Cyprus-Forum.com

[denizaksulu]

Talking to a village neighbour today about our mutual memories of being bombed by Turks in 1974 .... she kept repeating "we did a lot wrong too!".

She is a big hearted lady ......

But we would not have been put in the situation of having to defend ourselves and hence commit some wrongs if the Ottomans / Turks / TCs had not invaded our island and imposed their will on us.

Two wrongs do not make a right ....

Your remarks are so childish.

Next you will blame Adam and Eve. Get real will you.

[halil]

Movement: the Refugee Exodus (1)

(a) The Greek-Cypriot Community

A comparison of the 1960 and 1970 census figures indicates that there were possibly 12 mixed villages which have been wholly or partially evacuated by Greek-Cypriots because of inter-communal fighting between 21 December 1963 and 10 August 1964. The total number of Greek-Cypriots involved was 750 according to the 1960 census; however, field investigation indicates that very little of this rural Greek-Cypriot exodus can be attributed to the conflict. Probably less than 200 Greek-Cypriots from six mixed villages became refugees because of fighting or tension after 21 December 1963. The apparent evacuation of the other locations was due either to peculiarities in the census formats or to a general trend of rural depopulation resulting from urbanization.[61]

Official government figures[62] indicate that in 1967 442 Greek-Cypriot owned houses were in Turkish-Cypriot hands, or were abandoned either because they had been damaged by fighting or because of their proximity to dangerous areas. These figures however do not indicate the number of these houses which had been leased to Turk-Cypriots when fighting began. These houses were distributed among six towns: 236 in Nicosia; 42 in Famagusta; 66 in Larnaca; 44 in Ktima; 12 in Polis; 42 in Lefka. During the street fighting which occurred in Nicosia, Larnaca and Ktima, it is probable that a few thousand Greek-Cypriots fled from their homes. However, the majority of these people were able to return in a matter of days. The total number of rural and urban Greek-Cypriots who could be classified as refugees at the end of 1970 was probably only a few hundred.

On 4 March 1964, Turk-Cypriots evicted all Armenians from the Turkish-Cypriot quarters of Nicosia. This expulsion followed on the discovery of apparent collusion between some Armenians and armed Greek-Cypriot irregulars. Two hundred and thirty one Armenian houses were taken over by Turk-Cypriots, and their residents were given only a few hours notice to leave.[63] This expulsion gave rise to intense enmity against Turk-Cypriots within the small Armenian community; however, the Armenians had cast their lot with the Greek-Cypriots.[64] In the light of this decision, and of the situation created by the conflict, the responsibility for the Armenian expulsion cannot be wholly attributed to Turk-Cypriot extremists.

(b) The Turkish-Cypriot Community

We have previously noted that the process of urbanization and the refugee movements during the EOKA campaign had contributed to a progressive separation of the Cypriot ethnic communities. This disengagement was accelerated by the violent inter-communal conflict between December 1963 and August 1964.

During this period, Turkish-Cypriots completely evacuated their quarters in 72 mixed villages and abandoned 24 Turkish-Cypriot villages. In addition, they partially evacuated 8 mixed villages. In every one of the six district towns a partial evacuation of the Turkish-Cypriot quarters had occurred. Turk-Cypriots had partially returned to 21 villages which they had evacuated during the EOKA campaign. All but three of these villages were evacuated for a second time after December 1963. The total number of Turkish-Cypriot refugees cannot be accurately assessed because of the confusion of the period. It is known that in 1970 about 20,000 Turkish-Cypriots were registered as refugees with Turkish-Cypriot welfare authorities. If we consider the number of refugees who have not registered for welfare benefits and those refugees who have subsequently returned to their homes, UNFICYP's estimate of 25,000, as the maximum number of Turk-Cypriot refugees during the period of December 1963 to August 1964, seems quite reasonable. About two-thirds of these initially left their homes and moved to other villages and towns. The remaining one-third moved to other quarters within the same village or town.

By 1970 about 1,300 Turkish-Cypriot refugees had returned to 19 mixed villages and 5 Turk-Cypriot villages. Thus by 1970, 57 formerly mixed villages were wholly Greek-Cypriot, and 19 Turk-Cypriot villages remained deserted (i.e. in relation to the 1960 census).[68] . . .

