkish government. “Soz” was the main organ which helped the dissemination of the Kemalist ideas among the Turkish Cypriots. For the internal affairs, the editor and the owner of “Soz”, Mehmet Remzi, wrote on 7 March 1921 the following under the title “Our Parliament”:

[Get Real!]

Last night PIK 1 was showing a rally for Kasoulides, out of interstest I watched to see how many GC's were waving the flag of the RoC. The answer only ONE! There was at least 50 flags of Greece but only ONE flag of their own country. Just goes to show how much GREEK they are then CYPRIOT.

That's because Kashoulides is supported by the stupid far right DISY...

[halil]

(2)

Today our Parliament is going to be opened. It is the duty of the government to tell the Greek Cypriots that the Enosis issue which terrorized the people of the island is closed once and for all. This dangerous game is being played so many times that our security-loving people cannot bear it anymore. If this thorny issue which damaged the relations between the two communities of the island will be removed, the parliamentarians of both sides will have enough time to investigate the real needs of the country and they will negotiate the mutual draft laws in an atmosphere of trust... If the Christian members think that they have more rights than their compatriot Turkish Cypriots on this island, then they have to accept that the Turkish Cypriot members do not tolerate the discussion of Cyprus-Greek issue at the Legislative Assembly.”


We read in the “Alithia” newspaper of 30 April 1921 a letter of a Turkish Cypriot ex-member of the parliament. He supported the cooperation of the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot members and he pointed to the fact that it was only in the last ten to fifteen years that the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot members made it a habit to complain about each other in the Parliament. Whereas in the early days of the British Administration, they cooperated in local matters.9


We can find other articles published in the Greek Cypriot press. For example, Mr. Ioannis Clerides, was writing in “Eleftheria” of 2 April 1926 under the title “If the Turkish Cypriots would cooperate with the Greek Cypriots” the following:


“Our Muslim brothers have to understand that they have common interests with us and the progress and the prosperity of both the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots depend on the cooperation of the two communities.10


Similar views were expressed by Mr. Yorgo Hadjipavlou in an article published in the “Nea Laiki” newspaper of 23 September 1927: “We could go forward only if we cooperate with the Turkish Cypriots.” He wrote three months later again in the same newspaper on 23 December 1927 that there was no chance of cooperation in the Legislative Council, since the Turkish members were under the influence of the British colonial government through Evkaf. Therefore, the Greek Cypriots should support the populist Turkish Cypriots so that they can enter the parliament and get rid of the pro-Evkaf leaders. Only these progressive Turkish Cypriots could resist being the secret keys of the government. Mr. Hadjipavlou went further and recommended that leaflets in Turkish should be printed and the deficiency of the Turkish Cypriot members in defending the local interests should be exposed to the Turkish Cypriot community.11


It is important to note that since the beginning of the British administration in Cyprus, the number of the Turkish Cypriots together with British members of the Legislative Council were designed to be equal to the number of the Greek Cypriot members. The representation of the both communities was reflected in the parliament, not according to the ratio of the population. The Turkish Cypriot minority was seen politically as a guarantee against the Enosis demands of the Greek Cypriot majority. There were separate electoral lists and separate mainland-nationalist-oriented educational programmes for the Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots, which prevented the development of a common Cypriot policy against the British colonial administration.


This was already stressed by Dr. Eyyub, a Turkish Cypriot member of the parliament in his speech at the parliament’s opening ceremony on 11 November 1925. He said that the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots were not ready for full cooperation on political matters. So they had to put aside the political questions and cooperate in other issues which would bring prosperity to the whole island. We see that this was realized later through the common activities of the MPs in the struggle against trachoma, tuberculosis, venereal diseases, for the abolition of the tax of tithes, for a forest policy and for the financial support of the farmers.


We observe again during the elections of 1930 that Mr. Yorgo Hadjipavlou supported the election campaign of Nedjati Bey, who was the Kemalist candidate against Mr. Munir, the Turkish delegate of Evkaf. He was supported by Asaf Bey, the Turkish consul in Cyprus. While the populist Mr. Nedjati spoke at the Parliament that Cyprus was a part of Anatolia, the pro-British Dr. Eyyub, also an MP, criticized in his articles published in the pro-Evkaf “Hakikat” newspaper, that the nationalists wanted to copy everything done in Turkey, even if the two countries had different administrative and social structures.12


Mr. Nedjati was named by the British governor Ronald Storrs in his memoirs as “that little Turk, the 13th Greek Cypriot member of the Legislative Council”13 When Mr. Nedjati voted on 28 April 1931 together with the Greek Cypriot members against the draft Law of Customs Tariff and Revenue, the automatic support of the Turkish Cypriot members failed, since the other two Turkish Cypriot MPs were absent during the voting. This was the second case of cooperation between Greek and Turkish Cypriot MPs. A few years earlier Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot members voted together against the Draft Budget of 1927 in the Legislative Council.


When the British colonial government tried to impose the aborted draft law, this triggered the pro-Enosis nationalist demonstrations of October 1931 started by the Greek Cypriots. The British administration took this opportunity to abolish the Legislative Council and suspend the constitutional order. There followed a period of oppression until 1941.


