I think he thinks you mean the current one and not the one signed in 1959
The constitution never changed Zan.THE PACK IS CLOSING
by zan » Thu Dec 20, 2007 6:43 pm
Piratis wrote:I think he thinks you mean the current one and not the one signed in 1959
I think you need to look at it again mate....Do you also realise the implications of what Bir is asking...In order for the right members of government to assume their positions and all?????
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zan - Leading Contributor
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by Bananiot » Thu Dec 20, 2007 8:22 pm
You are not referring to facts Piratis. These are the facts:
1. The plan did safeguard the unity of the federation with only one sovereignty, international representation and nationality.
2. The plan constituted 10 000 or so pages because it included the laws for the functionality of the federation (this was asked by Papadopoulos, so that in the future his cronies would be able to call it a complicated and cumbersome plan).
3. The plan safeguarded the return of about 9% of the occupied territory.
4. The plan safeguarded the return of about 120 000 refugees to their places under Greek Cypriot administration.
5. The plan safeguarded the return or compensation for properties that were to remain in the TC component stat.
6. The plan safeguarded the restoration of human rights and the basic freedoms.
7. The plan safeguarded that no permanent derogations of the European acqui would exist.
8. The plan safeguarded the freedom of movement and the right to own a second residence in the TC component state.
9. The plan safeguarded the gradual withdrawal of the Turkish occupation army.
10. The plan safeguarded the demographic composition of the population of Cyprus.
Not bad after all, is it Piratis. I do not deny that there were negative points but I will not mention them just like Papadopoulos who promised to give a balanced evaluation of the plan but failed to mention one positive thing, just in case the "no" vote fell below 70%. You see, if the "no" vote was close to 50% he would probably have to take initiatives and suggest changes to the plan which would make it workable etc but this would be an anathema to Papadopoulos who does not care about federation.
1. The plan did safeguard the unity of the federation with only one sovereignty, international representation and nationality.
2. The plan constituted 10 000 or so pages because it included the laws for the functionality of the federation (this was asked by Papadopoulos, so that in the future his cronies would be able to call it a complicated and cumbersome plan).
3. The plan safeguarded the return of about 9% of the occupied territory.
4. The plan safeguarded the return of about 120 000 refugees to their places under Greek Cypriot administration.
5. The plan safeguarded the return or compensation for properties that were to remain in the TC component stat.
6. The plan safeguarded the restoration of human rights and the basic freedoms.
7. The plan safeguarded that no permanent derogations of the European acqui would exist.
8. The plan safeguarded the freedom of movement and the right to own a second residence in the TC component state.
9. The plan safeguarded the gradual withdrawal of the Turkish occupation army.
10. The plan safeguarded the demographic composition of the population of Cyprus.
Not bad after all, is it Piratis. I do not deny that there were negative points but I will not mention them just like Papadopoulos who promised to give a balanced evaluation of the plan but failed to mention one positive thing, just in case the "no" vote fell below 70%. You see, if the "no" vote was close to 50% he would probably have to take initiatives and suggest changes to the plan which would make it workable etc but this would be an anathema to Papadopoulos who does not care about federation.
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by zan » Thu Dec 20, 2007 8:54 pm
Bananiot wrote:You are not referring to facts Piratis. These are the facts:
1. The plan did safeguard the unity of the federation with only one sovereignty, international representation and nationality.
2. The plan constituted 10 000 or so pages because it included the laws for the functionality of the federation (this was asked by Papadopoulos, so that in the future his cronies would be able to call it a complicated and cumbersome plan).
3. The plan safeguarded the return of about 9% of the occupied territory.
4. The plan safeguarded the return of about 120 000 refugees to their places under Greek Cypriot administration.
5. The plan safeguarded the return or compensation for properties that were to remain in the TC component stat.
6. The plan safeguarded the restoration of human rights and the basic freedoms.
7. The plan safeguarded that no permanent derogations of the European acqui would exist.
8. The plan safeguarded the freedom of movement and the right to own a second residence in the TC component state.
9. The plan safeguarded the gradual withdrawal of the Turkish occupation army.
10. The plan safeguarded the demographic composition of the population of Cyprus.
Not bad after all, is it Piratis. I do not deny that there were negative points but I will not mention them just like Papadopoulos who promised to give a balanced evaluation of the plan but failed to mention one positive thing, just in case the "no" vote fell below 70%. You see, if the "no" vote was close to 50% he would probably have to take initiatives and suggest changes to the plan which would make it workable etc but this would be an anathema to Papadopoulos who does not care about federation.
But Piratis says no so it must be Bananiot..............Even Nikitas has given up on this now that he has some clarity on it....Must of read that book you recommend
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by zan » Thu Dec 20, 2007 9:57 pm
Is Turkey’s crisis proof we were right to say ‘no’?
