The document even includes a map detailing the plan of action of the Turkish invasion force. This is headed ``Map done by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research projecting Turkish moves on Cyprus, August 13, 1974.''
It is worth noting that this plan was the one followed exactly by the Turkish troops, a further proof of the close American involvement in the Turkish invasion planning.
Here is the full text of the document:
THE COUNSELOR
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
August 14, 1974
SECRET/EYES ONLY
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY
FROM: Helmut Sonnenfeldt
SUBJECT: Cyprus Actions
You wanted some brief ideas on what we do next.
Nothing I can think of will stop the Turks now from trying to secure by force what they demanded in their ultimata. In fact, as has always been true, the only coneivable modus vivendi will have to rest on a de facto division of the island, whatever the form.
If the Turks move fast and can then be gotten to stand down, it may pre-empt Greek counteraction and then give us a chance to try for a deal. (It may also save Karamanlis).
While the Soviets can serve as a bogey, we must keep them at arms length. They cannot become the arbiter between US allies. Their interests differ drastically from ours: we want a modus vivendi between Greece and Turkey, they want a non-aligned Cyprus, preferably with Greece or Turkey or both disaffected from NATO.
Thus, we should
- urgently try to contain Greek reaction; 24 hours at a time;
- bluntly tell the Turks they must stop, today, tomorrow at the latest;
- warn the Turks that Greece is rapidly moving leftward;
- send high-level US man to Athens to exert continuing direct influence on Karamanlis;
- assuming the Turks quickly take Famagusta, privately assure Turks we will get them solution involving one third of island, within some kind of federal arrangement;
- assure Greeks we will contain Turk demands and allow no additional enclaves, etc.
You should not get involved directly till the fighting stops; then you must since there is no alternative and only we have the clout.
I do not think Brussels/NATO is the place to use when the time comes. The Greeks are probably too sore at NATO and the vehicle of a ministerial meeting is awkward. Anyway, you need Ecevit and Karamanlis.
London may be unacceptable to the Turks because of Callaghan’s blast at them.
You should not shuttle.
This may mean Geneva. Washington, at the President’s initiative, would be all right but hard to get the parties to come to. Also provocative of the Russians. New York would make it difficult to keep the Russians away.
You could also try Rome.