During the oppressive period of the new British colonial governor Mr. Palmer, the Greek and Turkish nationalisms were put under pressure for a while. On the other hand the movement of the working people was getting strong after 1942. The British used both Greek and Turkish nationalism to check leftisideology. Nationalism was seen less harmful than a common front of the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot working class against British Administration.


In the 1930’s the nightmare of the British colonialists was that the concept of Cypriotism would be gaining ground leaving Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot nationalisms behind. Mr. Palmer, the British Governor, was of the opinion that after the idea of “Enosis” was forgotten, “Cypriot nationalism” would replace it. According to Mr. Palmer, the only way to stop or postpone this development was to establish a new administrational structure which would provoke inter-regional difference of identity. Governor Palmer, in a secret report sent to London on 23 October 1936, was saying the following:

[Eric dayi]

I did not even have to read the above to tell you that whom ever wrote that, is an IDIOT.

If you come from France, you are French,

If you come from Italy, you are Italian,

If you come from Germany, you are a German,

If you come from Cyprus, you are not Greek or a Turk, you are a Cypriot.

Now, put that in your pipe and smoke it.

Go to France and tell the French the Africans are French if you dare.

Go to Germany and tell the Germans the Turks and other foreigners are Germans if you think you are brave enough.

Go to Italy and do the same if you are stupid enough.

Come here to the UK and say that there are no Scottish, no Welsh and no Irish and see if you like the shite they'll force down your throat you dumb bastard.

You need to get off your knees and take a day or two off from your belly dancing for the GCs kick-a-poo, it's evident that your two cell brain is being liquefied by all that shaking around.

[halil]

(3)

“In order to have ease in the future on the island, we have to continue the administration on the basis of exceptis excipiendis (opening the way to exceptions), on the basis of districts. Thus the concept of Cypriot nationalism which will be emerging as a new concept after Enosis becomes an eroded value should be pushed away as much as possible and left in the dark. Now it is almost not living. Cypriots are either their district’s “nationalists”, or they are Greek or Turks.” 14


During the oppressive period which started with Governor Palmer, we observe the cooperation of the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots for the autonomy of the island, a common political aim. The Turkish Cypriot “Ses” newspaper in 1937 under the title “Political Association” reproduced a news item from the Greek Cypriot “Eleftheria” newspaper that a joint political association by the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots was established for the support of the autonomy of the island, with branches established in every town, besides Nicosia. The well-known Nicosia advocate Mr. Yiannis Clerides was the leader of this Political Association. Ex-member of the Legislative Council M.Hami, member of the Larnaca Town Council advocate Mr. Celal Shefik, member of the Limassol Town Council dentist Mr. Nazif were among the Turkish Cypriot notables who participated at the formation of this Association in their respective towns.15


The political cooperation of some Turkish Cypriots with their compatriots was attacked immediately in the Turkish Cypriot press. To this effect, an article under the title “Is the political and cultural unity of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots going to start instead of a Turkish-British cooperation?” was published in “Ses” newspaper of 25 June 1937 (No.99) where the participation of Mr. Mustafa Hami, one of the ex-Turkish Cypriot members of the Legislative Council which was closed, was being criticised and the following was written:


“If this situation continues, the government will soon see the unity of policy and culture of Turkish and Greek Cypriots rather than the traditional cooperation between the Turks and the British in Cyprus. Today’s policy is the shortest way for appreciation of this aim by the government. Otherwise Turkish Cypriots’ complaints should be heard and satisfied. It is certain that the central government will think likewise.”


This main article which was published in the “Ses” newspaper, one of the Turkish Cypriot press organs defending Turkish nationalism and Kemalism, gives us a good idea of the dominant Turkish Cypriot way of thinking.


As we have already pointed out in the previous chapter, right after these developments, Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots fought and served together during the Second World War on the side of the British on various fronts. At home they organised themselves in the same trade unions against difficult economic conditions. As also mentioned, Enosis policy of the Progressive Party of the Working people of Cyprus (AKEL), became an obstacle to Greek and Turkish Cypriots political cooperation.


British colonial administrations use of the Turkish Cypriot police and commandos against EOKA during 1955-9 created greater animosity between the communities and strengthened Turkish Cypriot leadership resolve for “Taksim” (partition).


The Turkish Cypriot underground organisation TMT forced the Turkish Cypriot trade unions not to cooperate with the Greek Cypriot trade unions, thus destroying the foundations of the common economical and political struggle. At the end of the day, neither the Greek Cypriots’ aim for enosis, nor the Turkish Cypriots’ aim for taksim was materialised, but rather a limited independence.


