Cyprus-Forum.com

[denizaksulu]

Humanist; Goodmorning to you and all. Unfortunately you have used an unfortunate term "Punishment fits the crime". Lots of TCs will also use that expression for the Greeks. "Punishment for for the crime of wanting Enosis". That is how they percieve the situation. Do you agree? I suggest you choose your expressions with more care. I am not denying at all that innocent people have suffered. It should never have happened.

Acusations and counter accusations will get us nowhere. The only benefit of "accusations" is to create more hardliners which will make it more difficult for any peace between us.
Regards
DA

[kafenes]

Humanist; Goodmorning to you and all. Unfortunately you have used an unfortunate term "Punishment fits the crime". Lots of TCs will also use that expression for the Greeks. "Punishment for for the crime of wanting Enosis". That is how they percieve the situation. Do you agree? I suggest you choose your expressions with more care. I am not denying at all that innocent people have suffered. It should never have happened.

Acusations and counter accusations will get us nowhere. The only benefit of "accusations" is to create more hardliners which will make it more difficult for any peace between us.
Regards
DA

Deniz, I was told that there was a referendum around 1960 or thereabouts (don't know the exact year) and 91% voted for Enosis.
If the 82% were GC, AC, Maronites etc. then this means 50% of TCs voted for Enosis. Could this be true?

[humanist]

Deniz, although I used the term in generic terms and not necessarily in relation to Cyprus I take your point and I retract that statement. As far as the rest of your coments about accusations create hardliners I do agree and therefore happy to retract the coment

cheers





Kafenes, although an interesting question, I doubt it very much that 50% of turksih seaking Cypriots would have voted yes to Enosis with Greece I would doubt ebevn if 30% would have done so. I would not have voted for Enosis at any period in time. My understandng is that Cypriots have always been economocally better off than Greeks. This would have been the only benefit as I would see it so why bother.

[denizaksulu]

Kafenes and Humanist, thanks for the response.
Regarding the "vote for Enosis". I read something like that but I am not sure of the date. Sometimes before that a vote was taken re: Enosis. Lots of TC Trade Unionists who had joined AKEL at that time. If I remember correctly there was a block vote where inadvertently a vote for Enosis was achieved. I am not aware if any of the TCs were aware of the vote, but I would tend to think that the TCs fell for this underhand ruse by AKEL. I am sure other members (GC) might be privy to more details. But rest assred, No TC would knowingly vote for Enosis.
I need to look through my archives.

[EPSILON]

Kafenes and Humanist, thanks for the response.
Regarding the "vote for Enosis". I read something like that but I am not sure of the date. Sometimes before that a vote was taken re: Enosis. Lots of TC Trade Unionists who had joined AKEL at that time. If I remember correctly there was a block vote where inadvertently a vote for Enosis was achieved. I am not aware if any of the TCs were aware of the vote, but I would tend to think that the TCs fell for this underhand ruse by AKEL. I am sure other members (GC) might be privy to more details. But rest assred, No TC would knowingly vote for Enosis.
I need to look through my archives.

The only thing which is not necessary to check is the fact that TCs before 1955 had the same relation with mainland Turkey as they have today with Ghanna.

[denizaksulu]

Epsilon;..and the point you are making? plz expand.
Regards
DA

[EPSILON]

Epsilon;..and the point you are making? plz expand.
Regards
DA

My point is that the case we are talking today "Cyprus problem" was not initially started because of GCs and Tcs were killing each other or majority was pressing minority but because of Britsh decision to use minority against the GCs freedom movement 1955-1960.

Any killings, descrepancies, separations etc created only by this fact.

Do not consider it very strange some Tcs to had voted in favour of Enosis (union) with Greece on 1950.They had not any bad feeling that time or any safety fears.

I can remind everybody that Gcs are Greeks not because Greece invated Cyprus but they are Greeks like Indians are Indians.

Now the theory saying that we are all Cypriots and not Greks and Turks appearred first time after 1962 when AKEL , acting by orders of Soviet Union tried to guide GCs far away from Enosis for the simple reason that ENOSIS was guiding Cyprus in NATO membership (as part of Greece).

