Cyprus-Forum.com

[Alexandros Lordos]

The following is very interesting ... my apologies to Admin for copy-pasting all of it, but it was sent to me via e-mail so I didn't know the internet link ...


Tassos: mediator tried to impose 'easiest solution' on us

PRESIDENT Tassos Papadopoulos yesterday criticised those involved in the Cyprus peace talks for "following the seemingly easy and most convenient recipe"

He said that "in the face of divergent views, [foreign mediators] proposed a solution by cutting differences in the middle." The President was speaking at a conference on federalism organised by the Belgian governments, in Brussels.

Papadopoulos did not name names but referred to "those assigned with the historical and heavy task of finding and proposing a balanced and functional compromise in the light of opposing aims and policies."

"But as the bible teaches us," he concluded his speech, "the solution found by wise King Solomon of cutting the baby in two, is definitely not the right or best solution. Certainly not for the 'baby'."

Former UN Cyprus envoy Alvaro de Soto was in the audience and is today expected to reply - also indirectly - during his address to the three-day conference celebrating 175 years of Belgian independence and 25 of federation.

Papadopoulos elaborated on three provisions in the Annan plan he believed would not facilitate the establishment of a federal state.

The first was the proposed federal Constitutional Court, which would take executive and legislative decisions if the federal executive or the federal legislature could not agree. He described its decision-making procedures ineffective and deadlock-resolving machinery damaging.

"To add insult to injury," he said, "foreign judges were included in the Court, while at the same time this organ would already be overly politicised by its executive and legislative interventions."

The President's second argument was that the Annan plan ignored the principle that "no state can be considered unified unless it has a unified fiscal and monetary economy and an integrated economy, assured by freedom of movement of persons, capital and goods."

He said this would make the government unviable and the federation unjust.

His third point was on displaced people and property, what he described as a core issue "inadequately" dealt with by the UN plan, making it unacceptable to the majority:

"In situations where a federal settlement follows war or civil war and there has been population displacement and settlement of new persons, benefits enjoyed by current occupiers of property, owned by displaced persons or by refugees, must be balanced against the rights of persons who have been expelled or fled."

Papadopoulos strongly rejected criticism he is against a federal solution. He said he was the first to submit written proposals for a bi-zonal, bicommunal federal solution, at the 1977 inter-communal talks, and remains committed.

Papadopoulos said several times that "goodwill and good faith are essential for a viable federation."

Copyright © Cyprus Mail 2005


I don't know how others feel, but to be honest I don't find anything in this article which I disagree with ... though I am not exactly sure what he means with "not unified economy" and what he would propose in return.

By the way, a few days ago Chrysostomides publicly presented an alternative proposal to Supreme Court tie-breaking: A political "council of wise elders", only Cypriot, presumably half Greek Cypriot and half Turkish Cypriot, who would be charged with the task of finding a resolution in case of deadlock. Sounds interesting ...

[cannedmoose]

Alex, link is to Cyprus Mail

http://www.cyprus-mail.com/news/

This article appears in todays news.

Have a good day re, let's keep going with the security concerns thread, it's becoming an interesting one.

[-mikkie2-]

Alexandre,

I heard his speech on the tv and, yes, what he said was agreeable. I was also of the view that the foreign mediators were trying to obtain a solution as easy as possible, which is why I was always blaming in a large part these mediators for their incompetant handling of the whole process.

People all too easily like to demonise Papadopoulos. I for one think that he has accepted a federal solution to the problem and that all he wants to do is to ensure that this solution will adhere to European norms. I also think he has his eye on history - he wants to be the man that solved the Cyprus problem. I don't subscribe to the view that he wants power all to himself or his supporters.

Regarding the economy, isn't this what you and I have been arguing about as a being a major flaw in the plan?

[Alexandros Lordos]

Regarding the economy, isn't this what you and I have been arguing about as a being a major flaw in the plan?

OK, let's take his comments phrase by phrase:

no state can be considered unified unless it has a unified fiscal and monetary economy ...

In federations, doesn't each federated state and the central government all have their own budgets, and, by extension, their own fiscal policy? Of course, I can understand it if limits were placed on the borrowing of federated states, but does he mean something else as well? Is it possible, necessary or desirable to "harmonise" budgets in federated states?

