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[brother]

 Hannay's book gives fascinating insights

 

DAVID Hannay’s book provides fascinating reading.

One may criticise British policy as perfidious and certainly question Britain’s role during the tragic events of 1974 but Lord Hannay, as the top British diplomat who devoted seven years trying to help the UN work out a comprehensive settlement for Cyprus does his best to give an objective and balanced account of the intricate and elaborate negotiations that led to the famous Annan Plan.

 Why did he decide to get involved in the first place when offered the job in February 1996?

Partly because he felt like a mountain climber “drawn towards an unclimbed peak.”

There was an element of “irresistible challenge” after so many had tried and failed to resolve the problem.

He accepts as an occupational hazard that both sides consider a mediator as being “prejudiced” against them and “in the pocket of the other side”. He also makes it clear that the opinions and judgements in his book are the author’s own and not those of the British government.

 

Thorny

 

Lord Hannay describes in his book “Cyprus, The Search for a solution” how he worked closely with Peruvian diplomat Alvaro de Soto, the U N Secretary-General’s representative, as well as Thomas Weston, and other American emissaries, to deal with a variety of difficult, thorny issues.

 He held private meetings with Clerides, Denktash, and a number of Greek and Turkish politicians. His recount brings the reader to the secrets of how international diplomacy works and how foreign envoys look at Cyprus and its people.

 It emerges from the book that Lord Hannay did offer useful assistance to the U N on occasions in trying to overcome procedural difficulties and tackle core issues. He describes the book as the anatomy of a negotiation, not the history of Cyprus, although he gives a historical background covering the period 1960-1996,as well as an outline of the may players and of the issues involved. His mission, he explains, was not to initiate a solo approach to the problem but to “put more clout” into the U N efforts.

 He also comments on the politicians in Athens and Ankara with whom he dealt during his visits. He notes that in Ankara, “opacity was invariably the order of the day--it was never clear where Turkey’s Cyprus policy was being decided or who was at any one time playing the key role in deciding it”.

 But one is struck by his admission that before his arrival in the island to take up his new duties, he had never visited Cyprus before. It is also depressing that as a former ambassador to the U N, he seems to attach little if any significance to the world body and its resolutions.

 Denktash, he says, was unwilling to negotiate at all with the U N or with those who backed its efforts. The Turkish Cypriot leader enjoyed to deliver history lessons to his visitors. Hannay recalls that when Britain’s minister for Europe Joyce Quinn called on Denktash “I timed it at 49 minutes before Denktash drew breath and allowed his visistor to speak for the first time”.

 

Refused

 

 Then he reports that Theodoros Pangalos, when he was Foreign Minister of Greece, because of an old dispute, refused to see Hannay during his visits to Athens. So he talked to Yannos Kranidiotis, then junior minister .

 One of the first thorny problems he describes is Cyprus’ decision in 1997 to deploy S-300 Russian made missiles. Suddenly Hannay remembers that Greek Cypriots were acting in a manner “inconsistent with the numerous Security Council resolutions that urged all parties to avoid a military build up on the island”. He criticises the Russians for selling these weapons. “Nor did attempts by the Americans and the British to persuade the Russians to cancel or at least to delay delivery of the missiles bear any fruit”. He criticises the “inconsistency” shown by the Russians--selling arms and at the same time supporting settlement negotiations.

Nothing about American or other Nato weapons used by the Turkish army occupying the north of the island, and the repeated Security Council calls for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Cyprus.

 How did they achieve it in the end? The pressure on Clerides from the US, the UK and other Europeans to cancel or suspend deployment mounted steadily .

In addition to the US President and the British Prime Minister, Wolfgang Schussel, Austrian Foreign Minister, “weighed in” in his capacity as president of the EU council. He stressed “very frankly” that the EU would “simply not understand it” if Clerides proceeded with deployment when accession negotiations were under way and efforts were being made to achieve a Cyprus settlement. The implications of this last message were “very clear and they were not missed either in Nicosia or in Athens.”

 

Committed

 

By December 1998, a plan was devised under which the missiles were to be diverted to Crete and the crisis was over. In return, the US President and the British Prime Minister issued statements committing themselves to a major sustained effort to secure a just, comprehensive and lasting settlement in Cyprus and to give full backing to this effort.

 He also refers to the G8 summit in Bonn in June 1999 and the SC resolution 1250 that followed which formed the basis for the negotiations that took place over the next three and a half years. Diego Cordovez of Ecuador stepped down and Annan looked for another full time negotiator. His first choice was Anna Hercus, of New Zealand, who was already on the island , but she resigned within two weeks for personal family reasons .

So the next candidate was Jan Egeland, a Norwegian with considerable experience. But Denktash vetoed this appointment, because Egeland had participated in the meetings between GC and TC businessmen . So Annan finally turned to Alvaro de Soto, an assistant SG, who arrived on the scene in the autumn of 1999. “Among his many qualities, imperturbability and precision were outstanding”.

