If I want to post a quote to support an argument that I make, I do that by either posting from authority, independent, or even hostile to us sources.
For example the UN website, the UN resolutions, the USA Library of Congress, usinfo.state.gov etc.
I very rarely post from GC or Greek sources, but on the rare occasion that I do, I do it for presenting official documentation. I don't remember ever giving as a source to support my argument a geocities (personal opinions) or other crappy websites.
On the other hand, Zan and some other TCs post from Turkish propaganda websites that are full with lies, gross exaggerations and half truths.
If they post from some independent source, this is usually done indirectly.
Take for example articles of foreign newspapers. As another member noted, the Turkish propaganda collects the few articles, or even worst small parts of articles, that suit them and then gives them to propagandists like Zan to publish them all over the place. If you asked these propagandists to show you another article from the same date from that same newspaper, or even the whole article from a newspaper article they quote, they wouldn't have a clue. This is because what was written in the rest articles or even the other parts of the same article, is not something that suited them, so they didn't save and distribute that.
To me it is obvious that the inability of the Turkish propagandists to support their position using official documents and authority and independent sources proves that their position is so weak that can be supported only by resorting to lies, gross exaggerations and half truths.
Compare the sources
19 posts
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Compare the sources
by Piratis » Mon May 21, 2007 9:43 pm
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Piratis - Moderator
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by Piratis » Mon May 21, 2007 9:46 pm
And since we are at it, I would ask all members to post their sources when they quote something. I understand that it would be too embarrassing for some members to reveal their sources, but I believe that they should at least do us this "favor".
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Piratis - Moderator
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by zan » Mon May 21, 2007 9:55 pm
Voices Home | Histories | Photo History | Stories
Recent Cyprus History
From a perspective Within the United Kingdom
Source:
Stephen, Michael. 1987[?]. "Cyprus: Two Nations in One Island." Bow Educational Briefing No.5. London. Pages 1-7.
Permission to reproduce this report granted by Bow Publications Limited. Copyright Bow Publications Limited.
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About the Bow Group.
About the Author.
About the Views expressed in Bow Papers.
The Bow Group website: www.bowgroup.org.uk
ABOUT THE BOW GROUP
Established in 1951 as the Conservative answer to "Intellectual Socialism" and the Fabian Society, the Bow Group took its name from the Bow and Bromley Constitutional Club in London where the first meeting was held. Founder-members were included Sir Geoffrey Howe, Britain's present Foreign Secretary.
Now in its 35th year, the Bow Group has approximately 900 members, mainly graduates and all selected by interview. Today nearly 100 members are in Parliament, including the Leader of the House of Commons, John Biffen; Energy Secretary Peter Walker; former Home Secretary Leon Brittan and former Defence Secretary Michael Heseltine. The Bow Group is considered somewhat of a proving ground for prospective MPs and rising Parliamentary stars.
At the 1983 General Election 24 members of the Group were newly elected to Parliament, and other members serve as Members of the European Parliament and as Councilors in Local Government.
Much of the research work of the Group is undertaken by a network of Standing Committees on such subjects as Defence, Foreign Affairs, Employment, Industry, Economic Affairs, and the Environment. Each Committee brings expert and informed opinion to bear on the main political issues of the day. This paper was commissioned by the Foreign Affairs Standing Committee, the Chairman of which is Robert Jackson, Member of Parliament for Wantage, and a former Member of the European Parliament.
All these efforts combine with conferences, speaker meetings, and the Group's authoritative political magazine Crossbow, to influence the formulation and development of Conservative Party policy.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Michael Stephen is a Barrister and International Lawyer. He was seconded to the British Delegation to the United Nations, and is Secretary of the Bow Group's Foreign Affairs Committee. He was Parliamentary Candidate for Doncaster North in the 1983 General Election.
ABOUT THE VIEWS EXPRESSED IN BOW PAPERS
The views expressed in Bow Papers are those of the authors. They do not represent a collective view of the Bow Group, nor do they represent a statement of the view of either of the Conservative Party or of the Government. Bow Educational Papers are published as containing arguments which merit consideration by the Conservative Party and by a wider audience.
BOW EDUCATIONAL BRIEFING No.5
PART I:
British foreign policy has two principal aims; to maintain the security of the British Isles, and to protect and enhance British trading interests. Allied to these aims, and indirectly supportive of them, is concern beyond our shores for justice and the rule of law, protection of human rights, and the promotion of mutual respect and understanding between peoples.
