Cyprus-Forum.com

[halil]

Source: Patterns of Cypriot Identity or Why Cypriotism doesn't exist
by Jan Asmussen

Once there were over 340 villages in Cyprus in which Greek and Turkish Cypriots lived,
worked, loved, struggled, discussed, drunk and celebrated together.

Most people living in these villages developed specific indigenous identities.

"I'm Yorgos of the Panteli family, I'm a Potamian (from the village Potamia in the Nicosia
district), I'm a Greek Cypriot, and I'm a Greek."
"I'm Ahmet of the Özgür family, I'm a Potamian, I'm a Turkish Cypriot, and I'm a Turk."

There is a remarkable set of cultural similarities, common heritage and shared local identities
detectable in the history of both communities in Cyprus, many of which either vanished
during the last forty to thirty years or which remained but were overshadowed by the
repercussions of the unsolved Cyprus conflict.
To which extend can cultural similarities help to find a new understanding between Greek
and Turkish Cypriots? The answer might be: As little as the repetition of historical accusation
about 1963/64 and 1974 can do!

A sound knowledge of both history and culture are of course vital for reconciliation between
the two communities once a solution is found for the political problems of the island.
However, after such a reconciliation is reached, both Turkish and Greek Cypriots have to find
new ways of co-operation.
Young Cypriots are usually not able to communicate in more than one of the traditional
languages of Cyprus. Unlike their grandparents and parents, young Turkish Cypriots have
little knowledge of Greek, while the knowledge of Turkish never has been widespread among
Greek Cypriots in the first place.
The opening of the borders has provided both communities with the chance to get to know
each other (anew). For the young generation, the means of linguistic and cultural
communication are set by globalisation. Not old values of Cypriot culture, but world culture as
manifested in the English language and (mainly) western culture, make them realise today
that their perceptions of life are not far apart from each other.
Combining these features with the framework of the institutions and values of the European
Union might pave the way for a new Cyprus, which leaves the burdens of the past aside and
recalls patterns of a shared Cypriot identity as an incentive to create new ones in the future.

[Pyrpolizer]

In my opinion cypriotism is in the DNA that in anything else.I see a lot of similarities even to TCs with whom I totally disagree. The temperament has many similarities too.

[iceman]

In my opinion cypriotism is in the DNA that in anything else.I see a lot of similarities even to TCs with whom I totally disagree. The temperament has many similarities too.

Thats true,we have more in common with each other than anyone else we like to associate ourselves with..But as it happens,even in families,the biggest disputes are always over property.....is it not?

[humanist]

NO Cypriotism because we see each other as different, for no good reason may I add. Wrongs were done in past on Turkish speaking Cypriots, the last 32 years have been payback time , so lets kiss and make up. Before we waste another 33.

[iceman]

NO Cypriotism because we see each other as different, for no good reason may I add. Wrongs were done in past on Turkish speaking Cypriots, the last 32 years have been payback time , so lets kiss and make up. Before we waste another 33.

Thats OK by me....As long as you promise to kiss us before you decide to fu*k us next time.. (just joking)

[halil]

