pantelis wrote:Sevgul always speaks like a true Cypriot. All crimes should be investigated and ALL perpetrators should be brought to justice.
Insan you said,Today, we all know that the aim of Makarios wasn't amending the constitution in order to make it fairer and more democratic. His aim was preparing the ground for Enosis and degrading TCs into a minority status. We all know that the aim of coupists was elliminate all obstacles in front of Enosis and annex Cyprus to Greece.
Can you explain why the ”coupists” wanted Makarios out of the way? Did they?
I told you a hundred times but you are still asking, Pantelis. You should spare more time for research about the facts of Cyprus.
Makarios was in team Enosis until 1967. In 1967, he was obliged to change his mind because the circumstances had changed:
1- Junta came to power in Greece and started an intense, public Enosis campaign both in Greece and Cyprus.
2- These developments alarmed Turkey and the Turkish cabinet gathered to discuss the intervention.
3- US interfered and dissuaded Turkey to intervene.
4- Until 1967 Makarios insisting on not to negotiate TC leadership if they didn't accept the minority status. In 1967 he was obliged to change his stance and accepted to negotiate with TC leadership without any pre-conditions. However he kept insisting on "majority rule".
Clerides comments on the intercommunal talks
In the year 1972, despite the internal situation amongst the Greek Cypriot community, I reached agreement with Mr. Denktash on all constitutional issues; except on the issue regarding the central local government authority.
On that issue the Turkish side abandoned its demand for the grouping of Turkish villages together in order to form areas of Turkish local government. It accepted that the House of Representatives would legislate, by simple majority, the laws relating to local government and that the two Communal Chambers would issue regulations, within the Laws enacted by the House, to be applied by the respective Greek and Turkish local government authorities. The Communal Chambers would also act as co-ordinators of the respective local government authorities. Administrative supervision would be exercised by a government civil servant. Further, agreement had already been reached on the power and functions of local government authorities. . .
Looking back at that formula I cannot but state that a cardinal error was committed by Makarios . . . , [who] considered [the formula] to be a form of concealed federation. . . . In local government autonomy, the element of two separate and geographical cohesive areas did not exist. The Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots would have remained in their villages and towns and would have enjoyed local government autonomy under their respective communities. Furthermore the scope of local government agreed to was much more limited than that of the powers and functions of a federal province, canton or state. Makarios in rejecting the September 1972 formula on local government failed to evaluate correctly the internal situation in Cyprus, i.e. the growing danger of a coup by the Greek military forces in Cyprus acting on orders from the Greek Junta, the reaction of Turkey to such a development, and the warning given by the United States. C
The internal situation amongst the Greek Cypriot community was such, the risk of a military coup by the Greek forces in Cyprus so great, and the danger of a Turkish invasion so real, that the formula of September 1972 on local government should have been accepted. Had it been accepted, an agreement would have been reached on the solution of the Cyprus problem, which would have left Cyprus with a much improved constitution. Turkey would have been thus deprived of any reason, and of any excuse to invade Cyprus. The Greek junta would have been prevented by the U.S. Government from attempting a military coup, and Cyprus would have been spared the Turkish invasion and its destructive effects
http://www.cyprus-conflict.net/clerides ... pt%204.htm
Clerides is one of the most fiery pro-US politicians of Cyprus. He should know the other side of the medallion better than any of us.
The Two Sides at Geneva, August 1974
While the Geneva meetings had the feel of shadow boxing, with little prospect of a settlement, the two offerings for a new constitutional structure are revealing. The Turkish Cypriots were now in a position of unprecedented strength, and their proposal shows it. The Greek Cypriots were still insisting on most of their previous positions, despite the catastrophic events of July and the probability of a further Turkish intervention. Clerides= plan only gave in on the issue of local self-governance, the concession that could have settled all their differences previously (but was repeatedly vetoed by Makarios), but now was too little, too late.
http://www.cyprus-conflict.net/Geneva%2 ... g%2074.htm
