by zan » Sun Dec 23, 2007 2:40 am
2. Movement: the Refugee Exodus
(a) The Greek-Cypriot Community
A comparison of the 1960 and 1970 census figures indicates that there were possibly 12 mixed villages which have been wholly or partially evacuated by Greek-Cypriots because of inter-communal fighting between 21 December 1963 and 10 August 1964. The total number of Greek-Cypriots involved was 750 according to the 1960 census; however, field investigation indicates that very little of this rural Greek-Cypriot exodus can be attributed to the conflict. Probably less than 200 Greek-Cypriots from six mixed villages became refugees because of fighting or tension after 21 December 1963. The apparent evacuation of the other locations was due either to peculiarities in the census formats or to a general trend of rural depopulation resulting from urbanization.[61]
Official government figures[62] indicate that in 1967 442 Greek-Cypriot owned houses were in Turkish-Cypriot hands, or were abandoned either because they had been damaged by fighting or because of their proximity to dangerous areas. These figures however do not indicate the number of these houses which had been leased to Turk-Cypriots when fighting began. These houses were distributed among six towns: 236 in Nicosia; 42 in Famagusta; 66 in Larnaca; 44 in Ktima; 12 in Polis; 42 in Lefka. During the street fighting which occurred in Nicosia, Larnaca and Ktima, it is probable that a few thousand Greek-Cypriots fled from their homes. However, the majority of these people were able to return in a matter of days. The total number of rural and urban Greek-Cypriots who could be classified as refugees at the end of 1970 was probably only a few hundred.
On 4 March 1964, Turk-Cypriots evicted all Armenians from the Turkish-Cypriot quarters of Nicosia. This expulsion followed on the discovery of apparent collusion between some Armenians and armed Greek-Cypriot irregulars. Two hundred and thirty one Armenian houses were taken over by Turk-Cypriots, and their residents were given only a few hours notice to leave.[63] This expulsion gave rise to intense enmity against Turk-Cypriots within the small Armenian community; however, the Armenians had cast their lot with the Greek-Cypriots.[64] In the light of this decision, and of the situation created by the conflict, the responsibility for the Armenian expulsion cannot be wholly attributed to Turk-Cypriot extremists.
(b) The Turkish-Cypriot Community
We have previously noted that the process of urbanization and the refugee movements during the EOKA campaign had contributed to a progressive separation of the Cypriot ethnic communities. This disengagement was accelerated by the violent inter-communal conflict between December 1963 and August 1964.
During this period, Turkish-Cypriots completely evacuated their quarters in 72 mixed villages and abandoned 24 Turkish-Cypriot villages. In addition, they partially evacuated 8 mixed villages. In every one of the six district towns a partial evacuation of the Turkish-Cypriot quarters had occurred. Turk-Cypriots had partially returned to 21 villages which they had evacuated during the EOKA campaign. All but three of these villages were evacuated for a second time after December 1963. The total number of Turkish-Cypriot refugees cannot be accurately assessed because of the confusion of the period. It is known that in 1970 about 20,000 Turkish-Cypriots were registered as refugees with Turkish-Cypriot welfare authorities. If we consider the number of refugees who have not registered for welfare benefits and those refugees who have subsequently returned to their homes, UNFICYP's estimate of 25,000, as the maximum number of Turk-Cypriot refugees during the period of December 1963 to August 1964, seems quite reasonable. About two-thirds of these initially left their homes and moved to other villages and towns. The remaining one-third moved to other quarters within the same village or town.
By 1970 about 1,300 Turkish-Cypriot refugees had returned to 19 mixed villages and 5 Turk-Cypriot villages. Thus by 1970, 57 formerly mixed villages were wholly Greek-Cypriot, and 19 Turk-Cypriot villages remained deserted (i.e. in relation to the 1960 census).[68] . . .
If we consider the refugee movement outside the district towns, we find that the exodus occurred in a number of waves. The initial movement occurred in 1963 when fighting first broke out in Nicosia and Larnaca. The majority of the refugee movements took place from the villages near these towns; 16 per cent of all villages evacuated between December 1963 and August 1964 were abandoned within a few days of 23 December 1963. The December refugee movement was halted by Greek-Cypriot blockades. However, after freedom of movement agreements were negotiated in January 1964, a second refugee movement took place. The evacuations of January were much more widespread than those of December and accounted for 51 per cent of all villages eventually deserted by August 1964. During the first half of February a third movement took place, primarily in Paphos District, which accounts for 18 per cent of all village evacuations. Three villages were evacuated during the second week in March, and two on 11 May. The last major refugee movement occurred in the Tylliria Region on 4 August as a result of the Greek-Cypriot offensive. . .
