by zan » Sat Aug 04, 2007 4:15 am
The Move Toward Violence, 1953-55
The failure of the British to offer any hope of a change in Cyprus=s colonial status was met by Greek Cypriots with a growing surge toward militancy, particularly (and perhaps exclusively) by those insisting in enosis. Greek scholar Ioannis Stefanidis explains this in Isle of Discord.
The emergence of a moderate, 'constitutional' faction in Cypriot politics was never a serious possibility. This was not due to lack of potential leaders. Rather, it seems that [John] Clerides, the former mayor of Nicosia, and Hryssafinis, a prominent lawyer and former member of the Executive Council, did try to do some groundwork for the return of the island to constitutional life. They were joined by purged members of AKEL, such as Ioannou, its former Secretary- General and newspaper publisher, and, on 30 March 1953, they even managed to hold a small pro-constitution meeting at Limassol. Their efforts failed as a result of, firstly, the British failure to produce a credible and workable proposal for constitutional advance, and, secondly, the relentless hostility of the Ethnarchy. Like his predecessors, Makarios feared that the introduction of a constitutional regime, unless coupled with a clear and short timetable for a plebiscite, would lead to the formation of political parties, which 'would tend to neglect [the] national struggle' in their pursuit of parochial political goals. The Archbishop used every opportunity, be it the plebiscite anniversary or his periodic sermons at Faneromeni, to warn against any constitutional 'deviation' from nationalist orthodoxy. Under the circumstances, those who dared defy such warn- ings and threats never managed to attract enough popular support.
A matter of urgency
By 1953, the Ethnarchy leaders had enough reasons for concern about the prospects of their campaign. Four General Assembly sessions had passed since the 1950 plebiscite without the Cyprus question being formally raised. There was an acute feeling among the Cypriots of being made an exception at a time when, as Makarios put it to Papagos, they failed 'to achieve whatever the semi-civilised peoples of today are achieving by their perseverance'. There were also signs, according to diplomatic sources at least, that Cypriot opinion had begun to show 'a surprising lack of sincere interest' in Enosis, Wagner, the US Consul, continued to speak of a, however latent, constitutionalist current of opinion. In October 1953, he ' appeared to believe that a timely British offer might induce a sufficient number of influential Cypriots to accept it 'out of political desperation or in self-interest'." Georgios Seferiadis, Greek Ambassador in Beirut, confirms that this prospect deeply concerned the Archbishop. After meeting with Makarios on 7 November, he noted in his diary that 'the Ethnarchy, despite its best efforts, cannot keep people's feeling on its side. The fear was that the prolongation of the present regime might prejudice the outcome of a plebiscite, even if it was held after two or three years.' In view of all this, Seferiadis concluded, 'something had to be done soon'.
Makarios' first reaction was to try to galvanise the faithful with ever more combative rhetoric. Preaching at Faneromeni on 28 June 1953, he braced his flock for sacrifices, arguing that Britain never set any people free unless forced to do so by violent means. He also sent a clear warning to the Greek government, when he exclaimed that the Cypriots would 'stretch out both our right and our left hands to accept help from the East as well as the West' in pursuing their cause. After addressing his petition to the UN Secretary-General, on 10 August 1953, Makarios authorised his envoy to New York, Savvas Loizidis, to solicit the support of members of the African-Asiatic group. Loizidis was able to report that the Thai representative was being sympathetic. Although this did not amount to much, the Archbishop, in his subsequent appeal to Papagos for sponsorship, once more referred to resorting 'to every means' and 'the affections of foreigners' Perhaps, Makarios did not as yet know that Papagos' mind was evolving towards the UN option. By early 1954, the initiative in the pursuit of Enosis had passed from Nicosia to Athens. Kyrou told the US Ambassador in March 1954 that Makarios' visit and activities in the Greek capital were 'of quite secondary importance', since the government had already decided to resort to the UN. From then on, Makarios concentrated on sustaining that decision against any slackening or sign of compromise. His repudiation of Stefanopoulos' acceptance of a constitution cum eventual self-determination in late April, and Papagos' subsequent reaffirmation of the UN course proved that his reactions could not be ignored by Athens. That particular intervention becomes more significant with hindsight, as it came exactly when the British Foreign Office was close to endorsing a formula similar to that envisaged by Stefanopoulos. Of course, the Archbishop could have no idea about deliberations behind Whitehall walls. Once again, the reasons of his reaction were mainly internalCofficial references to a compromise tended to 'dismay and confuse' the Ethnarchy camp and exposed it to AKEL polemics.
Similar considerations probably led Makarios to oppose an effort by Tom Driberg, a Labour MP, to convene an all-party political debate in Nicosia, in early September 1954. Driberg persuaded Mayor Dervis to invite some 250 prominent Greek Cypriots of every political persuasion as well as Turkish Cypriots to attend the meeting. The agenda included all aspects of the island's political problem, from the British constitutional offer to self-determination. The Arch- bishop found himself in an awkward position from which he was extricated thanks to the short-sightedness of the colonial authorities. The insistence of the police to be present and able to dissolve the gathering, if it turned 'seditious', led Dervis to have it cancelled. Driberg left Cyprus in frustration and anger, comparing the colonial regime to a 'fascist and police State'.