As for monetary policy, wasn't it ensured in the Annan Plan that there would only be one central bank? What is his complaint about here? Does he consider it a problem that there would be branches of the Central Bank in each of the federated states for a few years after the agreement?

... and an integrated economy, assured by freedom of movement of persons, capital and goods.

Is he referring to restrictions on investment in the northern federated state for the first 15 years? Or is it something else? I also agree that the temporary restrictions need some rethinking and adjustment, if that is all he is concerned about, but it would be wrong to totally remove them.

[Alexandros Lordos]

I got my hands on the full text of Tassos' speech ... (once again, apologies to Admin for copy-pasting this ...)


Keynote Address by the President of the Republic of Cyprus
Mr. Tassos Papadopoulos
at the Third International Conference on Federalism in Brussels

Your Majesty,
Heads of State,
Prime Ministers,
Ministers, and
distinguished “conferees”,

More than two hundred years ago, two great writers made cautionary comments, still relevant for those who seek to establish or apply governmental systems to resolve political problems. The satirist, Alexander Pope, observed:

“For forms of government, let fools contest;
Whate’er is best administered, is best.”

Not long afterwards, the Anglo-Irish political thinker, Edmund Burke, wrote:
“What makes every civil or political system beneficial or noxious, are the circumstances”.

Neither thinker knew of the potential for good governance of modern federalism, but both make crucial points: good practice, which entails good faith and good will, are vital to successful government; and the historical, political, geographic, economic and strategic circumstances need to be favourable, or at least not unfavourable, for any state to be effective and to remain as one.

Let me make these points concrete, by referring to the development of Belgian federalism, which we are celebrating at this Conference. The historical role played by your Majesty in reconciling differing political forces and in maintaining balance, the geographical location of common resources, this great capital city of Brussels, and the political will to maintain Belgium, have been major determinants in the success of Belgian federalism.

Conversely, disruptive circumstances should not be present – such as willingness of powerful neighbouring states, sharing ethnicity with major groups in the state’s population, to intervene in their perceived self-interest.

If circumstances are not adverse, federalism can be an important mechanism to promote unity, good governance, and preservation of group identities within the state.

The federal system is particularly well-adapted for holding diverse units together in a common larger entity and it should be designed as to promote convergence of “diverse units”, so that the people become a federal commonality.

Above all, a federal system should provide safeguards to avoid the perpetuation of divisiveness in its territory, the society, the economy and its institutions. The paramount consideration should be, to discourage any group, area, community or unit from pursuing secession or partition. This consideration is most important in cases, such as the case of Cyprus, when the constituent units would be only two, and where one of the units has, as its declared aim, the establishment of a separate state, coupled with the claim of unanimous co-decision at all levels. This state of affairs is the surest recipe for continuous deadlocks, which will lead the federal state to paralysis. In these circumstances, the distance between paralysis and dissolution of the federal state would be very short indeed.

None of the above, however, should in any way be interpreted as negating the principle that the federal system, must facilitate the enjoyment by territorially or ethnically concentrated population groups, of autonomy to pursue their political, economic, and cultural aspirations in freedom, without encouraging partitionist tendencies. Where the federation consists of two diverse units, no unit and no community should be able to impose its will on the other, but at the same time, no unit or community should be given the power to lead the government into continuous deadlocks.

There are other obvious federalist advantages. Federalism is a procedure for preventing or resolving internal political conflicts, by ensuring that all territorial groups, or, in the case of personal federalism, all community representatives have a significant input in governmental outcomes. Moreover, where there are national groups with differing cultural identities, preservation of such identities is assisted by federalism, which allows these to be accommodated, so that the groups are willing to remain as part of the larger federal entity.

Following an independence struggle from British Colonial power, Cyprus had been created as a unitary state, with about 82% of the population consisting of Greek Cypriots and other small religious communities and about 18% being Turkish Cypriots. Although there was a large degree of community representation and special community institutions, with power over cultural, religious, educational and social matters, Cypriots knew nothing of federalism.