Each of these factors applies in a greater or lesser degree to the island of Cyprus. The Eastern Mediterranean is important to Britain's security, in relation both to the Southern flank of NATO and to the situation in Iran and the Middle East. British trading interests, whilst small in Cyprus itself, require stability in the Region. Violations of human rights and breakdown of respect and understanding between peoples in the Region threaten both of Britain's principal foreign policy interests. Finally, Britain has residual legal rights and obligations relating to the island.
A Prisoner of History
Like that other island across the Irish Sea, Cyprus is a prisoner of its history. Its present is conditioned by its past, and there is a grave danger that unless there is wisdom and imagination in the management of its affairs its future will be fettered too. Everyone who wishes the people of Cyprus well prefers to look to the future, but the past is littered with well-intentioned mistakes, and they will be repeated yet again if account is not taken of the lessons of past failures. It is therefore necessary to look in some detail at the reasons why the present situation has arisen.
There is a popular belief that the Cyprus problem was caused by the landing of the Turkish troops in 1974, and if only they would withdraw the problem would be solved. This is a serious misconception, for the modern Cyprus problem began in 1960, and the landing of Turkish troops was the consequence, not the cause. Moreover, there were in fact two military interventions in 1974; the first was by Greece and the second was by Turkey.
For the time being Greek and Turkish Cypriots live apart. Does their future lie in political association on the same basis as before, or are their interests better served by secure geographical foundations from which each community can deal with the other on the basis of mutual respect?
The inhabitants of Cyprus have no common language (except English), and no common religion, nor have they, except at the surface, any common culture. This being so, any approach to the Cyprus question which regards Cypriots as a nation is fundamentally flawed. It is true that on a personal basis Greek and Turkish Cypriots can enjoy friendly relations with each other, but the history of the island shows clearly that their relationship is fragile when they deal with each other collectively.
Cyprus became part of the Turkish Empire in 1571, at which time the population was a mixture of people whose origins were in many different parts of the Eastern Mediterranean and Europe. Three hundred years later the island became part of the British Empire. During the second half of the 1950s a skillful and determined guerrilla campaign was waged against the British in Cyprus by EOKA, and organisation consisting of Greeks and Greek-Cypriots committed not to independence but to ENOSIS, or political union of Cyprus with Greece.
EOKA did not succeed in achieving ENOSIS, but the British Government eventually reached the conclusion that its security requirements could be met by withdrawing to two Sovereign Bases. Accordingly in 1959 a series of conferences took place in London and Zurich with a view to granting independence to the remainder of the island, at which the five interested parties were represented, namely Britain, Greece, Turkey, the Greek-Cypriots and the Turkish-Cypriots. The Greek-Cypriots were represented by Archbishop Makarios, and the Turkish Cypriots by Dr. Kutchuk. The two Cypriot leaders were accorded equal status.
Negotiations were long and difficult, but eventually agreement was reached upon the basic constitutional structure of a new Republic of Cyprus. Agreement was also reached upon the terms of a Treaty of Guarantee between Britain, Greece, Turkey and the new Republic.
The 1960 Constitution
The Constitution (Cmd. 1093) represented a compromise between the rights and aspirations of Greek and of Turkish-Cypriots. Although the Greek-Cypriots were more numerous the Turkish-Cypriots had lived in Cyprus for 400 years as a distinct community, and were willing to join the new Republic in exercise of their right of self-determination only if that basic fact of political life in Cyprus was formally recognized. The alternatives were two separate states, a condominium division of the island between Greece and Turkey, or continued British rule. It was eventually agreed upon that the new state would be a bi-communal Republic. Its structure was therefore unique because it was a quasi-federation in which there were two political entities within only one geographical area.
The bi-communal nature of the Republic is fundamental to the state of affairs created by the 1960 Treaties, and from its very inception the Republic of Cyprus had never been a unitary state in which decisions are made solely on the basis of one-man-one-vote. The two communities were political equals; not in the sense that each had the same legislative or executive powers, for those accorded to the Greek-Cypriots by the Constitution were greater by virtue of their numbers; but in the sense that each existed as a political entity, just as both large and small states exist as political entities within the structure of the European Community.
At the conclusion of the negotiations the Prime Minister of Greece made the following declaration (Cmd 680):
'From the very outset of these negotiations our main preoccupation was that there should be no victor in them, except the people of Cyprus themselves. I am certain we have achieved this. It is the best solution because its main foundation is co-operation between Greeks and Turks in the island, and in our two countries. And it is the best solution because it leaves to the island's majority the rights enabling it to develop in the most appropriate manner all aspects of its life, while it secures for the minority a splendid opportunity for maintaining its character and institutions, as well as for enjoying their generous share of common authority and responsibilities.'