If we consider the refugee movement outside the district towns, we find that the exodus occurred in a number of waves. The initial movement occurred in 1963 when fighting first broke out in Nicosia and Larnaca. The majority of the refugee movements took place from the villages near these towns; 16 per cent of all villages evacuated between December 1963 and August 1964 were abandoned within a few days of 23 December 1963. The December refugee movement was halted by Greek-Cypriot blockades. However, after freedom of movement agreements were negotiated in January 1964, a second refugee movement took place. The evacuations of January were much more widespread than those of December and accounted for 51 per cent of all villages eventually deserted by August 1964. During the first half of February a third movement took place, primarily in Paphos District, which accounts for 18 per cent of all village evacuations. Three villages were evacuated during the second week in March, and two on 11 May. The last major refugee movement occurred in the Tylliria Region on 4 August as a result of the Greek-Cypriot offensive. . .

Turk-Cypriots generally left those mixed villages in which they were in a minority. In addition, they left 10 mixed villages in which they were the majority, according to the 1960 census. However, hundreds of Greek-Cypriot armed reinforcements moved into many mixed villages in which Turk-Cypriots were in the majority, and so, at the time of their exodus, the Turk-Cypriots were in fact in the minority. In any case, the majority-minority status is more accurately defined by taking a broader view than one confined to the ethnic composition of each village in isolation. Invariably a Turkish-Cypriot majority in a given mixed village gives way to a minority status if the regional situation is considered.

The official Greek-Cypriot position is that the major portion of the Turkish-Cypriot refugee movement was both initiated and directed by Turkish-Cypriot leaders in accordance with a contingency plan to facilitate partition. Turkish-Cypriot leaders, on the other hand, claim that they had not developed any such contingency plan for population consolidation, nor did they initiate the movements which did occur. These leaders claim that their community members moved because they were intimidated by Greek-Cypriots, and that Turk-Cypriots fled, without prior planning, to the nearest refuge.

The author's investigations reveal that the overwhelming majority of Turk-Cypriot refugees moved only after Turk-Cypriots had been killed, abducted or harrassed by Greek-Cypriots within their village, quarter, or in the local vicinity. Most refugees expected to return to their homes within a few months at the most, and it was this assumption of an early return that facilitated their departure in the first place. In some instances, the evacuation of certain villages was encouraged by the expectation of an imminent invasion by Turkey. There was an understandable desire to withdraw from Greek-Cypriot areas which might become bombing targets of the Turkish air force. It was only in a few instances, after January 1964, that the Turkish-Cypriot Leadership took the initiative in recommending that certain villages should be evacuated. However, it is known that such advice was not always followed. Normally the Leadership was approached by village elders only after the villagers had already decided to evacuate, and they sought the Leadership's assistance In the pro- vision of transport and refugee housing. Any official administrative organization to direct refugee movements, or to oversee their welfare, was not established until the bulk of the refugees had already moved on their own initiative.

Generally, Turk-Cypriot refugees moved en masse to the nearest Turk-Cypriot village or quarter that was guarded by Fighters. In most cases, refugees fled from their homes, leaving clothing, furniture and food behind. Most of the abandoned villages and quarters were ransacked and even burned by Greek-Cypriots. A subsequent re-distribution of refugees took place when individual families left their first hostels for more distant areas where they had relatives, or where they could be near their property, or where they heard there was better accommodation, employment and security. If a village was gradually evacuated, the refugees would initially disperse more widely than those villagers who had been forced out at short notice. Many refugees from all over the island eventually moved to the Turkish-Cypriot quarter of Nicosia because it was here they thought homes and jobs could most readily be found. The Nicosia enclave also offered the most security since it was here that the Turkish National Contingent was stationed and the Fighters were strongest. In review, the pattern of refugee movement was not one that seems to have been designed to facilitate partition.

Although it appears unlikely that there was any centralized co-ordination of the Turk-Cypriot refugee exodus, there is ample proof that Turk-Cypriot political and military leaders controlled the return of refugees to their former homes. It is known that in late 1964 some local Fighter commanders resorted to armed threats and even murder to prevent some refugees from moving into government controlled areas,[69] but it is not known to what extent such actions were directed or condoned by leaders in Nicosia. However, such coercion should be put in perspective. The government was prepared to encourage the return of Turk-Cypriot refugees provided that they accepted government authority and that they did not return to 'sensitive' areas. Such areas included locations adjacent to Turkish-Cypriot enclaves or National Guard positions, and also mixed villages in which returned Turk-Cypriots would outnumber Greek-Cypriots. In addition, known Fighter leaders were specifically prohibited from returning. The acceptance of such pre-conditions would have won for the government the victory that it had failed to achieve by its armed offensive. In addition, the hostility of many local Greek-Cypriots was such that Turk-Cypriots did not believe that the government could fulfill its guarantees that returning refugees would not be molested. In any case, by August 1964, the abandoned homes were looted and often burned-out ruins. Neither community had the resources to rebuild the houses, to purchase new farming equipment or to provide resettlement grants. The side that undertook such indemnities would also be tacitly admitting to a degree of responsibility in the creation of the refugee problem, and that neither community was prepared to do.