Since 1976, however, after Turkish military forces occupied most of the northern Cyprus in 1974, I have been a practical seeker for a federal solution for my country, Cyprus.

In April 1977, at intercommunal talks in Vienna, under the Chairmanship of the, then Secretary General of the United Nations, Dr. Kurt Valdheim, I, as representative of the Greek-Cypriot community, submitted, on its behalf, written proposals for settlement of the Cyprus problem, for the first time, on the basis of a “bizonal, bicommunal federal solution”. I was the Chairman of the Committee of the National Council of the Greek-Cypriot Community, which, in close consultation and in agreement with the first President of Cyprus, Makarios, drafted those proposals for a federal solution.

I was then, and I still remain committed to a settlement of the Cyprus problem on the basis of a “bizonal, bicommunal federal solution”.

Each one of these terms, i.e. “bizonality”, “bicommunal”, “federalism”, is of course subject to numerous and diverse interpretations by theorists of federalism.

Difficulties always arise in attempts to join up political units, or to convert a unitary state into a federation. Unless developments are organic, growing out of a step-by-step process – as in Belgium for the last 35 years and as in Switzerland –, such difficulties can even render arrangements unviable.

The 20th century has seen some artificially constructed federations, put together by foreign or departing Colonial Powers, fall apart, because they lack emotional glue, not having been derived from popular identification with the federal entity. Such an outcome is even more likely with two-unit federations, consisting of units in which different ethnic groups were concentrated, and which were unequal in numbers and in economic power.

Asymmetry of ethnic populations, concentrated in units, and efforts to create “ethnically pure” areas, lead to a further problem in the federal decision-making processes. The smaller group will fear and reject majority decision-making, while the larger group considers this to be a democratic entitlement, perceiving an equal composition of all state organs and an equal say by the smaller group in all decisions, as being unjust.

As a compromise, large groups would agree on power-sharing and participation by proportional representation in government organs and a considerable amount of equality in significant federal organs and policy decision–making processes.

However, when the device of power-sharing has superadded to it a requirement of consensus, or of positive support, or even of unanimity, may be viewed as being conducive to blocking functional federal government, or, at very least, that this is likely.

It has been suggested that deadlock resolving machinery resolves dilemmas. But views are not always reconcilable and ultimately the will of one or the other side will prevail. The problem has not been avoided, but has been exacerbated by ingenious suggestions to use other parts of the governmental system as substitutes. This places at risk such institutions’ prestige and legitimacy.

A case in point is the Annan Plan concerning Cyprus. For example, it was proposed that the federal Constitutional Court should take executive and legislative decisions, if the federal executive or the federal legislature could not agree. To add insult to injury, foreign judges were included in the Court, while, at the same time, this organ would already be overly politicised by its executive and legislative interventions. If a Constitutional Court is successfully to perform its already difficult tasks of settling federal-regional disputes and constitutional issues, and of maintaining human rights standards, its prestige must not be diminished. This combination of ineffective decision-making procedures and damaging deadlock-resolving machinery, was one of the important concerns of the Greek Cypriots.

Many federalist devices, empirically successful in other states, are relevant in establishing a federation. Nonetheless, I believe cautionary words are necessary. Regard needs paying, when transplanting devices, to their original contexts, their supporting political, social and legal institutions, and the differing circumstances in which they will apply.

Questions of time-scale, lack of practice and operational skill in the new environment, suggest that a degree of gradualism in transplanting devices is advisable. If the soil is infertile or too dry, the transplants will not survive. That is why institutional arrangements, slowly developed elsewhere, and requiring consensus or support, cannot overnight be introduced into divided and different societies, which do not share the sophisticated political approaches of those who evolved such institutions.

I refer here to co-operative federalism which took years of experiment to work out. Of course, there is no need to reinvent the wheel, but such complex models when are transplanted to new governing institutions, where urgent daily decisions are needed – for example, as in the EU and external relations spheres – such procedural devices will risk deadlock and impotence of the relevant federation from the outset, reviving confrontation.

Thus, the comparative merits of different distributions of responsibilities need careful examination. Distribution of functions is particularly related to economic and fiscal policy issues. No state can be considered unified, unless it has a unified fiscal and monetary policy and an integrated economy, assured by freedom of movement of persons, capital, and goods.