The use of force
The price Makarios would ultimately have to pay for his ascendancy was his sliding into the hard line advocated by his fair weather companions in the struggle for Enosis. From 1951 onwards, resort to forceful methods was advocated by irredentists such as Kyprianos of Kyrenia and the quasi-professional Enosist circle in Athens. Prominent among the latter were Georgios Stratos, a former Minister for War, Law Professor Dimitrios Vezanis, a former theoretician of General Metaxas' inter-war authoritarian regime, and the expatriate Loizidis brothers, Savvas and Sokratis. In May 1951 , these men solicited the services of retired Colonel Georgios Grivas, a seasoned warrior and die-hard nationalist of Cypriot descent. According to Savvas Loizidis, the prospect of armed struggle had the blessing of Archbishop Spyridon of Athens, while Makarios himself had appeared willing to discuss it. Exactly a year later, while in Athens, Makarios came under pressure to sanction a concrete plan of action. In the event, a Struggle Committee was formed and organisational groundwork commenced.
Yet Makarios' attitude to the use of force remained ambiguous even after Grivas' plans got under way. At the same time, he proved unwilling or unable to distance himself from the ring of extremists in Athens, possibly because he wanted to retain a measure of control over their actions too. Thus, in March 1953, Makarios joined the other members of the Struggle Committee in taking an oath to support Enosis unto death, in the fashion of nineteenth century secret societies. At that point, Grivas was appointed military chief of the struggle, but the Archbishop reserved the last word for himself." Makarios' conversion to the use of force appeared complete by June 1953, but he would continue to disagree with Grivas and his associates over the scale of the operations, which he wanted limited to acts of sabotage.
The plans for armed struggle in Cyprus had been known to Papagos since their inception, as some of those involved, like General Georgios Kosmas, belonged to his entourage. Colonel Grivas claimed that the Field Marshal had never given any encouragement, while, after his coming to power, he sought to stop the Colonel's scheming through various intermediaries, at one point threatening him with arrest. Yet the fact remains that Papagos and his government raised no obstacles to the illicit activities of Grivas and his associates in the Struggle Committee. His sole concern, as Grivas notes, was to ensure that his personal knowledge of the plot remained secret. At the same time, he turned a blind eye to the collusion of Greek officials with the preparation of the struggle.
By the time the Greek government decided to raise the Cyprus question at the UN, Greek foreign policy-makers envisaged some show of force in Cyprus as a last resort. By way of contrast, Colonel Grivas and the Struggle Committee insisted that the diplomatic effort should be complemented by dynamic methods. Makarios had also come to share this view, although he continued to insist that operations be limited to sabotage. However, although he was recognised as supreme authority of the future struggle, he had little control over Grivas' planning. Thus, on 2 March 1954, the first shipload of arms and explosives safely landed on an isolated Cyprus beach.
Following Armitage's anti-seditious pronouncements in August, Makarios asked Grivas to step up preparations. Then, the dilemma arose whether to sanction the use of force pending the discussion of the Greek item at the General Assembly or to await its outcome. In Makarios' view, some acts of sabotage might prove sufficient to impress foreign opinion, particularly in the United States, that the prolongation of British rule in Cyprus was fast leading to a new crisis in the Middle East. On his way to New York in early October 1954, Makarios saw Grivas in Athens and asked him to wait for his signal. At the UN seat, however, he found Kyrou still hopeful that a change in US attitude could be achieved without resort to violent means. Thus, it was decided to postpone action until after the Assembly.
Nonetheless, Grivas embarked for Cyprus in late October. He arrived there on 10 November and methodically set about organising small guerrilla groups, which he trained in the use of arms and explosives. For manpower, Grivas tapped the reservoir of former PEON [Pancyprian National Youth Organization] members. At the same time he set up an effective network of intelligence and couriers in villages and towns. To this end, he relied on the loyal co-operation of Azinas and his associates in PEK [All-Farmers Union of Cyprus].
Back in Cyprus after the General Assembly, the Archbishop met Grivas on 11 January 1955 and gave him the green light. According to Makarios, Kyrou had advised action right after the UN debacle, while Papagos had come round the idea too. D-day was set for 25 March, Greek Independence Day. The capture of 'Agios Georgios' with its cargo of explosives and other difficulties only caused a slight delay. On Makarios' insistence, there would be only acts of sabotage against military targets. Eventually, during the night of 31 March-1 April, EOKA would enter the stage with blasts that rocked the island.
From the outset, AKEL would come out against the use offeree. In his Reminiscences, Secretary-General Papaioannou claims that, as early as mid-1954, he had been warned by an unnamed Greek officer to 'keep out of the struggle'. In December, the party condemned as provocative the violent incidents which took place in the aftermath of the Greek failure at the UN and threatened to undermine inter-communal relations. On 13 January 1955, its Central Committee denounced the allusions of the Athens radio broadcasts to violence and declared its commitment to a struggle by peaceful means. Equally damning was the party's first reaction to the EOKA explosions of 1 April 1955. Having helped to set the genie free by commencing the drive towards internationalisation, the Communist Party of Cyprus had by then forsaken its ability to influence the course of events.