EACH time Turkey is going through a crisis, there is a renewal of the argument that it would never have implemented the Annan plan and, therefore, a solution based on it was far from being a guaranteed option. The manner in which this argument has been used by those who had stoutly supported a ‘no’ vote contains a number of contradictions. Their 2004 position was that it was a blatantly pro-Turkish plan, dissolving our state and turning it into a Turkish protectorate. Today, they have recanted this argument and admit that since the plan was not so favourable for Turkey it had every reason to circumvent its implementation.
It is a politically naive position to argue that “since Erdogan cannot elect a President of Turkey how could he implement the solution of the Cyprus problem”. If the Cyprus problem had been solved, the whole of the island would have been part of Europe. Today, the acquis is suspended in the occupied areas and the whole island is only theoretically part of Europe. The European Union is not concerned by the uncontrolled influx of mainland Turkish settlers but only by the danger that they could easily move to the south. In other words, a solution of the Cyprus problem would have meant that the borders of Europe were in Kyrenia. Today, the de facto reality is that they end in the Ayios Pavlos suburb of Nicosia.
A failure to implement the solution on behalf of Turkey would have meant that the sovereignty of an EU member-state was under dispute, a development that by itself would have been sufficient to cause extensive complications to the functioning of the European Union.
Such a move by Turkey would be tantamount to a Russian attack against Estonia. It is inconceivable that this step could ever have taken place because Europe would never tolerate it. Does Turkey have the strength to confront the whole of Europe? Is it possible that the EU would accept this large-scale deviation from what had been agreed?
Moreover, the Security Council and the United States were the guarantors of the agreement and it is inconceivable that they would have allowed Turkey to jeopardise an agreement for resolving an international dispute, which was projected as a model for similar disputes around the world.
Is Turkey so strong that it can brazenly confront the whole world? Finally, if Cyprus cannot trust the European Union and the United Nations as credible guarantors of a solution, then why are we insisting that the Cyprus issue should be resolved through negotiations?
If in 2004, with the whole world standing by our side, we believed that the guarantees for implementing the solution were not strong enough, then what more can we gain from an agreement based on the July 8 procedure, which oddly enough is supported by those who have been arguing that Turkey would never have implemented the solution? Unless the July 8 agreement is yet another communications ploy, like the one of 2003, when we never tired of accusing Denktash in various international fora that he accepted the Annan plan only as a point of reference, whereas our side believed it was the basis for a solution!
Concerns about the implementation of a solution could easily be viewed from the opposite perspective. We had to predict the future complications arising in the path of Turkey’s accession process, either because of internal reasons (such as the current crisis) or because of external ones (such as the election of Nicolas Sarkozy). We had to take advantage of that particular moment in history, when Turkey was fervently seeking a date for the start of accession negotiations with the EU and there was a strong prospect that it would join as a member.
Instead, we have followed a policy based on the pursuit of a solution in the long term, while simultaneously taking advantage of our position as an EU member. Such a policy, however, carries bigger and more dangerous risks than those that would have resulted had we accepted the proposed plan.
Another arguments used, and one that has a wide appeal among public opinion, is that we would have dissolved our state and left ourselves exposed.
Our state is not a simple object that can be lost. A state consists of territory, population, institutions and its recognition. Our state would have become stronger and bigger. Stretching from the Cape of Saint Andreas to the harbour of Paphos, it was going to become a member of the most powerful political and economic club in the world.
The Turkish Cypriots, for political, economic and, even, for reasons of self interest, would have chosen Europe over Anatolia. Through a proper policy (not like the one we followed between 1960 and 1963), the implementation of the solution would not be dependent on Turkey. Any attempt by Turkey to try and complicate the situation could become a boomerang and irrevocably cut the umbilical cord between Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots. Provided, however, that we had leaders with a vision and not scare mongers.
Makarios Drousiotis
Cyprus Mail
20/05/2007
EACH time Turkey is going through a crisis, there is a renewal of the argument that it would never have implemented the Annan plan and, therefore, a solution based on it was far from being a guaranteed option. The manner in which this argument has been used by those who had stoutly supported a ‘no’ vote contains a number of contradictions. Their 2004 position was that it was a blatantly pro-Turkish plan, dissolving our state and turning it into a Turkish protectorate. Today, they have recanted this argument and admit that since the plan was not so favourable for Turkey it had every reason to circumvent its implementation.
It is a politically naive position to argue that “since Erdogan cannot elect a President of Turkey how could he implement the solution of the Cyprus problem”. If the Cyprus problem had been solved, the whole of the island would have been part of Europe. Today, the acquis is suspended in the occupied areas and the whole island is only theoretically part of Europe. The European Union is not concerned by the uncontrolled influx of mainland Turkish settlers but only by the danger that they could easily move to the south. In other words, a solution of the Cyprus problem would have meant that the borders of Europe were in Kyrenia. Today, the de facto reality is that they end in the Ayios Pavlos suburb of Nicosia.