In the Annan Plan, these principles were, at best, ignored. But they are relevant not only to the efficiency of the State but also to legitimacy. If financial burdens are seen as having been unjustly allocated, or if the arrangements are perceived as making the Government unviable, such federation will be unjust.
Federalism is such a vast subject that one could almost endlessly pronounce on various aspects, but, before concluding, I would like to refer, indicatively to one aspect which I consider of great significance:

I refer to the Separation of Powers and the need for any federal Constitutional Court to be able to uphold the federal Constitution, and to enforce human rights’ standards. This last aspect is of fundamental importance since no federation will be accepted or legitimated by the public, unless it upholds the rule of law and human rights.

Nevertheless, rights can be in competition with humanitarian considerations, or there can be competition between rights, so that a balancing exercise may be necessary.

For example, group rights and protection of group identity must be balanced against individual equality and democracy. In situations where a federal settlement follows war or civil war and there has been population displacement and settlement of new persons, benefits enjoyed by current occupiers of property, owned by displaced persons or by refugees, must be balanced against the rights of persons who have been expelled or fled. This is one of the core issues of resolving the Cyprus problem, and this issue was inadequately dealt with by the United Nations’ Plan for Cyprus, making it unacceptable to the majority of the people.

I conclude by reverting to my initial reflections that favourable circumstances, good will and good faith are essential for a viable federation.

Moreover, if perceptions prevail that new federal arrangements have been imposed for the sole purpose of bringing neighbouring States on board, the population of the proposed new federation will not contemplate identifying with a system engineered in that fashion. Only if a federation is the product of an internally-generated compromise, made after comprehensive negotiations, is it likely to be legitimated, thereby making it workable.

That conclusion is in accordance with the very spirit of federalism. In the final analysis, federalism is all about achieving working and workable agreements through groups’ ability to promote their views in a procedure, governed by the rule of law, and in which powers are so divided and balanced as to protect the diverse interests of the major groups within the State.

In the case of Cyprus, those assigned with the historical and heavy task of finding and proposing a balanced and functional compromise in the light of opposing aims, committed the fatal mistake of following the seemingly easy and most convenient recipe:-

“In the face of divergent views, propose a solution, by cutting the differences in the middle”.

But, as the Bible teaches us, the solution found by wise King Solomon of cutting the baby in two, is definitely not the right or best solution.

Certainly not for the “baby”.

Thank you for listening to me.

[turkcyp]

About the three points he has raised,

1) I agree with him when he says that supreme court should not have executive decisions. That is completely against the principle of separation of powers. Having said that I think it is completely absurd to say “if the federal executive or the federal legislature could not agree.” If everyone simply exercise the powers bestowed upon them there would not need to be an agreement.

Legislative makes laws, and executive power executes those laws. As simple as that. There is no need for agreement. The executive power in presidential systems (not necessarily a characteristic of federalism) usually have power to veto those laws he does not like, but that power almost never means that executive power has the right to make laws. The vetoed proposal turns back to house, for further negotiation and if send back to president without any change then usually president is forced by law to sign it. You may find presidential systems where president can keep on vetoing the bills ad infinitum. But this simply cause a deadlock between executive and legislative presidents and the best way to prevent this deadlock is not to give president legislative powers but limit his veto power and give him privilege to take the bill to supreme court for its constitutionality (since every bill has to conform with constitution).

Another point he had raised was the existence of foreign judges on the supreme court bench. I do not think any TC is very interested in that anyway. What every TC is interested in is to have equal number of judges from GC and TC. And I do not see any way to break a deadlock in a even number supreme court. I think it is just a matter of practicality. But if you think that is not fair, then you can limit the power of foreign judges to only when there is a deadlock in decision. So lets say 3 TC and 3 GC judge decide something on 4-2 basis then there is no need for the foreign judges to get involved.