Cypriotism
So far, the term 'Cypriotism' has been used without a precise definition. It is now time to explicate its meaning more systematically. In broad terms, Cypriotism refers to the idea that Cyprus has its own sui generis character and, thus, must be viewed as an entity which is independent from both the motherlands of the two main communities of the island, that is, Greece and Turkey. This, of course, contrasts sharply with the view that dominates nationalist ideology (Greek- or Turkish-Cypriot) and views Cyprus as an extension of Greece and Turkey. For the Cypriotist, the independence or autonomy of Cyprus is manifest at different levels -- history, politics, social structure, culture -- but it rarely (and only in its more extreme expression) takes the form of a complete disengage ment from Greece and Turkey. Thus, Cypriotism does not deny the Greek or Turkish ethnicity of the inhabitants of the island; it stresses, however, that their ethnic identity -- and, thus, on a more general level. their culture -- has also acquired sui generis features which not only differentiate the Greek and the Turkish Cypriots from the Greeks and the Turks but also create some common ground between the two communities of the island (Lanitis 1963; The New Cyprus Association 1975; 1980). Cypriotism does not therefore promote the idea that there exists a Cypriot nation - unless 'nation' is understood as a strictly political-territorial category.
Since 1960 Cypriotism has been articulated as a 'de-ethnicized' political ideology, stressing that Cyprus is an independent polity with interests (social, political and economic) which may be different from those of either the Greek or the Turkish state; for the Cypriotists, to view the issue from a different angle, what matters most is not the ethnicity of the inhabitants of Cyprus but their Cypriot citizenship. Whereas Cypriotist elements can be traced throughout the modern history of Cyprus, in the pre-1974 period Cypriotism rarely took the form of a systematic movement with the ability to challenge ideological orthodoxy on the island. It should not be surprising therefore that very few historical documents or declarations of Cypriotist ideology exist and those that do are mostly in leftist publications. What we could even call the 'bashfulness' with which Cypriotists have publicly expressed themselves is, of course, directly related to the dominance of nationalist ideology. From the 1920s to the 1940s elements of Cypriotism can be found in declarations of the Cypriot Communist Party [KKK], which later became transformed into AKEL, and the newspapers (Torch) and New Man affiliated with the left. For the early Cypriot communists, the explicit rejection of Greek-Cypriot nationalism emanated from Marxist ideology and its internationalist stress on the primacy of the class struggle; in this view, nationalism was an instance of false consciousness, simply an ideology solidifying the dominance of the bourgeoisie, and the working classes of the two communities ought to unite and promote their common interests. In the 1940s Cypriotism was passionately expressed by the communist mayor of Famagusta, A. Adamantos, and other leftists, the most eminent of whom were P. Servas and F. Ioannou, who distanced themselves from AKEL on the ground of its shift to a pro-enosis stance. Along with the communist version of Cypriotism, however, there was also a liberal modernist Cypriotism, expressed mainly by N. Lanitis, one of the leading industrialists of the island, who had founded the Party of Progress in the 1940s. Lanitis's (1963, p. 7) views centred on the idea that the cooperation between the two communities is the sine qua non for modernization and economic development and, more generally, 'progress'. Lanitis (1963, p. maintained that 'union and only union was essentially a negative policy' and urged the Greek- Cypriots 'to apply self-restraint in (their) nationalist aspirations' and to honour their signature on the London-Zurich agreement. Despite the latter's limitations, Lanitis (1963, pp. 6-8) writes, the agreement 'is as good as the men who apply if and it is primarily the Greek-Cypriot majority's responsibility 'to gain the confidence of the Turks'.
Whereas there can be no doubt that Cypriotism has largely developed in explicit opposition to Greek nationalism in Cyprus, the student of nationalism may indeed raise the issue of whether Cypriotism is itself a different form of nationalism. Cypriotism meets many of the criteria offered in most definitions of nationalism - the stress upon common history, homeland, culture (Kellas 1991; Smith 1991) - and thus could be described as Cypriot, as distinct from Greek-Cypriot, nationalism. It is thus possible to view Cypriotism as a civic, or even 'anti-ethnic', nationalism and refer to its battle with Greek ethnonationalism as a clash of opposing nationalisms. Whereas the adherents of Greek nationalism usually have no trouble with the label 'nationalist', the Cypriotists present their views as explicitly anti-nationalist - assuming that the only type of nationalism that exists is ethnic nationalism which they view as inherently chauvinistic - and would certainly reject the label; especially since in Cyprus the latter has been closely associated with Greek-Cypriot irredentism.
Broadly speaking, it may be argued that the contrast between Greek nationalism and Cypriotism corresponds to the political opposition between right and left. Historically, however, the picture concerning the social bases of the two ideologies has been more complex. Until 1960 the main carrier forces of Greek-Cypriot nationalism had been drawn from the groups dominating Greek-Cypriot politics: the urban bourgeoisie, the clergy, and the Greek-educated intelligentsia (Kitromilides 1979); in as far as these groups constitute the political right, and notwithstanding that nationalism had a wider appeal to the masses, it can certainly be said that the leadership of nationalism had been monopolized by the right; and this despite the fact that even the communists, who had feebly expressed some Cypriotist positions, often adhered to an enosist ideology. Following independence, on the other hand, Cypriotism began to be clearly associated with the elites who had vested interests in Cypriot independence - more specifically in the