A failure to implement the solution on behalf of Turkey would have meant that the sovereignty of an EU member-state was under dispute, a development that by itself would have been sufficient to cause extensive complications to the functioning of the European Union.
Such a move by Turkey would be tantamount to a Russian attack against Estonia. It is inconceivable that this step could ever have taken place because Europe would never tolerate it. Does Turkey have the strength to confront the whole of Europe? Is it possible that the EU would accept this large-scale deviation from what had been agreed?
Moreover, the Security Council and the United States were the guarantors of the agreement and it is inconceivable that they would have allowed Turkey to jeopardise an agreement for resolving an international dispute, which was projected as a model for similar disputes around the world.
Is Turkey so strong that it can brazenly confront the whole world? Finally, if Cyprus cannot trust the European Union and the United Nations as credible guarantors of a solution, then why are we insisting that the Cyprus issue should be resolved through negotiations?
If in 2004, with the whole world standing by our side, we believed that the guarantees for implementing the solution were not strong enough, then what more can we gain from an agreement based on the July 8 procedure, which oddly enough is supported by those who have been arguing that Turkey would never have implemented the solution? Unless the July 8 agreement is yet another communications ploy, like the one of 2003, when we never tired of accusing Denktash in various international fora that he accepted the Annan plan only as a point of reference, whereas our side believed it was the basis for a solution!
Concerns about the implementation of a solution could easily be viewed from the opposite perspective. We had to predict the future complications arising in the path of Turkey’s accession process, either because of internal reasons (such as the current crisis) or because of external ones (such as the election of Nicolas Sarkozy). We had to take advantage of that particular moment in history, when Turkey was fervently seeking a date for the start of accession negotiations with the EU and there was a strong prospect that it would join as a member.
Instead, we have followed a policy based on the pursuit of a solution in the long term, while simultaneously taking advantage of our position as an EU member. Such a policy, however, carries bigger and more dangerous risks than those that would have resulted had we accepted the proposed plan.
Another arguments used, and one that has a wide appeal among public opinion, is that we would have dissolved our state and left ourselves exposed.
Our state is not a simple object that can be lost. A state consists of territory, population, institutions and its recognition. Our state would have become stronger and bigger. Stretching from the Cape of Saint Andreas to the harbour of Paphos, it was going to become a member of the most powerful political and economic club in the world.
The Turkish Cypriots, for political, economic and, even, for reasons of self interest, would have chosen Europe over Anatolia. Through a proper policy (not like the one we followed between 1960 and 1963), the implementation of the solution would not be dependent on Turkey. Any attempt by Turkey to try and complicate the situation could become a boomerang and irrevocably cut the umbilical cord between Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots. Provided, however, that we had leaders with a vision and not scare mongers.
Makarios Drousiotis
Cyprus Mail
20/05/2007
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by Pyrpolizer » Thu Dec 20, 2007 10:35 pm
Piratis wrote:Pyrpolizer, the primary reason we joined the EU was for our security. From what I know neither Christofias nor Kasoulides favored a veto in the EU accession of Turkey at the current state. The important thing is what we have this option. If we had accepting the AP this option, along with a ton others, would have disappeared.
Birkibrisli, the USA (and UK) have a very close relationship with Turkey for at least 50 years. There is nothing new there. If you look at the map you will see that we have about 70 million Turks "breathing down our necks" and thats not going to change. However now we at least have a state that can offer some protection against them, where with some agreement like Annan plan those people would be free to roam among and we would have nothing to defend ourselves from Turkey.
Yes, the earlier we have a solution the better. All I am saying is that today a solution is simply not on offer and I don't see it becoming in the near future either.
About the mid to long term future nobody can say how the balance of power will change. Things are moving fast now and anything can change in 10 or 15 years.
Piratis may I remind you once again the whole discussion IS NOT whether we should have accepted the Anan Plan or not, but why or not Papadopoulos should be re-elected.
You base your whole argumentation in suggesting he should be re-elected, on your assumption that he is not leading us from an already bad position to worse (everybody can
on this)-that he is holding firm and steady waiting for the day that the balance of powers will shift so much in our favor, that we will get everything our way.