Now Junta of Greece using fanatics from mainland and locally in Cyprus did what they did in 1974. This facists action which became the reason for today's situation allowed AKEL to find a big and easy base in population (GCs) -mixing the acts of fanatics with the population will for Enosis.

Ourdays , ofcourse Enosis is out of question , but the propaganta of a Cyprus nation remained and in some people is a deap believe that they are not Greeks but only Cypriots.

If someone is reading the modern history of Cyprus without fanatism and unchanged believes can accept the above statement.

[Pyrpolizer]

Humanist; Goodmorning to you and all. Unfortunately you have used an unfortunate term "Punishment fits the crime". Lots of TCs will also use that expression for the Greeks. "Punishment for for the crime of wanting Enosis". That is how they percieve the situation. Do you agree? I suggest you choose your expressions with more care. I am not denying at all that innocent people have suffered. It should never have happened.

Acusations and counter accusations will get us nowhere. The only benefit of "accusations" is to create more hardliners which will make it more difficult for any peace between us.
Regards
DA

Deniz, I was told that there was a referendum around 1960 or thereabouts (don't know the exact year) and 91% voted for Enosis.
If the 82% were GC, AC, Maronites etc. then this means 50% of TCs voted for Enosis. Could this be true?

It was in January 1950, and nobody could draw any conclussion from that signing of names in open books, and what that 95.7% yes really represented.

Quoting from Cyprus Conflict Web site:

,"It is not easy to draw any definite conclusions from this event since the population was persistently urged by the nationalists to vote and the voting took the form of signing one's name under a petition in public. If a Greek was to vote on this issue at all it was as embarrassing and risky for him to vote against Enosis as to declare in public that he was not a 'True Greek'."



The truth is some TCs voted yes. The reasoning was "sure if that is what our Gc brothers want why not"?
I am saying this because it proves how stupid we were to turn our brothers into enemies. Sure some Tcs considered us brothers enough to vote for Enosis. Where was our brotherhood and respect to the vast majority of TCs who didn't want Enosis?

[Pyrpolizer]

Epsilon;..and the point you are making? plz expand.
Regards
DA

My point is that the case we are talking today "Cyprus problem" was not initially started because of GCs and Tcs were killing each other or majority was pressing minority but because of Britsh decision to use minority against the GCs freedom movement 1955-1960.

Any killings, descrepancies, separations etc created only by this fact.

Do not consider it very strange some Tcs to had voted in favour of Enosis (union) with Greece on 1950.They had not any bad feeling that time or any safety fears.

I can remind everybody that Gcs are Greeks not because Greece invated Cyprus but they are Greeks like Indians are Indians.

Now the theory saying that we are all Cypriots and not Greks and Turks appearred first time after 1962 when AKEL , acting by orders of Soviet Union tried to guide GCs far away from Enosis for the simple reason that ENOSIS was guiding Cyprus in NATO membership (as part of Greece).

Now Junta of Greece using fanatics from mainland and locally in Cyprus did what they did in 1974. This facists action which became the reason for today's situation allowed AKEL to find a big and easy base in population (GCs) -mixing the acts of fanatics with the population will for Enosis.

Ourdays , ofcourse Enosis is out of question , but the propaganta of a Cyprus nation remained and in some people is a deap believe that they are not Greeks but only Cypriots.

If someone is reading the modern history of Cyprus without fanatism and unchanged believes can accept the above statement.

You might be right that Akel started the "all Cypriots" idea and although I am not a communist, I acknowledge its validity, and I embrace it.

You confuse 2 things. Ethnicity and Nationality.Of course we are ethnic Greeks and Ethnic Turks in Cyprus. That's why we have Greek and Turkish mother languages. But OUR NATIONALITY IS CYPRIOT. Do you know what nationality means? It means our interests, our concerns our everything is totally different than the interests of Turkey and Greece, totally different than those of the mainland Turks and Greeks. Even their governing systems are allien to us.

Have a look at your identity card or your passport. Does it mention anywhere the word Greek or Turkish? Does it clearly say NATIONALITY: CYPRIOT, yes or no?