[halil]

(2)


3. Field: The Pattern of Geopolitical Control

As a result of the violent inter-communal conflict, new de facto geopolitical fields evolved within Cyprus. The breakdown of inter-communal government had altered political processes; the military confrontations and the movement of refugees had redefined the territory within which such processes could function.

The Cyprus Government had become a Greek-Cypriot administration, but it claimed to be no less of a state government Just because the Turk-Cypriots had 'withdrawn' from it. The government maintained that the Turkish-Cypriot Leadership's claims to control certain population centres and lands were illusory. Firstly, the government held that the Turkish-Cypriot Leadership did not exist as a legal entity. Secondly, the government alleged that the Turkish-Cypriot armed force was a 'paper tiger', and that the Cyprus Police, the National Guard and the Greek Army in Cyprus could over-run any Turkish-Cypriot area at the government's bidding. Therefore, the Turk-Cypriot Leadership's claim of de facto coercive control over certain areas was as weak as its legal standing.

However, such reasoning was fallacious because it avoided the obvious fact that strength of the Greek and Greek-Cypriot forces was overshadowed by the military might of Turkey and that precipitous action by the Cyprus Government would trigger a Turkish invasion. It was also a moot point as to the degree of control which the government could exert over the National Guard and the Greek Army in Cyprus. Following the battle at Kokkina in August 1964, the leaders of both Cypriot communities implicitly recognized that a balance of coercive force had, for the time being, stabilized a new de-facto geopolitical pattern on the Is land.[71]

The author's field research Indicates that of 233 Turkish-Cypriot centres, 98 stood abandoned by 10 August 1964. Of the 135 that were partially or fully occupied at that time, 20 were under government control and accounted for approximately 8,000 of the Turkish-Cypriot population. By 1971 about 2,000 refugees had returned from 22 additional centres under government control. Although a number of Turk-Cypriot centres were under government control, these villages and quarters were not integrated into the government's administrative structure. In the first place, Turkish-Cypriot mukhtars refused to take an oath of allegiance to the Republic. The government refused therefore to recognize that these mukhtars had any de jure authority. Secondly, since most of the Turk-Cypriots in these 20 villages refused to recognize the de jure existence of the Cyprus Government, the government dissociated itself from any responsibility towards their social welfare. Turkish-Cypriot villages under government control were, for the most part, left to their own devices. The government's only concern was that they remain quiet and that they pay all required taxes and fees owed to government bodies or to Greek-Cypriots. In mixed centres under government control, the representatives of the Turkish-Cypriot quarters were not allowed to sit on a village board or commission, or on a municipal council. At the same time, the Greek-Cypriot members who had gained complete charge of these authorities imposed taxes and fees on the Turk-Cypriot quarter for public utilities.

The Turk-Cypriot centres under government control in fact depended to a large extent on the limited facilities which the Turk-Cypriot Leadership could provide. Such dependence arose both because of the lack of government involvement and because Turk-Cypriots spurned government officials. For example, although Greek-Cypriot police regularly patrolled these centres, the villagers took their complaints to Turk-Cypriot police and to Turkish-Cypriot courts.

During the first months following 23 December 1963, the central administration of the Turkish-Cypriot community was almost completely disrupted. By the Spring of 1964, this administration had been reorganized. In the Turk-Cypriot quarter of Nicosia a 'General Committee' was formed, headed by Vice-President Kuchuk, and initially consisting of 13 members drawn from amongst the Turkish-Cypriot members of the Republic's Council of Ministers, House of Representatives and Judiciary, and from the Executive Committee of the Turkish-Cypriot Communal Chamber. The General Committee held its first meeting on 21 May 1964. In Nicosia, Famagusta, Larnaca, Limassol and Paphos, District Committees were established under the control of the General Committee. Village and municipal councils reported in turn to the District Committee. This system of government was essentially a matter of executive decree by Vice-President Kuchuk and by his District Officers.[72] However, the Communal Chamber continued to function and the area of its concern, as well as that of the Turk-Cypriot members of the House of Representatives, overlapped that assumed by the General and District Committees.

The structure of government in the Turkish-Cypriot community should not be equated solely with the various legislative and executive organizations outlined above. In many cases, the de facto leadership at the level of the village and quarter, of the district, and of the community as a whole, was assumed by the Fighters. Therefore, the community's government structure was in fact a civil-military synthesis.

