Bananiot wrote:Joe, in case you are interested, I have read Klerides's book from page 1 to page 549. It's titled "documents of an era" and in it I have found some very interesting staff which about the period between 1993 and 2003 when Klerides was President. It is also true that I am an admirer of Klerides's realism and pragmatism and I was there, at the launching of the book.
I have made a search of the archives of Cyprus Mail. Is this the article that you claimed I copied?
Piratis wrote:We need a change man, let's no be conservative peasants who only know growing potatoes. Let's try grapes this time.
Pyrpolizer, I am not conservative at all. However not all changes are positive. A change can be for the better but it can also be for the worst. So we shouldn't make a change for the sake of the change, just randomly hoping that this change will be a positive one. Before we make our choices we should seriously evaluate our options.
So you shouldn't just say "Let's try grapes this time." You should explain why it will be better with the "grapes" and not worst.
In my opinion Papadopoulos did almost as much as he could when we brought him in the last moment to make the big "U Turn" to avoid the collision that was planned by the AngloAmericans with the cooperation of Vassiliou and Cleredes during the last 15 years. The problems we face today are simply a result of the reaction of US/UK for daring to refuse their plans for Cyprus. The only way to avoid those problems would have been to accept that much bigger problem called Annan plan.
Christofias can not bring anything better. On the contrary it is very possible that he will bring us back a re-cooked Annan plan, and when we will reject it again (because there is no doubt about that), the problems for "daring" to reject that plan twice will be even bigger.
And if you think the mud that the AngloAmericans through their media throw against Papadopoulos now is a lot, and Christofias will create for us a better image abroad, then wait to see how the AngloAmericans would treat Christofias if he doesn't adopt their line. The UK/USA press will be writing articles about the super conservative Stalin leader of the Cuba of the Mediterranean.
So Christofias is not a change for the positive in my opinion, despite the shortcomings of Papadopoulos.
5) The plan legalized the violations of our human and democratic rights.
CopperLine wrote:Piratis,
You point out an important factor in any political settlement namely5) The plan legalized the violations of our human and democratic rights.
But here is the strategic choice that *all* peace plans oblige one to make : EITHER, a peace plan/settlement basically says 'here is the broad proposed settlement between states, between warring parties, between erstwhile enemies; we don't pretend to address (let alone remedy or redress) the individual human rights abuses and democratic violations that occurred during the war or as a consequence of the war; all we are trying to do is establish a general peace; that general peace may contain many individual injustices, but a general peace is worth the continuation of some, even many, individual injustices.'
OR, forget a general peace plan/settlement and instead try to secure, redress and remedy for all the individual cases human rights violations and other injustices.
The Annan Plan certainly had dangers that it prioritised a peace settlement over the settlement and remedying of individual violations or abuses. By contrast, the pursuit of individual cases through the ECHR might more obviously secure individual justice but it does not (can not) bring a general peace settlement.
In the first option it is states that have rights and duties that are to be upheld, whilst in the second case it is individuals a who have rights and duties which must be upheld. The trouble is that it is very difficult, if not impossible, to pursue both paths at the same time. Each path compromises the ability of the other to realise its objectives. For example, suppose you favour a comprehensive peace settlement negotiated between the parties to the dispute then those parties might say 'forget the detail of who owns that particular acre of ground because we're going to transfer the whole of this district to that federal state'. But if you as an individual were the rightful owner of that particular acre this ignoring of your particular claim would be a further insufferable cost, a further violation of your rights, a further source of animosity .
Thus, with general peace plans we're always faced with the danger or dilemma of accepting peace without justice, or in rejecting a general peace plan, trying to pursue justice in the absence of peace. As both paths are pursued and as time goes by, each confounds the chances of the other being realised. Thus, in time, because a timely strategic choice could not be made, neither strategy can be fulfilled. And that, in my view, is the nature and origin of the current stalemate.
Piratis wrote:CopperLine, I disagree with you about the "all peace plans" part. It is not necessarily all. A war can end without winners or losers, in which case nobodies rights need to be compromised, and no land has to be transfered from one to another. Everybody simply keeps what they legally own, the troops withdraw to the positions they had before the war had started, and the human rights of all people are restored.
What you are referring to is the subset of peace plans, where there is a winner and loser, and the losers makes compromises while the winner makes gains. These "peace plans" are otherwise known as surrender and capitulation agreements.
I hope you understood by now that we do not want any such "peace plan" and if you continue to insist on gains or our loss then peace will never come.
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