Also I am completely against judges being appointed by presidential council anyway. Even though each judge is appointed for life which makes them “not political’ in the short run, in the long run it makes them political just as in USA. So judges should be elected by the council of judges among themselves. The details of this is still being worked out in my proposal but I want to ask what do you think about this in general

2) The second point he had made was related to economy. What is his proposal to make economy more unified. I do not understand. There will be one fiscal policy in the federal level and one monetary policy in the federal level. On top of this each state will have its own fiscal policies. I do not see any harm in these. This is exactly what happens in every federal country.

I believe the best way to manage the economy is “laisez-faire” approach anyway. Just deregulate the economy as much as you can, by only putting safeguards to guard consumer, and environment, then if it is profitable then the GC and TC economies will be integrated anyway.

3) For the third point, I think he is talking about property rights. He should put forward his proposal on the table so we can see what kind of balancing he wants for the refuges.

Take care everybody

[Alexandros Lordos]

More info:

Alvaro de Soto responded to Tassos' speech yesterday.

Ha acknowledged that using the Supreme Court as a tie-breaker was also disliked by the UN but that "no one suggested anything better".

Concerning the economy, he denies that there was anything wrong with the economics of the Annan Plan. He says "the EU checked it, and found no problem."

As for property rights, de Soto did not comment ...

[erolz]

Concerning the economy, he denies that there was anything wrong with the economics of the Annan Plan. He says "the EU checked it, and found no problem."

From the report I saw (http://www.cyprus-mail.com/news/main.ph ... 7&cat_id=1) he said the EU had no problem with "free movement of people, capital and goods" as laid out in the Annan plan. Which to me is slightly different from just 'economics' at least as I see it?

[Alexandros Lordos]

Some comments of my own regarding Tassos' speech ...

Your Majesty,
Heads of State,
Prime Ministers,
Ministers, and
distinguished “conferees”,

Importance audience - he knows the stakes are high.

More than two hundred years ago, two great writers made cautionary comments, still relevant for those who seek to establish or apply governmental systems to resolve political problems. The satirist, Alexander Pope, observed:

“For forms of government, let fools contest;
Whate’er is best administered, is best.”

Not long afterwards, the Anglo-Irish political thinker, Edmund Burke, wrote:

“What makes every civil or political system beneficial or noxious, are the circumstances”.

He has strong rhetorical skills, and the ability to adapt to different audiences ...

Neither thinker knew of the potential for good governance of modern federalism, but both make crucial points: good practice, which entails good faith and good will, are vital to successful government; and the historical, political, geographic, economic and strategic circumstances need to be favourable, or at least not unfavourable, for any state to be effective and to remain as one.

No "blanket" rejection of Federalism, however:

Conversely, disruptive circumstances should not be present – such as willingness of powerful neighbouring states, sharing ethnicity with major groups in the state’s population, to intervene in their perceived self-interest.

He is obviously concerned here about how Turkey would intervene in the politics of the TCCS.

The federal system is particularly well-adapted for holding diverse units together in a common larger entity and it should be designed as to promote convergence of “diverse units”, so that the people become a federal commonality.

Again, he affirms his faith in federation, but:

Above all, a federal system should provide safeguards to avoid the perpetuation of divisiveness in its territory, the society, the economy and its institutions. The paramount consideration should be, to discourage any group, area, community or unit from pursuing secession or partition. This consideration is most important in cases, such as the case of Cyprus, when the constituent units would be only two, and where one of the units has, as its declared aim, the establishment of a separate state, coupled with the claim of unanimous co-decision at all levels. This state of affairs is the surest recipe for continuous deadlocks, which will lead the federal state to paralysis. In these circumstances, the distance between paralysis and dissolution of the federal state would be very short indeed.

This is obviously the heart of Tassos' objection: The TCs have been seeking independence all this time, who is to guarantee that they will remain devoted to the new state of affairs? Will the need for constant consensus lead to paralysis of the government, given TCs seperatist tendencies?

None of the above, however, should in any way be interpreted as negating the principle that the federal system, must facilitate the enjoyment by territorially or ethnically concentrated population groups, of autonomy to pursue their political, economic, and cultural aspirations in freedom, without encouraging partitionist tendencies.

Again, re-affirming his faith in Federation. He is being very careful to avoid the accusation that he is against Federation.