The administrative boundaries used by the Turk-Cypriot civil and military authorities did not always coincide. Civil districts were based on those that had been in existence In December 1963, with some modifications. Nicosia District was subdivided into eastern and western halves; the western half was administered from Lefka and known as Lefka District, whilst the eastern area and Kyrenia District were amalgamated under a district officer in Nicosia. The Fighter's administrative boundaries were based primarily on tactical considerations, and therefore reflected the altered pattern of ethnic settlement much more closely than did those of the civil districts.

If the Turkish-Cypriot government of August 1964 is viewed as a civil-military synthesis, five administrative levels can be considered. The first level was the village or quarter of a mixed village. The most influential members of a 'typical' village or quarter would usually include the mukhtar, the rural con- stable, the policeman, the teacher and the Fighter commander. The acknowledged leader of the village would in most cases be either the mukhtar or the Fighter commander, but it was not unusual for one man to fill both appointments. Such factors as the local intensity of inter-communal hostility, spatial proximity and layout, population numbers, and patterns of communication and transportation were relevant In the administration of a number of villages as a 'group'.

The group was the second level of local government organization, and the group headquarters was usually established in the most important or most central village of the group. Police and Fighter officers at this headquarters normally carried out their group duties in addition to their responsibilities for their own village. A typical group headquarters was manned by a police sergeant and a Fighter Officer in charge of a company. However, in an area which included some clusters of villages, some isolated villages and a large town, a simple group organization was not feasible.

The third level was that of the 'sub-region', usually the lowest level to which Turkish Army officers were posted, and a sub-regional headquarters became, in subsequent years, the lowest administrative centre at which full-time Fighter units were stationed.[73] At village and group levels, the Fighters were to spend very little time in training or on sentry duty. They tended to become farmers who wore uniforms as durable work clothes rather than as uniforms per se. The Fighter strengths of the various sub-regions, in 1964, differed greatly, depending as they did not only upon population densities but also upon local tactical situations. In simple terms however, a sub-region's garrison was a battalion.

The Turkish-Cypriot quarters of the district towns were administered as municipalities. Municipal government was more formalized than that in the villages, primarily because a larger population facilitated a more extensive division of labour and there was a clearer separation of responsibilities between civic officials and Fighter leaders.

The actual composition of the sub-regions depended primarily on the demographic distribution and the variable pattern of inter-communal hostility throughout the island. In some areas, a municipality constituted a sub-region; in other areas, it was a combination of village groups, or a municipality together with a number of scattered outlying villages and quarters.

The fourth level was the 'region', which was composed of two or more sub-regions. There were seven de facto Turkish-Cypriot local government regions: Nicosia, Chatos, Famagusta, Larnaca, Limassol, Paphos and Lefka. To a very large extent, the region boundaries reflected the boundaries of the six civil administrative districts. The civil affairs of the regions were directed by District Officers, who dealt directly with the village mukhtars and town mayors, bypassing the sub-region and group administrative levels which were primarily military subdivisions. Major police stations were maintained at the regional headquarters level. The regional Fighter commanders were Turkish army colonels, and the strength of each of their commands normally equalled two or more battalions.

The fifth level of Turkish-Cypriot government, based in Nicosia town, was the policy-making coalition for the island-wide community. For civil affairs, authority resided ostensibly in the General Committee. Military affairs on the other hand, were under the supreme command of a Turkish army general with a nom de guerre of 'Bozkurt'. This commander was attached to the Turkish embassy, but the relationship between him and the ambassador was unclear; most certainly it could not be assumed that Bozkurt was subordinate to the ambassador. In matters where civil and military considerations overlapped, there was close liaison between the General Committee and senior Fighter officers. Questions which were not resolved at this level were subject to mediation, arbitration or direction by the Turkish embassy or even by the Turkish government. In such instances, weight was given to considerations of security.[74] . . .

It should be appreciated that there existed a continuum range of control among the various Turk-Cypriot villages and quarters. Many locations might have best been labelled 'contested' rather than being definitely allotted to either the Cyprus government or to the Turkish-Cypriot administration. Both organizations on occasion attempted to clarify such ambiguity by altering the local status quo in their favour. For example, Greek-Cypriot farmers, owning fields immediately adjacent to a Turk-Cypriot village, may have attempted to work those fields without obtaining the usual prior permission of the local Turkish-Cypriot officials; or a Greek-Cypriot police patrol, which had regularly passed through a Turkish-Cypriot village without stopping, may have stopped and attempted to arrest a villager.