Turk-Cypriots generally left those mixed villages in which they were in a minority. In addition, they left 10 mixed villages in which they were the majority, according to the 1960 census. However, hundreds of Greek-Cypriot armed reinforcements moved into many mixed villages in which Turk-Cypriots were in the majority, and so, at the time of their exodus, the Turk-Cypriots were in fact in the minority. In any case, the majority-minority status is more accurately defined by taking a broader view than one confined to the ethnic composition of each village in isolation. Invariably a Turkish-Cypriot majority in a given mixed village gives way to a minority status if the regional situation is considered.
The official Greek-Cypriot position is that the major portion of the Turkish-Cypriot refugee movement was both initiated and directed by Turkish-Cypriot leaders in accordance with a contingency plan to facilitate partition. Turkish-Cypriot leaders, on the other hand, claim that they had not developed any such contingency plan for population consolidation, nor did they initiate the movements which did occur. These leaders claim that their community members moved because they were intimidated by Greek-Cypriots, and that Turk-Cypriots fled, without prior planning, to the nearest refuge.
The author's investigations reveal that the overwhelming majority of Turk-Cypriot refugees moved only after Turk-Cypriots had been killed, abducted or harrassed by Greek-Cypriots within their village, quarter, or in the local vicinity. Most refugees expected to return to their homes within a few months at the most, and it was this assumption of an early return that facilitated their departure in the first place. In some instances, the evacuation of certain villages was encouraged by the expectation of an imminent invasion by Turkey. There was an understandable desire to withdraw from Greek-Cypriot areas which might become bombing targets of the Turkish air force. It was only in a few instances, after January 1964, that the Turkish-Cypriot Leadership took the initiative in recommending that certain villages should be evacuated. However, it is known that such advice was not always followed. Normally the Leadership was approached by village elders only after the villagers had already decided to evacuate, and they sought the Leadership's assistance In the pro- vision of transport and refugee housing. Any official administrative organization to direct refugee movements, or to oversee their welfare, was not established until the bulk of the refugees had already moved on their own initiative.
Generally, Turk-Cypriot refugees moved en masse to the nearest Turk-Cypriot village or quarter that was guarded by Fighters. In most cases, refugees fled from their homes, leaving clothing, furniture and food behind. Most of the abandoned villages and quarters were ransacked and even burned by Greek-Cypriots. A subsequent re-distribution of refugees took place when individual families left their first hostels for more distant areas where they had relatives, or where they could be near their property, or where they heard there was better accommodation, employment and security. If a village was gradually evacuated, the refugees would initially disperse more widely than those villagers who had been forced out at short notice. Many refugees from all over the island eventually moved to the Turkish-Cypriot quarter of Nicosia because it was here they thought homes and jobs could most readily be found. The Nicosia enclave also offered the most security since it was here that the Turkish National Contingent was stationed and the Fighters were strongest. In review, the pattern of refugee movement was not one that seems to have been designed to facilitate partition.
Although it appears unlikely that there was any centralized co-ordination of the Turk-Cypriot refugee exodus, there is ample proof that Turk-Cypriot political and military leaders controlled the return of refugees to their former homes. It is known that in late 1964 some local Fighter commanders resorted to armed threats and even murder to prevent some refugees from moving into government controlled areas,[69] but it is not known to what extent such actions were directed or condoned by leaders in Nicosia. However, such coercion should be put in perspective. The government was prepared to encourage the return of Turk-Cypriot refugees provided that they accepted government authority and that they did not return to 'sensitive' areas. Such areas included locations adjacent to Turkish-Cypriot enclaves or National Guard positions, and also mixed villages in which returned Turk-Cypriots would outnumber Greek-Cypriots. In addition, known Fighter leaders were specifically prohibited from returning. The acceptance of such pre-conditions would have won for the government the victory that it had failed to achieve by its armed offensive. In addition, the hostility of many local Greek-Cypriots was such that Turk-Cypriots did not believe that the government could fulfill its guarantees that returning refugees would not be molested. In any case, by August 1964, the abandoned homes were looted and often burned-out ruins. Neither community had the resources to rebuild the houses, to purchase new farming equipment or to provide resettlement grants. The side that undertook such indemnities would also be tacitly admitting to a degree of responsibility in the creation of the refugee problem, and that neither community was prepared to do.