Where the federation consists of two diverse units, no unit and no community should be able to impose its will on the other, but at the same time, no unit or community should be given the power to lead the government into continuous deadlocks.

A clear acceptance of the principle of equality of communities, but at the same time a demand for effective decision making.

Since 1976, however, after Turkish military forces occupied most of the northern Cyprus in 1974, I have been a practical seeker for a federal solution for my country, Cyprus.

In April 1977, at intercommunal talks in Vienna, under the Chairmanship of the, then Secretary General of the United Nations, Dr. Kurt Valdheim, I, as representative of the Greek-Cypriot community, submitted, on its behalf, written proposals for settlement of the Cyprus problem, for the first time, on the basis of a “bizonal, bicommunal federal solution”. I was the Chairman of the Committee of the National Council of the Greek-Cypriot Community, which, in close consultation and in agreement with the first President of Cyprus, Makarios, drafted those proposals for a federal solution.

It's true, actually. Tassos was a major actor in the High Level Agreements.

I was then, and I still remain committed to a settlement of the Cyprus problem on the basis of a “bizonal, bicommunal federal solution”.

Each one of these terms, i.e. “bizonality”, “bicommunal”, “federalism”, is of course subject to numerous and diverse interpretations by theorists of federalism.

So he is saying, I want Federation, but not necessarily the way it was cooked up in the Annan Plan.

The 20th century has seen some artificially constructed federations, put together by foreign or departing Colonial Powers, fall apart, because they lack emotional glue, not having been derived from popular identification with the federal entity.

A sharp criticism of "solution plans given from above".

Asymmetry of ethnic populations, concentrated in units, and efforts to create “ethnically pure” areas, lead to a further problem in the federal decision-making processes. The smaller group will fear and reject majority decision-making, while the larger group considers this to be a democratic entitlement, perceiving an equal composition of all state organs and an equal say by the smaller group in all decisions, as being unjust.

A clear analysis of the majority rule / political equality problem.

As a compromise, large groups would agree on power-sharing and participation by proportional representation in government organs and a considerable amount of equality in significant federal organs and policy decision–making processes.

OK, Tassos accepts the basic structural make-up of the Annan Plan's Federal Government.

However, when the device of power-sharing has superadded to it a requirement of consensus, or of positive support, or even of unanimity, may be viewed as being conducive to blocking functional federal government, or, at very least, that this is likely.

Ah, so this is his problem, qualified majorities: "It's OK if you are 50% of the senators, but why must we also have a quota that 40% of you must agree to each decision?"

It has been suggested that deadlock resolving machinery resolves dilemmas. But views are not always reconcilable and ultimately the will of one or the other side will prevail. The problem has not been avoided, but has been exacerbated by ingenious suggestions to use other parts of the governmental system as substitutes. This places at risk such institutions’ prestige and legitimacy.

A case in point is the Annan Plan concerning Cyprus. For example, it was proposed that the federal Constitutional Court should take executive and legislative decisions, if the federal executive or the federal legislature could not agree. To add insult to injury, foreign judges were included in the Court, while, at the same time, this organ would already be overly politicised by its executive and legislative interventions. If a Constitutional Court is successfully to perform its already difficult tasks of settling federal-regional disputes and constitutional issues, and of maintaining human rights standards, its prestige must not be diminished.

Tassos is right here, even de Soto conceded this point. Using the Supreme Court as a "political organ" would inevitably compromise its legitimacy, and besides judges are not "trained" to make political decisions.

This problem was not as widely understood by the general population, because it requires a thorough understanding of constitutional principles and of the importance of "separation of powers". Nonetheless, a problem it is.

Many federalist devices, empirically successful in other states, are relevant in establishing a federation. Nonetheless, I believe cautionary words are necessary. Regard needs paying, when transplanting devices, to their original contexts, their supporting political, social and legal institutions, and the differing circumstances in which they will apply.

Questions of time-scale, lack of practice and operational skill in the new environment, suggest that a degree of gradualism in transplanting devices is advisable. If the soil is infertile or too dry, the transplants will not survive. That is why institutional arrangements, slowly developed elsewhere, and requiring consensus or support, cannot overnight be introduced into divided and different societies, which do not share the sophisticated political approaches of those who evolved such institutions.