Local 'understandings' often represented a compromise, by local officials of both Cypriot communities, between instructions from distant superiors and a desire to live and let live. A Greek-Cypriot police sergeant may have been instructed to ensure that the Turkish-Cypriot quarter of the mixed village where he was stationed was kept under government control. The mukhtar of the Turkish-Cypriot quarter may have been ordered by his superiors to prevent any attempts by the Cyprus Police to patrol the quarter. Both men, who could be old acquaintances, might on their own initiative, have come to an understanding whereby the sergeant would drive, unarmed and at specified times, along the main road of the Turkish quarter on his way to another Greek-Cypriot village. It could also have been arranged that the sergeant would hand any summonses to the Turk-Cypriot mukhtar at a coffee-shop frequented by men of both communities. The mukhtar in turn would hand the summonses on to the appropriate villager in the Turk-Cypriot quarter. By such agreements, both the sergeant and the mukhtar could equally report to their superiors that the Turkish-Cypriot quarter was under their control. Difficulties could arise, however, if these superiors accepted such reports at face value and proceeded to formulate policies or to make claims based on the assumption that their subordinates were in exclusive control of the local situation.

It should not be thought that the boundaries separating Greek-Cypriot and Turk-Cypriot controlled areas were always precisely demarcated. In certain instances the limits of control exercised by the Cyprus Government and by Turkish-Cypriot authorities were marked by two concentric rings of fortified posts separated by a contested area patrolled by UNFICYP. However, around many other Turkish-Cypriot controlled villages. Fighter sentries posted only a nominal guard at the village's entrance, and the control boundary more nearly resembled a frontier zone in the unguarded fields around the village. Beyond this frontier lay an ill-defined 'contested zone' whose irregular shape depended on local patterns of ethnic settlement, land ownership, communications, transportation and inter-communal hostility. The contested zone gave way in turn to government controlled territory.

In summation, the general trends of the December 1963 - August 1964 period are clear. . . . Decisions were made to implement the conflicting ideas of enosis and taksim by various coercive movements. This activity created a field of violent inter-communal conflict. Violence induced a refugee movement which altered existing demographic fields. The two new fields, of armed confrontation and ethnic segregation, interacted to form fields of communally controlled territory. Subsequently a Turkish-Cypriot civil and military administration was developed to govern and protect Turk-Cypriots and the land they held. The result was the de facto partition of the Republic of Cyprus.

http://www.cyprus-conflict.net/patrick% ... pt%202.htm

[miltiades]

Very interesting Halil , once again it proves that the Fanatics of both sides were responsible for the conflict . As this summay states , " ""Dcisions were made to implement the conflicting ideas of enosis and taksim by various coercive movements. This activity created a field of violent inter-communal conflict. Violence induced a refugee movement which altered existing demographic fields. The two new fields, of armed confrontation and .......

"""In summation, the general trends of the December 1963 - August 1964 period are clear. . . . Decisions were made to implement the conflicting ideas of enosis and taksim by various coercive movements. This activity created a field of violent inter-communal conflict. Violence induced a refugee movement which altered existing demographic fields. The two new fields, of armed confrontation and ethnic segregation, interacted to form fields of communally controlled territory. Subsequently a Turkish-Cypriot civil and military administration was developed to govern and protect Turk-Cypriots and the land they held. The result was the de facto partition of the Republic of Cyprus. """

Halil , this article further indicates that coercion was used by"military" leaders to influence the people to fall in line.
Furthermore , no mention of the constantly used by some " genocide" nonsense.

[halil]

Very interesting Halil , once again it proves that the Fanatics of both sides were responsible for the conflict . As this summay states , " ""Dcisions were made to implement the conflicting ideas of enosis and taksim by various coercive movements. This activity created a field of violent inter-communal conflict. Violence induced a refugee movement which altered existing demographic fields. The two new fields, of armed confrontation and .......

"""In summation, the general trends of the December 1963 - August 1964 period are clear. . . . Decisions were made to implement the conflicting ideas of enosis and taksim by various coercive movements. This activity created a field of violent inter-communal conflict. Violence induced a refugee movement which altered existing demographic fields. The two new fields, of armed confrontation and ethnic segregation, interacted to form fields of communally controlled territory. Subsequently a Turkish-Cypriot civil and military administration was developed to govern and protect Turk-Cypriots and the land they held. The result was the de facto partition of the Republic of Cyprus. """

Halil , this article further indicates that coercion was used by"military" leaders to influence the people to fall in line.
Furthermore , no mention of the constantly used by some " genocide" nonsense.

Miltiades,
i never used the word genocide at my writings.
both sides are using same word for each other .
i don't agree with some people that during 63-64 and up to 67 many Turkish Cypriots didn't left their homes or villages.
at Monday i will put here all the villages names , i am sure many of you should agree with me. Some of them were return back to their homes but not complete village people . You read above writing some of them was returned says.
Miltiades , take your time and read rest of it from above link. book is very interesting and looks biased to me.