This is what we are after 1960, and this is what we should aim with a solution to the Cyprob.

You may admire as much as you like your ethnic roots the same can be said about the Tcs, however don't place them above our CYPRIOT interests as defined by our NATIONALITY. Nobody has such a right.

[halil]

Kafenes and Humanist, thanks for the response.
Regarding the "vote for Enosis". I read something like that but I am not sure of the date. Sometimes before that a vote was taken re: Enosis. Lots of TC Trade Unionists who had joined AKEL at that time. If I remember correctly there was a block vote where inadvertently a vote for Enosis was achieved. I am not aware if any of the TCs were aware of the vote, but I would tend to think that the TCs fell for this underhand ruse by AKEL. I am sure other members (GC) might be privy to more details. But rest assred, No TC would knowingly vote for Enosis.
I need to look through my archives.

The only thing which is not necessary to check is the fact that TCs before 1955 had the same relation with mainland Turkey as they have today with Ghanna.

The Debate on Enosis: 1929

Greek Cypriots often remind their listeners that the movement to join Greece began much earlier than the 1950s, and in fact that is true. Sentiment for enosis was evident early in the twentieth century, and became the subject of continuous discussion. In this excerpt from his history of the 1931 confrontation with Britain over Cyprus= political status, G. S. Georghallides provides a glimpse of the nature of the debate over the island=s fate among Greek Cypriots. Not only does he provide a vivid picture of the tone and substance of the discourse, he signals how many different views there were - - in sharp contrast to the apparent, and rather rigid, uniformity of opinion characterizing the Greek Cypriot community in the 1950s, enforced by EOKA and the Church. He also indicates how significant the left-wing labor unions were in the politics of the island, another dimension of politics submerged in the conservative fundamentalism that emerged in mid-century. Georghallides is one of Cyprus=s most distinguished and accomplished historians.


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From the arguments presented in the press it is possible to distinguish three main trends: the nationalist-autonomist-enosists, the nationalist-enosists, and the pure enosists. It goes without saying that all three were agreed that the final goal should be the island's national restoration and achievement of liberty through its cession to Greece. The three groups were also equally dissatisfied with the practical results of British rule. Between the most moderate, the nationalist- autonomist-enosists, whose ideas in 1929 were articulated by K. P. Rossides and the Bishop of Kition, and the most intransigent, the pure enosists, with the Bishop of Kyrenia as their best known spokesman, the newspaper [Freedom] sought to be the exponent of a middle position, here defined as that of the nationalist-enosists. Indeed, it was Freedom that initiated the public discussion in January 1929 as a response to what it considered to be the dangerous views obtaining among the body of the Greek elected members of the Legislative Council in favour of self-government. Over the next three months, it published a series of articles warning against the espousal of autonomy as an intermediate Greek Cypriot demand. The arguments adduced were as follows. Political freedoms had of necessity been adopted as a stage towards union by the 1923 National Assembly - - a concession Freedom retrospectively regretted not least because it believed that the British had been more nervous when the demand was exclusively for enosis than when it became diluted to political liberties. The 1925 general elections had returned to the Legislative Council politicians pledged to co-operate with the authorities and to work for the economic improvement of Cyprus. No mandate had been asked for a policy of autonomy and any desire by the elected members now to declare themselves openly in favour of self-government lacked popular consent and was also tactically unsound. The current British rulers of Cyprus were more dangerous than their predecessors since they had on the one hand made it impossible for the Greeks to resort to mass public protests against their policies while on the other they kept the islanders in a state of financial and political oppression and harboured designs against the demographic and cultural character of the colony. Britain's inability to create conditions of relative happiness and prosperity had dealt a blow to its political plans and destroyed the islanders' respect for it.' This was not to say that there was room for complacency since even among the Cypriot graduates of Athens University there was little enough Panhellenic enthusiasm while the ordinary people did not appear actively to resent their position of helots and were mistakenly uneasy about the financial consequences of enosis: in order to enlighten them Freedom reported in glowing terms on Hellenic advances in rural credit facilities and social services. One disturbing fact discerned by Freedom was that the strongest supporters of autonomy were the Limassol communists, who had declared themselves against enosis. But non-communist politicians should not even coincidentally share common ground with them - - the British authorities being highly sensitive to the communist threat (vide the arbitrary imposition of the Penal Code) - - and the nationalist Cypriots ran the risk of finding themselves twice damned in British eyes. The Hellenic ideology had to be kept as pure and intense as possible in order properly to educate the succeeding generations and to stop them from becoming, under foreign influence, denationalised Levantines.