"Just because you guys here in Europe can live with complicated decision making mechanisms, doesn't mean that we will also manage the same in Cyprus. After all, we are politically backward. "

I refer here to co-operative federalism which took years of experiment to work out. Of course, there is no need to reinvent the wheel, but such complex models when are transplanted to new governing institutions, where urgent daily decisions are needed – for example, as in the EU and external relations spheres – such procedural devices will risk deadlock and impotence of the relevant federation from the outset, reviving confrontation.

"Before you preach to us Greek Cypriots to accept consensus decision making in everything, remember that in the EU constitution you placed foreign policy under the clear supervision of a foreign minister."

Thus, the comparative merits of different distributions of responsibilities need careful examination. Distribution of functions is particularly related to economic and fiscal policy issues.

"Especially for the economy, I will not tolerate such cumbersome decision making mechanisms."

No state can be considered unified, unless it has a unified fiscal and monetary policy and an integrated economy, assured by freedom of movement of persons, capital, and goods.

A hint against: a) The ability of constituent states to borrow as much as they like, and b) Against the absolute restrictions to investment in the other constituent state for 15 years after the solution.

In the Annan Plan, these principles were, at best, ignored.

"Sorry, but those guys who wrote the plan didn't know anything about economics"

If financial burdens are seen as having been unjustly allocated, or if the arrangements are perceived as making the Government unviable, such federation will be unjust.

The economic equity argument.

For example, group rights and protection of group identity must be balanced against individual equality and democracy. In situations where a federal settlement follows war or civil war and there has been population displacement and settlement of new persons, benefits enjoyed by current occupiers of property, owned by displaced persons or by refugees, must be balanced against the rights of persons who have been expelled or fled. This is one of the core issues of resolving the Cyprus problem, and this issue was inadequately dealt with by the United Nations’ Plan for Cyprus, making it unacceptable to the majority of the people.

An obvious assault on the Annan Plan approach of not allowing restitution of property, for the sake of achieving "economic bizonality", even if such limitations are unnecessary to protect current occupants.

If perceptions prevail that new federal arrangements have been imposed for the sole purpose of bringing neighbouring States on board, the population of the proposed new federation will not contemplate identifying with a system engineered in that fashion. Only if a federation is the product of an internally-generated compromise, made after comprehensive negotiations, is it likely to be legitimated, thereby making it workable.

"The Annan Plan was designed "from above" to convenience Turkey, you need to allow Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots to freely negotiate a settlement, rather than impose your own plans"

That conclusion is in accordance with the very spirit of federalism. In the final analysis, federalism is all about achieving working and workable agreements through groups’ ability to promote their views in a procedure, governed by the rule of law, and in which powers are so divided and balanced as to protect the diverse interests of the major groups within the State.

"If we are to devise a solution, it needs to be in accordance with standard and well-established principles of Federalism".

In the case of Cyprus, those assigned with the historical and heavy task of finding and proposing a balanced and functional compromise in the light of opposing aims, committed the fatal mistake of following the seemingly easy and most convenient recipe:-

“In the face of divergent views, propose a solution, by cutting the differences in the middle”.

"We wanted a Federation, Denktash wanted a Confederation, so the negotiators created something that was in between the two"

But, as the Bible teaches us, the solution found by wise King Solomon of cutting the baby in two, is definitely not the right or best solution.

Certainly not for the “baby”.

Thank you for listening to me.

Powerful ending. Designed to shock and make one think.


Anyway, this is how I analyse the speech. Does anyone else want to give it a go?

[cannedmoose]

Some comments of my own regarding Tassos' speech ...

Alexandros... brilliantly done. I don't have the time to do such a full analysis as I've got a lot to read about the lovely AKEL, but I agree with 90% of your interpretations. I'd also say that I thought it was a beautifully crafted speech, designed to express a new, thoughtful image of TPap rather than the bombastic, difficult image he's projected previously. I agree with you about the ending of the speech, it is a shocking analogy and one that made me think twice when I initially read it. In fact, I'm still chewing on my thoughts about that.

Anyways, a good job well done re