 De Soto began to assemble a small but effective negotiating team, with competent legal adviser Didier Pfirter of the Swiss Foreign Ministry and Robert Dann, a young Australian as his jack of all trades, and experts on property issues and peacekeeping. So de Soto was able to work on every aspect of the core issues, from map making to constitution-drafting.

 

Obsessive

 

Then came the proximity talks in New York and Geneva. Denktash had an obsessive preoccupation with status and sovereignty. “He continued to harp on these at every meeting he had with Annan and de Soto and the rest of us to the exclusion of everything else”.

 In September in New York, the SG read out a statement which angered the Greek Cypriot side because Denktash interpreted it as amounting to recognising his breakaway state, as it laid emphasis on political equality and equal status of the parties and their desire to achieve a “new partnership” .

 “Clerides’ immediate reaction was sulphurous and he retired to the Waldorf Astoria where he remained holed up for the next three days refusing to attend any further meetings with Annan and receiving much bad advice from most of the members of the National Council, with t he notable exception of George Vaasssiliou, to the effect that he should either seek the withdrawal of Annan’s statement or himself withdraw from the negotiations”.

 Finally de Soto put out a statement denying “some of the wilder interpretations being put on the statement” and stressing that this did not imply recognition of the TRNC or derecognition of the Republic of Cyprus.

 Clerides returned to the daily meetings which continued until Sept 26. George Papandreou as foreign minister helped and the Greek government in general was “as good as its word” in its commitment to supporting the SG’s effort to get a settlement.

 Then Denktash announced he would stop attending any more proximity talks unless the existence of his state was accepted. Ecevit backed him fully. “Neither Denktash nor Ecevit had ever really been committed to a negotiation in good faith for a settlement that would involve some elements of compromise over their publicly stated positions”.

 Denktash thoroughly enjoyed the break up of the talks he had himself precipitated, and went daily to the press with aggressive rhetoric.

 

 

 

“When de Soto sat down with Moses and myself in New York on 18-19 January we had no difficulty in agreeing on the way ahead, even if we had no illusions that it would be easy or quick.” The US became involved with the Turkish Foreign Ministry in the spring of 2001 aimed at defining the way in which Denktash should be brought back into the negotiations.

The UN and the UK did not play any role but were kept informed by Weston at every stage. Annan issued invitations to Clerides and Denktash to resume negotiations in New York on12 Sept, but Denktash declined the invitation. Then, in November, Denktash made a complete U-turn. He wrote completely out of the blue to Clerides proposing that the two of them start face to face talks on the island . From the very start, Denktash insisted that de Soto should remain “a fly on the wall” simply taking the note. Face to facce talks in the buffer zone (Nicosia airport) began in mid January 2002 and continued until end of September with a break in August.

 “The U N briefed our missions after every session. We had secure conference telephone calls between de Soto, Weston and myself on average once or twice a week. During 2002 we had 12 tripartite meetings--in Paris, London, Rome, Vienna, Nicosia and Copenhagen, New York and Vevey.

 By April negotiations were bogged down, Denktash rejected all UN suggestions and reverted to playing for time in a filibuster.

Later he refused to name representatives s to the working groups for over two months thus ensuring they could neither meet nor do any work for the rest of the year, “That blatant act of bad faith had serious implications for the final stages of the negotiation”.

 in drafting the Annan Plan, the UN did not share things with the UK or US. In some cases their advice was accepted, in others it was not followed.

There were Consultations but to suggest that the Plan was virtually written by one or other or both governments was a gross exaggeration.

 The structure of the Annan Plan was complex, but ingenious...

 it sought to navigate through the shoals of status, sovereignty and continuity with some ingenious legal drafting...The two nightmares of secession and domination were dealt with explicitly. The new state was proclaimed indissoluble, with secession prohibited, and domination of any institution by one side being l declared to be unconstitutional.

 

No leak

 

 Hannay reports on the Copenhagen EU summit...”so near, yet so far” (Dec 2002), and the massive demonstrations in the north which exerted mounting pressure on Denktash, and the presidential election in February 2003, which Tassos won on the first round.

He also writes about the British move to help the negotiations. About 45 of the 99 sq. miles of bases territory could be offered, most going to Greek Cypriots with a small parcel of land going to turkish Cypriots. “Astonishingly there was no leak until Annan tabled the second revision of his Plan (Annan III). Even more astonishingly neither side in Cyprus was able to identify any perfidious motives behind the British offer”.

 “The full text of Annan III , which took the UN team several sleepless nights to complete, was tabled on February 26. It banished the old placebos of common state and component states. “The United Cyprus Republic is an independent and sovereign state with a single international legal personality and a federal government and consists of two constitutent states... This judgement of Solomon balanced extremely important concessions to both sides. The Greek Cypriots getting the federal label and the Turkish Cypriots getting the concept of constitutent states...It could be said that parthenogensis (virgin birth) had been achieved”.

 At The Hague in March, there was Increasing frustration and exhaustion as the talks went into the night.

Denktash was totally negative . “ I drove to the airport to catch the first flight to London. It was a cold, grey, dank morning, which matched my mood as I contemplated the ruins of seven years of hard labour.”