In short, Freedom was concerned to preserve the purity and strengthen the intensity of the Greek national cause at a time when the local politicians were, in its view, failing to give a decisive lead to the people and Venizelos's Greece refused to fill the gap in leadership. Being profoundly conservative, Freedom judged that the safest policy was one that made no compromise in advance, that based Greek Cypriot claims on ethnological rights and that steered the island's political course beyond the ephemeral changes in Greek foreign policy. It advocated a fuller mobilization of the people, under the control of an effective leader, and it anticipated that by the use of moral pressure alone the mechanism in British politics that would vindicate Cyprus's rights would sooner or later be triggered off. One further argument in favour of a policy of enosis was put forth during this stage by Theophanis Theodotou, namely that an intermediate phase of self-government entailed risks for a country such as Cyprus, without a homogeneous population and at the mercy of Britain's conscious undermining of the Greek Cypriots' nationalism.

When in March 1929 the texts of the Bishop of Kition's two pro-autonomy statements in Alexandria reached Cyprus, Freedom was greatly distressed. While wishing to spare the Bishop an outright denunciation, and while repeating that it held him in high regard, the paper expressed bitter disappointment at his demand for autonomy. Such a programme it claimed, neither the Cypriot people nor the Bishop's Lefkara electors had sanctioned in 1925. If correctly quoted, Nicodemos's utterances represented a personal and "paradoxical policy" in conflict with national traditions. Having for 740 years survived in slavery, without forgetting cultural roots and aspirations, how could the Cypriots now, when the dawn of their freedom was rising, enter into a "bastard compromise" which would in many respects hurt them and which would never constitute a definitive settlement? At the moment, Venizelos was in power in Greece, and on the strength of his past record it was not impossible that major political developments might be in the offing, or that Greece might in a few years be able to concern itself seriously with Cyprus. However - - and this indicated the paper's unwilling- ness to break completely with Nicodemos - - Freedom conceded two points: that autonomy under Greece, not England, could have been asked for with a degree of justification; and that no-one could anticipate the Cypriots' reaction in the event of Greece's undertaking an active role in the creation of an autonomous state joining Cyprus and the Dodecanese. Yet no sooner did Freedom make these concessions than Nicholson dismissed Stavrinakis from the Executive Council and quarrelled with the Legislative Councillors, events which, not unreasonably, reinforced the view of the conservative nationalists that the authorities would treat a demand for autonomy no more favourably than the calls for enonsis. At about this time Freedom also entered into an interesting debate with K. P. Rossides, who published his newspaper Democracy in Famagusta. As an agrarian, Rossides had a different outlook from his nationalist colleagues in the Legislative Council, tending usually to emphasise actual needs rather than future aspirations. In response to a challenge by Freedom to explain his views' he set out in a series of articles in his paper his strategy for autonomy-enosis. The following were his principal arguments, being akin to those put forth in 1921 by the opponents of abstention from the Legislative Council elections. The precedent of the union of the Ionian Islands with Greece could not conclusively apply in the case of Cyprus because the Ionian Islands were very much nearer to Greece, and in the nineteenth century Greece was actively pursuing its territorial expansion. At the present time, Greece could undertake no diplomatic or military action to bring about enosis. Since, without a strong Greek intervention, union was impossible, the Cypriots should appreciate the futility of continually asking for it, and they should instead demand autonomy. The sacrifice of the pro-enosis slogans should not be too painful since the enosis struggle, as hitherto conducted, had consisted almost exclusively of verbal declarations. The real choice facing the Greek Cypriots was not between enosis and autonomy, but between self-government or British government. Union might be delayed for years; therefore the Cypriots had a duty to promote, through self-government, their local interests, which suffered in the hands of indifferent, inexperienced, ignorant and transient British officials. The maintenance of colonies in a state of economic backwardness was a well known method employed by British imperialism in order to rule more easily over subject nations. The political aim of Cyprus should be to achieve, through economic liberation, political and national liberation. If the solution of the pressing economic problems of Cyprus by the Cypriots were delayed until the day of enosis, it could be tantamount to sentencing Cyprus to death. A manifest obligation existed to try to make people's lives more bearable. The improvement of conditions under autonomy need not be at the cost of a diminution in national consciousness. Proof of this was the fact that it was the townsmen - - those who possessed most financial independence - - who were the strongest nationalists. Conversely, the non-co-operation policy (1921-1925) had failed because the people were financially exhausted, and as a result entirely dependent on the Government. The present sterility in the political life of the country was due not to the innate shortcomings of the Cypriots but to the nature of British administration which encouraged the most negative qualities in their politicians. Democratic institu- tions could be developed only in conditions of freedom and, under a figurehead British governor, there was every prospect of success for an autonomous Cyprus.