I asked you before and I am asking you once again:
How is the NOT VETOEING OF TURKEY helping us reach that goal of seeking a shift of the balance of powers in our favor?(and please don't give me the excuse that both Christofias and Kasoulides consented. That's irrelevant.) In case you haven't realised what Turkey's EU road means let me explain it to you: It means the least Turkey will end up is a special relations with the EU, billions of financial aid and investment, and a voice in the EU 100 times stronger/more important than the little voice we now have as full members. It means it will be militarily backed up fully by the US, and financially by the EU
So the truth is that Papadopoulos (as well as other Politicians) do not really believe in waiting until the balance of powers shifts in our favor. They believe Turkey's EU road and her democratic reforms will help find a solution. THIS IS THE REASON WHY Papadopoulos did not vetoe Turkey and NEVER he or anyone else will.
To make a long story short, the reason you support Papadopoulos re-election, in that you think he is in line with your philosophy, is just a
Fallacy
Last edited by Pyrpolizer on Thu Dec 20, 2007 10:58 pm, edited 1 time in total.
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by Pyrpolizer » Thu Dec 20, 2007 10:54 pm
Birkibrisli wrote:Piratis wrote:Pyrpolizer, the primary reason we joined the EU was for our security. From what I know neither Christofias nor Kasoulides favored a veto in the EU accession of Turkey at the current state. The important thing is what we have this option. If we had accepting the AP this option, along with a ton others, would have disappeared.
Birkibrisli, the USA (and UK) have a very close relationship with Turkey for at least 50 years. There is nothing new there. If you look at the map you will see that we have about 70 million Turks "breathing down our necks" and thats not going to change. However now we at least have a state that can offer some protection against them, where with some agreement like Annan plan those people would be free to roam among and we would have nothing to defend ourselves from Turkey.
Yes, the earlier we have a solution the better. All I am saying is that today a solution is simply not on offer and I don't see it becoming in the near future either.
About the mid to long term future nobody can say how the balance of power will change. Things are moving fast now and anything can change in 10 or 15 years.
Of course a solution is not on offer,Piratis.
My point is that we,Cypriots,should take the bull by the horn and provide our own solution. We have an agreement already. It is called the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus. We should agree to implement it as soon as possible. This calls cooperation from Talat and Co I know which will prove impossible. But nothing is stoping Papadopoulos from making an official invitation to the TC community to return to the Republic.
That would put the cat amonst the pidgeons. And things might start rolling from there. But you know and I know that Papadopoulos could never do that. I am not sure if Christofias or the other guy could act differently,but it is worth giving them a chance. You never know...
Birkibrisli gardash you know I agree completely with you. We gave Papadopoulos 5 years, he had his chance, nothing happened. Enough! Time to elect another guy... and who knows maybe the new president will propose return to the 1960 constitution, maybe an autonomy for the TCs, at least propose something to prove we do mean well for the TC people as well, not only for ourselves.
Imo the Tcs are holding their breath to grasp a positive sign that they can be safe and prosperous living with the Gcs, in some kind of autonomy, but nobody gives them any.
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by zan » Thu Dec 20, 2007 10:55 pm
Pyrpolizer wrote:Birkibrisli wrote:Piratis wrote:Pyrpolizer, the primary reason we joined the EU was for our security. From what I know neither Christofias nor Kasoulides favored a veto in the EU accession of Turkey at the current state. The important thing is what we have this option. If we had accepting the AP this option, along with a ton others, would have disappeared.
Birkibrisli, the USA (and UK) have a very close relationship with Turkey for at least 50 years. There is nothing new there. If you look at the map you will see that we have about 70 million Turks "breathing down our necks" and thats not going to change. However now we at least have a state that can offer some protection against them, where with some agreement like Annan plan those people would be free to roam among and we would have nothing to defend ourselves from Turkey.
Yes, the earlier we have a solution the better. All I am saying is that today a solution is simply not on offer and I don't see it becoming in the near future either.
About the mid to long term future nobody can say how the balance of power will change. Things are moving fast now and anything can change in 10 or 15 years.
Of course a solution is not on offer,Piratis.
My point is that we,Cypriots,should take the bull by the horn and provide our own solution. We have an agreement already. It is called the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus. We should agree to implement it as soon as possible. This calls cooperation from Talat and Co I know which will prove impossible. But nothing is stoping Papadopoulos from making an official invitation to the TC community to return to the Republic.
That would put the cat amonst the pidgeons. And things might start rolling from there. But you know and I know that Papadopoulos could never do that. I am not sure if Christofias or the other guy could act differently,but it is worth giving them a chance. You never know...
Birkibrisli gardash you know I agree completely with you. We gave Papadopoulos 5 years, he had his chance, nothing happened. Enough! Time to elect another guy... and who knows maybe the new president will propose return to the 1960 constitution, maybe an autonomy for the TCs, at least propose something to prove we do mean well for the TC people as well, not only for ourselves.
Imo the Tcs are holding their breath to grasp a positive sign that they can be safe and prosperous living with the Gcs, in some kind of autonomy, but nobody gives them any.
Thanks Pyro....Keep that up and I could learn to like you again.....
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