[halil]

We may now examine in greater detail the specific effects of the Makarios government's sanctions policy on the Turkish-Cypriot community.

(a) Agriculture

The hardest hit sector of the Turkish-Cypriot economy was agriculture.[18] Because Turk-Cypriot villages had been abandoned, and because some land was near National Guard positions or in insecure areas, much of the Turk-Cypriot grain, citrus and grape crop was not harvested in 1964. As a result of inter-communal tension, Turkish-Cypriots were unable to sell the grain and grapes which they did harvest through government marketing organizations. Many Turkish-Cypriot farmers had the choice of either selling the produce to Greek-Cypriot agents at cut-rate prices or not being able to sell their crops at all. However, by 1965 Turkish-Cypriot crops were being sold through government marketing boards, providing that the Turk-Cypriot farmers had arranged to pay off any debts owed to the government. Thus, the Grain Commission agreed to purchase the Turk-Cypriot grain crop, less 20 per cent to amortise outstanding debts which arose because the Commission had advanced the Turk-Cypriot Co-operative Bank funds in 1963 against the 1964 harvest, which had not been subsequently delivered to the Commission.

In 1966, UNFICYP estimated that about one-half of the farmland abandoned by Turk-Cypriots was being leased to Greek-Cypriots.[19] The government had responded to United Nations pressure and made it a punishable offence for Greek-Cypriots to use Turk-Cypriot land without the authority of the absentee Turk-Cypriot owner. In practice, Turk-Cypriots were often forced to lease their abandoned land at uneconomic rents. Any complaints by the Turk-Cypriot owner would result either in his land being damaged or in his receiving no return at all for his land. Turk-Cypriots by comparison had taken over only a very small amount of Greek-Cypriot farmland.[20] Most of this land was within the enclave north of Nicosia, and was being worked by refugees whose own land was being farmed by Greek-Cypriots. The Turk-Cypriot Leadership offered to pay the government a rental fee for this land but it was rejected as inadequate. In 1966 the government tried to finance a compensation fund for Greek- Cypriots whose land was under Turk-Cypriot control by imposing a deduction of 30 per cent on all Turkish-Cypriot grain, grown in the enclave north of Nicosia, which was sold through the Grain Commission. This deduction was in addition to the 20 per cent deduction already imposed to amortise other debts. No grain from this enclave was delivered to the Commission in 1966 and the 30 per cent penalty was subsequently removed.

[denizaksulu]

We may now examine in greater detail the specific effects of the Makarios government's sanctions policy on the Turkish-Cypriot community.

(a) Agriculture

The hardest hit sector of the Turkish-Cypriot economy was agriculture.[18] Because Turk-Cypriot villages had been abandoned, and because some land was near National Guard positions or in insecure areas, much of the Turk-Cypriot grain, citrus and grape crop was not harvested in 1964. As a result of inter-communal tension, Turkish-Cypriots were unable to sell the grain and grapes which they did harvest through government marketing organizations. Many Turkish-Cypriot farmers had the choice of either selling the produce to Greek-Cypriot agents at cut-rate prices or not being able to sell their crops at all. However, by 1965 Turkish-Cypriot crops were being sold through government marketing boards, providing that the Turk-Cypriot farmers had arranged to pay off any debts owed to the government. Thus, the Grain Commission agreed to purchase the Turk-Cypriot grain crop, less 20 per cent to amortise outstanding debts which arose because the Commission had advanced the Turk-Cypriot Co-operative Bank funds in 1963 against the 1964 harvest, which had not been subsequently delivered to the Commission.

In 1966, UNFICYP estimated that about one-half of the farmland abandoned by Turk-Cypriots was being leased to Greek-Cypriots.[19] The government had responded to United Nations pressure and made it a punishable offence for Greek-Cypriots to use Turk-Cypriot land without the authority of the absentee Turk-Cypriot owner. In practice, Turk-Cypriots were often forced to lease their abandoned land at uneconomic rents. Any complaints by the Turk-Cypriot owner would result either in his land being damaged or in his receiving no return at all for his land. Turk-Cypriots by comparison had taken over only a very small amount of Greek-Cypriot farmland.[20] Most of this land was within the enclave north of Nicosia, and was being worked by refugees whose own land was being farmed by Greek-Cypriots. The Turk-Cypriot Leadership offered to pay the government a rental fee for this land but it was rejected as inadequate. In 1966 the government tried to finance a compensation fund for Greek- Cypriots whose land was under Turk-Cypriot control by imposing a deduction of 30 per cent on all Turkish-Cypriot grain, grown in the enclave north of Nicosia, which was sold through the Grain Commission. This deduction was in addition to the 20 per cent deduction already imposed to amortise other debts. No grain from this enclave was delivered to the Commission in 1966 and the 30 per cent penalty was subsequently removed.