 

Lion's share

 

Hannay makes no secret that “the breakdown of the talks “lays at Denktash’s door... He bore the lion’s share of the responsibility for frustrating the most far reaching of the attempts so far to resolve the Cyprus problem.

 In his concluding remarks, Hannay notes that “many of those who struggled over the years and broken their teeth on it, have concluded that the problem is insoluble. I do not share that view. The problem is soluble, although only with the greatest difficulty... The Annan Plan is not perfect and some balanced changes can still be negotiated.

 His own assessment is that it is not to an increase in external pressure and assistance that one must look in the future...It is rather to an increased positive input from Cypriots themselves and from the two motherlands.

 “I stepped down from my job as the British government’s special representative for Cyprus at the end of May 2003 with some relief and some regret...

 “What will happen now? Much will depend on the prospects for Turkish accession to the EU. If Turkey’s candidature prospers, and as the reality of Turkish accession comes closer, a solution to the Cyprus problem will become a necessity; and it is difficult to see any solution straying far away from the Annan Plan which has been so widely endorsed. But if Turkey’s candidature stalls or is blocked, it is not easy to be so sanguine”.

[Saint Jimmy]

THANK YOU brother for this post
I've read about Hannay's book but it's been impossible to find both here in England, and in Cyprus, even over the Internet...
This should suffice till I manage to get my hands on the damn thing

[brother]

Most welcome young jimmy.

[pantelis]

"Denktash thoroughly enjoyed the break up of the talks he had himself precipitated, and went daily to the press with aggressive rhetoric."

This kind of attitude/behaviour of his, went on during negotiations of both before and after, 1974.

Some questions I have:
Is he the "president"of the TCs or of the Cypriot Turkish settlers and their
Anatolian relatives?

For how long are they going to be "enjoying" his services?

Have the TCs erected any statues of Rauf, yet? (I suspect that they had made already, but keep them in storage, waiting for the big day to dipslay them. Denktash must have already approved them and also have picked their locations.

[insan]

This kind of attitude/behaviour of his, went on during negotiations of both before and after, 1974.

Yes, Denktas is the only responsible of Cyprus tragedy. All GC leaders, Hellenic Gang Leaders, cadres and priests are innocent as the angels.

[Saint Jimmy]

I find the quote Pantelis used most interesting... It seems to me that if we were to ask any given adult in the RoC, chances are he or she will say that Hannay is the devil himself, and works ceaselessly to end the Cypriot Hellenism.
The quote is, I think, contradictory to the prevailing attitude towards him, in Cyprus.

[insan]

EU candidature; a fragile economy; and above all the looming war in Iraq, with
the US and UK request to use Turkish territory for their troops. In the end it
was perhaps as much a case of policy overload as anything. The outcome was a
major missed opportunity which may not recur in such a favourable form. Was
there no responsibility on the other side? Certainly there was, although I am as
convinced as one can be about anything that has to be a speculative judgement,
that, if Denktash and the Turks has been ready to do a deal at either Copenhagen
in December 2002 or at The Hague in March 2003, then Clerides on the first
occasion and Papadopoulos on the second would have felt the need to go along
with that and would have done so, the former somewhat more willingly than the
latter. But further back their record was little different from that of
Denktash. Kyprianou's endless filibustering, Clerides' rejection of
Boutros-Ghali's Set of Ideas for purely opportunistic electoral reasons,
Clerides' dropping of the major package of confidence-building measures in 1994;
all these are a matter of record. But in this latest set of negotiations they
were not, in my view, at fault. Why this sudden change? Because they knew that
the European Union would not tolerate a "no" from a candidate country, when the
Union's own interest was to admit a re-united and not a divided island. The sad
irony was that the Turks and Denktash believed that the Greek Cypriots had a
blank cheque for membership, but the Greek Cypriots The Journal of European
Affairs, Vol. 1, No. 2, November 200316 themselves never believed that for a moment. So much for the immediate causes of
failure. But behind them lay, and still lie, many layers of distrust, suspicion
and sometimes hatred which have to be overcome.

Taken from an interview of Hannay.

http://www.europeananalysis.org.uk/jea/JEA1-2.pdf

GC leaders have no differences than Denktash. They are just better actors than Denktash. They know how to act according to circumstances. Denktash is most honest than most of the GC leaders. But this does not mean I like his nerdish behaviours. He does not know diplomatic language. He has neither drawn a good picture of a politician nor a lawyer; afterwards 1977. He and his backers have hugely damaged the communal cause of TC community.

[insan]

Hannay underscored two more important points in the House of Commons: A solution is virtually impossible as long as Papadopoulos remains President. Turkey cannot accede to the EU as long as the Cyprus problem remains unsolved.

http://www.timdrayton.com/a8.html

[pantelis]

Insan,
Is this for real?

http://memri.org/bin/latestnews.cgi?ID=SD85705

[insan]

Insan,
Is this for real?

http://memri.org/bin/latestnews.cgi?ID=SD85705

For real? What are you talking about, Pantelis? Please ask clearly and directly?