insan wrote:You still have doubts? Turkey will informally recognize "RoC". They clearly stated this so many times in last 3 months.
I agree with Insan. I'm not sure how far Turkey will push this (i.e. will they take it all the way to October 3rd?), but undoubtedly they will sign the protocol. There was quite an interesting comment piece in the Cyprus Mail today by Katie Clerides, 'The protocol, the recognition and the bitter reality' (with the indulgence of admin, I've posted the full article below as I don't know how to link to it... sorry... it's certainly interesting and relevant though!
), in which she stated that according to classical interpretations of international law (she cites Oppenheimer), Turkey's signature on a multi-lateral agreement does not signify de jure or even de facto recognition of the Republic of Cyprus and consequently does not 'de-recognise' the TRNC.
Hence, Erdogan will present this as just another document that needs to be signed in order to begin the accession negotiations, and nothing more. No doubt TPap will also present this as a victory for his diplomacy, but in essence neither side will either gain or lose too much from it. It's not the protocol that's the big issue, Turkey's progression through the stages of accession are where the real fun and games will begin.
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Comment - The protocol, the recognition and the bitter reality
By Katie Clerides
(archive article - Sunday, March 13, 2005)
THE ongoing debate over Turkey’s signature of the Customs Protocol with the 25 member states of the EU prompted me to freshen up my reading of international law books in order to have a more informed view on where we stand as far as this matter is concerned. According to classic interpretations of international law such as Oppenheimer, the signature of a multi-lateral agreement does not amount even to implied recognition. Furthermore, a written clause providing for that particular reservation is not even needed.
This is why, Turkey, sooner or later, will sign the Protocol without giving as much as an inch on her legal argument which backs up her political position of not recognising the Republic of Cyprus. This is why the Democratic Rally did not consider that the issue of the Protocol signature ought to be put first on the high priority aims list in the first place.
Moreover, there is still another weakness as far as the Protocol signature is concerned, and this is that the Protocol, similarly with the acquis communautaire, will only apply to the areas under the control of the Republic of Cyprus, therefore the Protocol signature does not in itself constitute the de-recognition of the pseudo state by Turkey. At the end of the day, the signature of the Protocol by Turkey will only further the development of a “Taiwan” status of the occupied territories.
The impression that has been formed in public opinion both in Cyprus and in Turkey is that the issue of the Protocol signature is something very important from a political standpoint, due to the manoeuvring of the two sides at Brussels on December 17, 2004. However, this perception is likely to gradually change in view of the arguments that Turkey will call upon in order to excuse the signature of the Protocol in the eyes of the public in Turkey and within the Turkish Cypriot community.
Once this happens, our side will realise, once more, that while we invested on a Turkish ‘no’, that ‘no’ will transform before our surprised eyes into a ‘yes’, when Turkey judges that it is to her best interest to do so. Turkey will, once more, accept the congratulations of our European partners and the international community for the flexible and co-operative attitude she has demonstrated. As for us, we will be left gaping, trying to find out where it all went wrong.
What should concern us much more than the issue of the Protocol is the gradual upgrading of the illegal state within the international community. If one takes as an example the recent ‘elections’ in the occupied areas, one will see that, whilst our government was using belittling adjectives to describe the ‘elections’ in the occupied areas, the European Commission and the Foreign Affairs Ministry of the USA hailed the election of Mehmet Ali Talat and considered it as confirmation of the Turkish Cypriot community’s will to achieve a solution. At the same time they repeated their determination to help the Turkish Cypriot community to come out of its “isolation”.
We have to realise that the stance of the EU vis-à-vis the pseudo-state has changed dramatically since the Turkish Cypriots voted ‘yes’ in the referendum. It is crystal clear that people elected by the ‘elections’ that take place in the occupied areas, even if they are not considered to represent a legitimate state, are still considered to represent the Turkish Cypriot community. This is also proven by the formula developed by the Council of Europe in order to allow Turkish Cypriots to be represented (the ‘members of parliament’ who represented the Turkish Cypriots in the Council of Europe were elected in illegal elections).
Whilst we console ourselves that the illegal status of the occupied areas will remain and that the pseudo-state will never be recognised as a legitimate, official state, the bare fact of the matter is that third countries (our European partners included) are acting as though it is a similar case as that of Taiwan, that is to say there exists a community that they wish to have relations with. The dangers behind a constant burying of our heads in the sand are visible. The only chance we have of reuniting Cyprus is if we pull our heads out of the sand and face the issue by entering a new round of real negotiations.
Otherwise, we may save the “Republic of Cyprus” in name, but the price will be to have a “TRNC” with a “Taiwan” status next to us.
Copyright © Cyprus Mail 2005