Thanks Halil. Most of these events have almost been forgotten with the passage of time. Nice to be reminded and keep them coming.

[halil]

We may now examine in greater detail the specific effects of the Makarios government's sanctions policy on the Turkish-Cypriot community.

(a) Agriculture

The hardest hit sector of the Turkish-Cypriot economy was agriculture.[18] Because Turk-Cypriot villages had been abandoned, and because some land was near National Guard positions or in insecure areas, much of the Turk-Cypriot grain, citrus and grape crop was not harvested in 1964. As a result of inter-communal tension, Turkish-Cypriots were unable to sell the grain and grapes which they did harvest through government marketing organizations. Many Turkish-Cypriot farmers had the choice of either selling the produce to Greek-Cypriot agents at cut-rate prices or not being able to sell their crops at all. However, by 1965 Turkish-Cypriot crops were being sold through government marketing boards, providing that the Turk-Cypriot farmers had arranged to pay off any debts owed to the government. Thus, the Grain Commission agreed to purchase the Turk-Cypriot grain crop, less 20 per cent to amortise outstanding debts which arose because the Commission had advanced the Turk-Cypriot Co-operative Bank funds in 1963 against the 1964 harvest, which had not been subsequently delivered to the Commission.

In 1966, UNFICYP estimated that about one-half of the farmland abandoned by Turk-Cypriots was being leased to Greek-Cypriots.[19] The government had responded to United Nations pressure and made it a punishable offence for Greek-Cypriots to use Turk-Cypriot land without the authority of the absentee Turk-Cypriot owner. In practice, Turk-Cypriots were often forced to lease their abandoned land at uneconomic rents. Any complaints by the Turk-Cypriot owner would result either in his land being damaged or in his receiving no return at all for his land. Turk-Cypriots by comparison had taken over only a very small amount of Greek-Cypriot farmland.[20] Most of this land was within the enclave north of Nicosia, and was being worked by refugees whose own land was being farmed by Greek-Cypriots. The Turk-Cypriot Leadership offered to pay the government a rental fee for this land but it was rejected as inadequate. In 1966 the government tried to finance a compensation fund for Greek- Cypriots whose land was under Turk-Cypriot control by imposing a deduction of 30 per cent on all Turkish-Cypriot grain, grown in the enclave north of Nicosia, which was sold through the Grain Commission. This deduction was in addition to the 20 per cent deduction already imposed to amortise other debts. No grain from this enclave was delivered to the Commission in 1966 and the 30 per cent penalty was subsequently removed.

Thanks Halil. Most of these events have almost been forgotten with the passage of time. Nice to be reminded and keep them coming.

Deniz,
I am not happy with talking about past . They put my name to prove it .
I will try . when you are reading them you will all remember .Your yeğen also will remember. He should not spend his time with Sabahattin İsmail.

(b) Public Utilities

The government's economic sanctions were only partially extended to public utilities.[21] By and large, the government refused to repair Turkish-Cypriot telephones which had been dis- connected in December 1963. Electricity and water supplies were not stopped, primarily because there was no way of disrupting these services to the Turkish-Cypriot quarters or villages without simultaneously cutting them off for a substantial portion of Greek-Cypriots as well. In some cases, however, local irregulars of both communities destroyed village water pumps and erected weirs which deprived downstream villages of sufficient irrigation water. However, in the arid landscape of Cyprus, such actions were motivated as much by a parochial concern to save ones own crops as by any inter-communal hostility.

The collection of debts for wafer and electricity from Turkish-Cypriots became a problem. Methods of payment varied throughout the island. In certain areas, Turk-Cypriots refused to pay the government for these services. In such cases the government could only collect public utilities= back debts if Turk-Cypriots were compelled to approach the government on some other matter such as the licensing of an automobile. The licence would not be issued until the utilities bill had been settled. In Larnaca, the water system had been owned by the Turkish-Cypriot community before December 1963. From that time, the government had taken control of this system but in compensation did not bill the Turkish-Cypriot quarters of Larnaca for electricity. In the Nicosia enclave, the Turkish-Cypriot administration charged the community for water and electricity, and deposited the funds in a >frozen account=. The eventual disposition of these funds was to be negotiated during any future political settlement.