As was to be expected, Freedom hotly contested Rossides's ideas. Putting on a brave face, it argued that between 1864 and 1929 geographical distance from Greece had been eliminated as an obstacle to enosis. In 1864 Greece was weak, and the Ottoman empire a major power. In the future, Greece, which had in the meantime grown stronger, would look for expansion southwards; the probabilities in favour of Cyprus's achieving union had not diminished. If the Greek Cypriots did not make their demand for union an important issue, or asked only for autonomy, how could Greece dare ask Britain to hand over the island to it? The Cypriots' only hope lay in being even more intransigent than the Ionian enosists, whereupon Britain would sooner or later be forced to reach a settlement with Greece, or Greece would be obliged to find a way of discussing Cyprus with Britain. In the same spirit, Freedom denied that Venizelos did not care about Cyprus, blaming the Cypriots' inertia for the existing stalemate. Venizelos was busy reforming the finances and armed forces of Greece, and in view of the Greco-Turkish disputes, chiefly over the Greek minority in Constantinople, war between the two countries could not be excluded. Should war break out it would be in Cyprus's interest not to be found with an autonomous regime. Freedom also partly disputed Rossides's explanation for the defeat of the non-co-operation policy. In its opinion the real reason for the failure had been the financial crisis and the Greek Asia Minor disaster. Moreover, the non-co-operation policy had its own narrow self-imposed limits, and its lack of success should not lead to the abandonment of the struggle. That struggle should be more radical than for autonomy, seeing that, as Rossides wrote, Britain kept its colonies in economic subjugation. As for Rossides's assumption that Britain would respond more kindly to a Cypriot demand for autonomy, Freedom (it will be recalled that in a slightly different context it had itself recently pronounced the essential moral worth of Britain) considered such thoughts to be naive and based on a misunderstanding: "the moment Great Britain begins to show genuine good-will [towards its colonies] it will see itself collapsing". Rossides's general philosophy Freedom dismissed as influenced by fashionable theories of historical materialism. The people of Cyprus had in the past preserved their identity by the power of an ideal which had survived repeated failures. If now the ideal were to be abandoned, what would save the Cypriots in the event of the failure to achieve autonomy, or of the failure of autonomy itself? The newspaper dreaded that communism or anarchy would quickly destroy the character and unity of Cypriot society.