existence of an independent Cypriot state apparatus - and which certainly cannot be placed in the political left; Cypriotism continued, of course, to be expressed by AKEL, even though the communists again reverted to a pro-enosis position from 1963 to 1966 (Kakoulli 1990).3 Makarios's policy of independence, moreover, definitely drew support from part of the right and the majority of the centrist forces. In the immediate post- 1974 years, when Cypriotism gained considerable ground and to a significant extent became officialized in state ideology, nationalism was confined to the right and, perhaps, only its most extreme elements. With the emergence of a new Greek-Cypriot nationalism in the mid-1980s, Cypriotism begins to be closely associated with the communist left, with the socialist EDEK (Unified Democratic Union of the Centre) appearing as one of the most nationalistically inclined political forces on the island (Stamatakis 1991; Peristianis 1995). However, Cypriotist elements and orientations can be found in almost all political parties, and it should be clear that the reduction of the contest between nationalism and Cypriotism into a left-right opposition cannot be fully sustained and can only oversimplify the picture.
The most methodical formulation of the Cypriotist ideology that developed in the first post-1974 years was provided by the New Cyprus Association, an organization which was founded in March 1975, with the aim of promoting and safeguarding Cypriot independence. The Association's founding was an explicit reaction to the events of 1974, an attempt to create an atmosphere in which the mistakes that led to 1974 could not possibly be repeated. The Neocypriots proclaimed that it was high time to formulate 'the lessons that must be drawn out of the fires of Pentadaktylos', referring to the northern mountain range of Cyprus which was the site of intense fighting during the Turkish invasion (The New Cyprus Association 1975). The prevailing mood of the people who set up the Association becomes deal in their official Declaration:
Now that the tears are dry, now that the anger and despair have gone we must think: We have been happy, we have been honest, tolerant and liberal. We had been leading a serene and carefree existence and we were silent. Now we are paying for our silence. We, the silent majority. must search our mind and our conscience so that we can realize the sudden awakening of the seven days. Our children and the coming generations expect us to act so that they will not find themselves in the same position as ours (The New Cyprus Association, 1975).
Given the division of the island in 1974 - and its undeniable connection to Greek-Cypriot nationalism - it is probably true that in the immediate post-1974 years the New Cyprus Association indeed expressed the prevailing Greek-Cypriot sentiments. The Association's foremost political priority was to ensure that this 'majority' was never again to remain silent, as it had remained when the Republic of Cyprus was being under mined by nationalist extremists and the Greek junta.
The New Cyprus Association (1975) had no intention to 'deny ethnic origins and cultural links' and made it clear that 'we cannot forget our national descent'. It stressed, however, that the inhabitants of Cyprus 'must as a people consider themselves as Cypriots first and foremost and then as Greeks, Turks, or others'. And this, precisely because 'the most significant cause of our present predicament is that the two major communities were living in air-tight separateness without contact and with the wrong conceptions about each other - and that a significant cause for this has been the separate orientations and organization of Cyprus society, and the wrong slogans'. For the Neocypriots,
the danger of the partition of Cyprus or the dissolution of our state ii imminent and the responsibility for preventing this belongs mainly to us the Cypriots and no country outside Cyprus can help effectively either because it has not the power or because its interests are not always identified with ours.
In the Association's view, ethnic separation must be overcome through 'the rapprochement and continuous cultivation of understanding between the two communities so that our common features will be fully realized and emphasized and our differences confined and alleviated' (The New Cyprus Association, 1975).
Despite the small size of the Association, the Neocypriots played a prominent role in pressuring the official Greek-Cypriot leadership to denationalize the Republic of Cyprus and to assume an explicit policy of independence (Peristianis 1995). Its members were mostly intellectuals and professionals from the educated elite of the island, especially those who had studied in Europe or North America. It is interesting to note that people who belong to the Association are eager to confess that the fact that they received their education in countries other than Greece has changed their perspective considerably, enabling them to understand the importance of interethnic communication in a multicultural society. It must, of course, be pointed out that this mostly Anglo-Saxon-educated elite has definite vested interests in Cypriot independence and especially the state apparatus that developed after 1960 out of the British colonial administrative structures.
Whereas the members of the Association were drawn mostly from the broader political left and centre, the organization made a conscious effort to stay above party politics. It presented itself not as a new political party, but, rather, as a pressure group intending to gain support from a broad ideological spectrum, excluding, of course, the radical nationalist elements. The Association was relatively successful in keeping a distance from all political parties, thus managing to attract people who belonged to the traditional right. Given that the Greek-Cypriot disaster of 1974 was also a failure of democracy, the Association stressed the importance of safeguarding the democratic process. The adoption of democratic principles in all aspects of our political life and the strict adherence to them', it is stated in the Association's official declaration (1975), 'is an indispensable prerequisite for the correct evolution of our society'.

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