Cyprus-Forum.com

by **insan** » Wed Feb 23, 2005 6:15 pm

How Cyprus's wounds are hurting Europe - 23.12.2004

How Cyprus's wounds are hurting Europe

By Quentin Peel

Words such as "historic" were being freely bandied about in the corridors of the European Council's headquarters in Brussels last week after the deal was done to launch negotiations with Turkey to join the European Union.

If the process comes to its intended conclusion - in about 10 years - it will demonstrate the extraordinary capacity of the EU to heal the wounds of history. If Europe can bind Christians and Muslims in one great secular construction, it would provide a dramatic demonstration that the "clash of civilisations" is not inevitable.

Yet it was a moment that very nearly did not happen. A combination of clumsy diplomacy by the Dutch presidency of the EU and legalistic quibbles by both the Turkish and Greek Cypriot delegations almost brought it to grief. It took the intervention of the Big Three - Britain's Tony Blair, France's Jacques Chirac and Germany's Gerhard Schröder - to force a conclusion.

There is a clear lesson for the future politics of the EU. If the Three act together, they can deliver deals. Equally, there is an ominous omen for the negotiations with Turkey. For it was not the worries of European politicians about the risks of opening their doors to such a large, poor and overwhelmingly Muslim country that nearly scuppered the deal. It was the unresolved conflict over Cyprus, one of the smallest of the new member states.

If that row cannot be resolved then Turkey's membership talks could drag on forever. Tassos Papadopoulos, the president of Cyprus, has boasted that he has no fewer than 64 opportunities to veto and block the process: one at the beginning and one at the end, and two for each of the 31 technical chapters. It is a dreadful prospect.

On Friday, Mr Papadopoulos was persuaded not to veto. He found himself isolated among the 25, with even Greece determined to give Turkey a firm date. When he protested to the Big Three that Turkey must be forced to grant his government formal recognition, he was silenced by a tirade from Mr Chirac.

Yet the question of recognition is at the heart of the problem. Turkey refuses to recognise the Republic of Cyprus as the government of the whole island because in doing so it would have to de-recognise the Turkish Cypriot administration in the north. More fundamentally, it would amount to an admission that the Cyprus conflict is an internal matter and therefore nothing to do with the United Nations, which has spent years trying to mediate a peaceful resolution.

At the same time, the Cyprus government refuses to recognise the northern administration, created after the Turkish invasion of 1974 and maintained with the presence of more than 30,000 Turkish troops.

The trouble is, Northern Cyprus has voted in favour of the UN peace plan put forward by Kofi Annan, while the Greek Cypriot republic voted against it. Now Mr Papadopoulos is blocking attempts by the other EU member states to reward the north with financial aid and direct trade links.

Every piece of the jigsaw puzzle is connected. The lack of any EU aid package has undermined the position of Mehmet Ali Talat, the northern Cypriot prime minister, who was instrumental in persuading his co-citizens to vote Yes to the Annan plan, against the advice of Rauf Denktash, their president. Mr Talat faces critical parliamentary elections in February but his position is clearly weaker than it was.

In Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the prime minister, managed to persuade his powerful military establishment to go along with a Cyprus deal as a vital concession to open the door for his EU membership negotiations. That was before the Greek Cypriots said No. He simply cannot and will not recognise Cyprus - his trump card - until a peace settlement is in place. In New York, Mr Annan says he will only put his plan back on the table if all parties say they want to do a deal.

So that means persuading Mr Papadopoulos and his government to spell out their objections, and engage in the process.

The question is whether he really wants a deal or would prefer to maintain the status quo and therefore not share power on the island.

The key is to persuade both Turkish and Greek Cypriots that a deal is not a zero-sum game: it will bring benefits to both sides. But both must be prepared to give ground. The Turkish Cypriots must be ready to live without the Turkish security umbrella. Greek Cypriots must accept that there will not be full restitution of property to all who fled the north, and that they cannot expect all Turkish settlers since 1974 to be expelled.

Concessions can be made: Greek Cypriots still do not trust Turkey to stick to the deal. There needs to be a stronger international guarantee. But the fact that Turkey will be negotiating EU membership will provide a huge disincentive for Ankara to pull out.

More money should be made available from outside - from the EU, Britain, the US - to pay compensation to Greek Cypriots who cannot get their property back. At present they are convinced they will end up paying for it themselves. The Annan plan also needs to be made more workable: it is awfully complicated in seeking to balance two semi-independent entities in one confederal state.

Finally, Turkey will have to agree that it does not need to keep troops on the island even after a deal has been done. The present plan allows them to have 650 there as a token force, while the Greeks can have 850.

Such concessions could still unblock a deal. But the big question remains: does Mr Papadopoulos want one? If he does not, then prepare for the 64 vetoes.

FT 23 December 2004
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