Postal facilities for the Turkish-Cypriot community were disrupted; this situation arose in part because government officials were barred from entering Turkish-Cypriot controlled areas. At the same time, the government clearly did not want the postal service to be used as a means for organizing anti-government activities within the Turkish-Cypriot community.

On 15 October 1966, after prolonged negotiations sponsored by UNFICYP, the government appointed two postal agents in the Turkish-Cypriot quarter of Nicosia and one in Lefka, and the .Turkish-Cypriot administration established its own system of mail collection and distribution. In the towns and mixed villages where government postal facilities were open to Turk-Cypriots, local Turk-Cypriot leaders often barred their community members from using them since they believed that such use would constitute a recognition of government authority and would encourage fraternization. Turk-Cypriots also alleged that their mail was subjected to censorship of government postal inspectors.

[miltiades]

Very interesting Halil , once again it proves that the Fanatics of both sides were responsible for the conflict . As this summay states , " ""Dcisions were made to implement the conflicting ideas of enosis and taksim by various coercive movements. This activity created a field of violent inter-communal conflict. Violence induced a refugee movement which altered existing demographic fields. The two new fields, of armed confrontation and .......

"""In summation, the general trends of the December 1963 - August 1964 period are clear. . . . Decisions were made to implement the conflicting ideas of enosis and taksim by various coercive movements. This activity created a field of violent inter-communal conflict. Violence induced a refugee movement which altered existing demographic fields. The two new fields, of armed confrontation and ethnic segregation, interacted to form fields of communally controlled territory. Subsequently a Turkish-Cypriot civil and military administration was developed to govern and protect Turk-Cypriots and the land they held. The result was the de facto partition of the Republic of Cyprus. """

Halil , this article further indicates that coercion was used by"military" leaders to influence the people to fall in line.
Furthermore , no mention of the constantly used by some " genocide" nonsense.

Miltiades,
i never used the word genocide at my writings.
both sides are using same word for each other .
i don't agree with some people that during 63-64 and up to 67 many Turkish Cypriots didn't left their homes or villages.
at Monday i will put here all the villages names , i am sure many of you should agree with me. Some of them were return back to their homes but not complete village people . You read above writing some of them was returned says.
Miltiades , take your time and read rest of it from above link. book is very interesting and looks biased to me.

Halil , you have never used the word genocide , I know this.
What many on this forum are constantly doing is apportioning blame for events on to one side or the other. I , as a committed Cypriot whose ONLY allegiance is to Cyprus and all Cypriots , believe that it is time now to forget and forgive and move on towards making Cyprus a united nation with NO Majorities or Minorities.This can only be achieved if both sides severed , or at least demoted relations , connections with the powers that are mainly responsible with our predicament.

[denizaksulu]

Very interesting Halil , once again it proves that the Fanatics of both sides were responsible for the conflict . As this summay states , " ""Dcisions were made to implement the conflicting ideas of enosis and taksim by various coercive movements. This activity created a field of violent inter-communal conflict. Violence induced a refugee movement which altered existing demographic fields. The two new fields, of armed confrontation and .......

"""In summation, the general trends of the December 1963 - August 1964 period are clear. . . . Decisions were made to implement the conflicting ideas of enosis and taksim by various coercive movements. This activity created a field of violent inter-communal conflict. Violence induced a refugee movement which altered existing demographic fields. The two new fields, of armed confrontation and ethnic segregation, interacted to form fields of communally controlled territory. Subsequently a Turkish-Cypriot civil and military administration was developed to govern and protect Turk-Cypriots and the land they held. The result was the de facto partition of the Republic of Cyprus. """

Halil , this article further indicates that coercion was used by"military" leaders to influence the people to fall in line.
Furthermore , no mention of the constantly used by some " genocide" nonsense.

Miltiades,
i never used the word genocide at my writings.
both sides are using same word for each other .
i don't agree with some people that during 63-64 and up to 67 many Turkish Cypriots didn't left their homes or villages.
at Monday i will put here all the villages names , i am sure many of you should agree with me. Some of them were return back to their homes but not complete village people . You read above writing some of them was returned says.
Miltiades , take your time and read rest of it from above link. book is very interesting and looks biased to me.

Halil , you have never used the word genocide , I know this.
What many on this forum are constantly doing is apportioning blame for events on to one side or the other. I , as a committed Cypriot whose ONLY allegiance is to Cyprus and all Cypriots , believe that it is time now to forget and forgive and move on towards making Cyprus a united nation with NO Majorities or Minorities.This can only be achieved if both sides severed , or at least demoted relations , connections with the powers that are mainly responsible with our predicament.

Thanks Milti. As long as you stick to the Cyprob, we will get on fine as neighbours.

I hate the misuse of the word'genocide' too.