N. Kl. Lanitis, the leading nationalist politician of Limassol to whom Freedom usually referred disparagingly as more or less a windbag, now expressed ideas closer to its own. On March 29, 1929, he wrote in the Limassol Athenia that in his opinion it would not be easier to extract autonomy rather than enons from Britain. He believed that the imperialist-capitalist interests of Britain were better served by union, coupled with the maintenance of military facilities on the island, and that such a solution was favoured by the Lloyd George Liberals, the British Philhellenes and possibly the Labour party. In another article published in [a Limassol newspaper], quoted by Freedom, Lanitis cited additional grounds against a direct Cypriot demand for autonomy. He pointed out that, unlike the Irish, the Cypriots did not by themselves constitute a nation seeking independence. They were an unfree part of a nation which possessed its own state. Consequently, for the Greek Cypriots freedom was synonymous with union with Greece. Furthermore, it was right for the Greeks to want to avoid the proliferation of autonomous provinces (formerly favoured by Tsarist Russia as a means of restricting the power of Greece) since several states meant weak states which, inevitably, as the examples of Samos and Crete had shown, spent their energies on bitter and corrupting internal conflicts. Autonomy would distance Cyprus from the goal of enosis, because the British Government would say that in granting autonomy it had satisfied the Cypriot political claims. Moreover, if the Greek Cypriots were to demand autonomy they would be doing so under false pretences: they would intend to use it only as a step towards enosis. Nevertheless, as a personal friend of Venizelos, Lanitis was not wholly intransigent. He admitted that notwithstanding the objections to asking for autonomy, any constitutional improvements that might be offered by Britain should be accepted by the Cypriots. The proper course of action would be to avoid deviating from the demand for union, but to accept autonomy if decided upon by the British Government.

Into this protracted debate Venizelos himself was drawn on May 16, 1929, when he gave an interview to Kyros Stavrinides, the owner-editor of Freedom. The Greek Premier told Stavrinides that in some ways Cyprus reminded him of the national struggles of his birthplace, Crete. He suggested that as much as possible Cyprus should imitate Cretan policies, and he skilfully gave his interlocutor to understand that, in pursuing its national aspirations, the Greek Cypriots should neither decline any offers of improvements nor miss any opportunity for the achievement of a better fate under the British regime until the realisation of enosis. Stavrinides also published an interview with Panayis Tsaldaris, the leader of the opposition Populist party. He praised the Cypriots' patriotism and their insistence on union. In his opinion, while demanding enosis, the islanders could confidently expect at least autonomy, though autonomy would not necessarily speed up the grant of enosis. Tsaldaris feared in particular that the intensity of Greek Cypriot nationalism might be lessened by the feeling of satisfaction that autonomy could create as well as by the concentration of public attention on local rivalries for political influence. He added that in some respects the fate of Cyprus was connected with that of the Dodecanese where, however, there was no indication of an early change in Italian oppressiveness. So, barring unexpected developments, he was not optimistic about a solution of the Cyprus problem in the near future.

Following the political advice, albeit measured and oblique, from Athens, Freedom attempted a redefinition of its position on the autonomy-enosis controversy. In view of its editorials, it was surprising that on June 22 the paper declared that further public discussion was harmful because it was untimely. To their other internal disputes the Greek Cypriots should not add a quarrel between the pro-enosists and the pro-autonomists. In fact the conflict was unnecessary, since a nationally permissible middle position could be reached whereby the continued claim for union would not preclude the Cypriot politicians from entering into any negotiations with the British Government whenever it seriously decided to offer self-government to the island. Thus, in the absence of any favourable changes, the islanders would protect themselves from the likely accusation by foreigners that their enthusiasm for enosis had evidently diminished, thereby giving a degree of credibility to cynical comments about the racial origins of Greek Cypriots. If the Labour party were to win the forthcoming elections in Britain, and, if in office, Ramsay MacDonald's socialist principles could prevail over the obligations of a Prime Minister towards the British empire to the extent of offering Cyprus autonomy, then there would be time enough to discuss the various political issues. In any case, if the British Government decided on autonomy, Freedom believed that it would impose it on the colony without the prior approval of the Greek Cypriots - - an ideal situation since the Greek nationalists would preserve intact their Panhellenic virtue. However, the paper could not resist adding that, of course, the massive rejection by the Cypriots of any proffered autonomy would be a glorious event in the island's history that would be bound, shortly afterwards, to be followed by enosis itself.


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From Cyprus and the Governorship of Sir Ronald Storrs: The Causes of the 1931 Crisis, by G.S. Georghallides (Cyprus Research Centre, 1985).