On the day of independence, 16 August 1960, we see the first issue of the Turkish Cypriot newspaper “Cumhuriyet” (Republic) which was published by the two Turkish Cypriot advocates, Ahmet Muzaffer Gurkan and Ayhan Hikmet. For the first time, the idea of Cypriotism was being propagated among the Turkish Cypriots, through an oppositional newspaper and later by the organisation of a political party. The “Cumhuriyet” writers were supporting the news that the independence of Cyprus meant, not to union the island with one nation or state, but to govern Cyprus by the Cypriots. Unfortunately these staunch supporters of the Republic of Cyprus were killed by the Turkish Cypriot underground organization TMT on 23 April 1962, on the pretext that “they served the interests of the Greek Cypriots”. They were warned before they were murdered that “if they did not believe in the existence of the national struggle of the Turkish Cypriots, they should be silenced.”


Dervish Ali Kavazoglou, who was a Turkish Cypriot member of Central Committee of the AKEL was also murdered together with his Greek Cypriot trade-unionist friend on 11 April 1965. He was against the partitionist policies of the Turkish Cypriot leadership and for the friendship and cooperation of the two communities in Cyprus.


Western powers objected to the emergence of an independent non-aligned Republic of Cyprus. The guarantors of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cyprus were members of NATO, i.e. Britain, Greece and Turkey and did not want to see a Cypriot state, free of their influences for reasons of their own.


The anti-Cypriotist feelings expressed in the Turkish Cypriot community were echoed at the highest levels in the Greek Cypriot community. Archbishop Makarios, the President of the Republic did not believe in the idea of creating a new Cypriot nation. He told to an Italian newspaper that the London Agreements created a new state, but not a new nation.16


In those times, contrary to the processes in Europe, many African and Asian states were formed before the consolidation of a nation. In the case of Cyprus, the partnership lasted only three years, because the Turkish Cypriot leadership withdrew from the state apparatus. The intercommunal clashes between the pro-enosis Greek Cypriots and the pro-partition Turkish Cypriots complicated the solution of the ethnic-national question in Cyprus.


The separatist policy of the Turkish Cypriot leadership since 1958 was one of the reasons that Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots could not have a common political aim during the period until 1974. In the summer of 1974, the coup d’Etat was staged in Cyprus by the Greek Junta of Athens against President Makarios and this was followed by the Turkish invasion and the occupation of the island’s 37% territory. The Greek Cypriots were forced to leave the occupied areas and the Turkish Cypriots living in south of the cease-fire line were transported to the northern part. The new state of affairs forced the Turkish Cypriots to have closer relationship with Turkey. The Turkish Cypriots, therefore, came under the direct influence of the mainland Turkish economy, politics and culture.


The “Soz” newspaper which started its publication in 1978 turned to be the main critic of the intervention of the Turkish politicians into the Turkish Cypriot internal affairs. The influx of mainland Turkish settlers in the occupied areas threatened the existence of the Turkish Cypriots. This led them to re-identify their communal characteristics as a Turkish Cypriot community. A series of panels on Turkish Cypriot identity, folkloric exhibitions and historical research were done in the 1980’s.17


The Turkish Cypriot intellectuals started to ask themselves the question “who are we?” as they looked into the history of their cultural heritage. As it is well-known, the cultural, the scientific and the literary heritage are the three important components of the national consciousness. The responsibility of the researchers, and of the intellectuals, for the development of a common Cypriot consciousness. The responsibility for the development of common Cypriot consciousness rests with researchers and other intellectuals. What is needed is more research on the common cultural heritage of the two communities and use these common elements for a common political aim. The cooperation between the two communities in the commercial, social life and in trade union movement in the past are good examples of their co-existence.


The state has a big role to play in the formation of the Cypriot consciousness. There has to be a clearly designed state policy for the support of a Cypriot identity. The organs of the mass media should also play a constructive role in this respect since they can easily reach almost all citizens.


We see that especially after 1974, two different identities emerged: One in the north of the divide, focusing on the separatist TRNC as an expression of a Turkish Cypriot’ nationalist identity, and another one in the south of the divide of the Cypriot state asserting its ownership of the Cypriot State and having a distinctively Greek Cypriot character. This is close to the prediction of the British Governor Palmer in 1937 who said: “The concept of Cypriot nationalism -which will be emerging as a new concept after Enosis becomes an eroded value- should be pushed away as much as possible and left in the dark. Now it is almost not living. Cypriots are either their district’s “nationalists”, or they are Greek or Turks.”


Even more recent attempts to foster a cohesive Cypriot identity have not been very successful. The activities of the New Cyprus Association which was formed in March 1975 are an example. The Association aimed to preserve the existence of the state of Cyprus and to avert the danger of partition by behaving first as Cypriots and then as a member of the respective community. Unfortunately in the past thirty years, this movement of intellectuals has been unable to turn itself into a political movement that could mobilise great masses of Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots under a common Cypriot identity.


Both the development and the expression of a common Cypriot national consciousness will require among other things the development of common political parties of Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots, seeking common political goals. The full equality of all the communities living on the island in the fields of politics, economy and culture could only be achieved through common political parties which will fight for a democratic federal state and against all kinds of separatism and discrimination. A correct policy for the solution of the problem of nationalities is crucial and this is the responsibility of the progressive political forces on both sides of the ethnic divide.


İt was long but it must be interesting for reading and getting oters ideas as well.