The means by which the Constitution gave effect to the agreement were fourfold; political, legal, administrative, and military. The President was to be a Greek-Cypriot and the Vice-President a Turkish-Cypriot. Legislative authority was vested in a House of Representatives, of whom 70% would be Greek-Cypriots and 30% Turkish-Cypriots, but legislation was subject to the veto of the President and / or Vice-President in certain specified circumstances. Moreover, legislation relating to certain matters of sensitivity as between the two communities required a separate majority of the representatives from each community.
The interpretation and enforcement of the Constitution was entrusted to a Supreme Constitutional Court, which consisted of three judges, a Greek-Cypriot, a Turkish-Cypriot and a neutral as President of the Court. The Council of Ministers was to consist of seven Greek-Cypriots and three Turkish-Cypriots. The Civil Service was to consist of 70% Greek-Cypriots and 30% Turkish-Cypriots. Further, by Article 173 (1) it was provided that separate municipalities were to be established in the five largest towns, subject to transitional provisions and to review within four years.
Underpinning the Constitution were the armed forces of the Republic and, in the last resort, the three Guarantor Powers. By Article 129 it was provided that the Army should consist of 2,000 men of whom (subject to transitional provisions) 70% would be Greek-Cypriots and 30% would be Turkish-Cypriots. The strength of the Police and Gendarmerie could be varied, but only with the agreement of the Vice-President.
By Article 185 it was declared that the territory of the Republic could not be divided, nor integrated wholly or in part with the territory of any other State. Finally, Article 182 provided that the basic Articles (listed in Annex III to the Constitution) and which had been agreed at Zurich; could not be amended.
The Republic of Cyprus Breaks Down
Sadly, and with the benefit of hindsight it now appears that the Greek-Cypriot leadership never intended to operate the Constitution to which they had agreed, and on the basis of which independence had been granted and international recognition accorded. As early as September 1960 Archbishop Makarios said: "The Cause of ENOSIS has not died. I cannot say that ENOSIS has been forgotten." (New York Tribune, 27.9.60).
From the beginning, before the Turkish-Cypriots had exercised any powers, the Greek-Cypriots failed to implement constitutional provisions which did not suit them. They failed for example to implement Article 129(1) for the establishment of the national army in the ratio 60 / 40, which was regarded by the Turkish-Cypriots as an essential practical safeguard; but they did discharge large numbers of Turkish-Cypriot police auxiliaries and recruited Greek-Cypriots in excess of the numbers permitted by Article 130. They also instituted compulsory military service for Greek-Cypriots alone, contrary to Article 129(2).
They also failed to establish the ratio 70 / 30 in the Civil Service as required by Article 123 on the pretext that suitable Turkish-Cypriots could not be found. Further, they failed to implement Article 173 which provided for separate municipalities. The Turkish-Cypriots regarded this too as an important practical safeguard, and responded by creating their own municipalities and by taking the issue to the Supreme Constitutional Court of Cyprus.
On 25th April 1963 the Court ruled that Article 173 had not been complied with, but Archbishop Makarios declared that he would ignore the judgment, and did ignore it (Cyprus Mail 12.2.63). The neutral President of the Court, a West German citizen, resigned on 21st May 1963 and thereafter the Turkish-Cypriots were excluded, sometimes by actual physical force; from most of their positions in the Institutions of the Republic. The United Nations tried to mediate, but the Greek-Cypriots would not allow the Turkish-Cypriots to return unless they accepted fundamental changes to the Constitution (UN docs. S/5950, S/6569, S/7350).
On 30th November 1963 Makarios demanded that the Turkish-Cypriots accept 13 amendments to the Constitution, which included no less than eight of the basic articles enacted for their protection; and which only three years before it had been expressly agreed could not be amended. It is said that these demands were prompted by frustration caused by the exercise by Turkish-Cypriots of the rights conferred upon them by the Constitution. However, the history of the period 1960 to 1963 shows that it was the very existence of those safeguards to which the Greek-Cypriots objected, for they prevented them from ruling Cyprus in the interests of Greek-Cypriots alone, and were an obstacle to ENOSIS.
The Greek-Cypriots has agreed to a bicommunal republic but now wanted to change it unilaterally into a unitary state in which their voting power would be paramount. On 2nd January 1964 the Daily Telegraph wrote "The Greek-Cypriot community should not assume that the British military presence can or should secure them against Turkish intervention if they persecute the minority. We must not be a shelter for double-crossers."
However, the Greek-Cypriots then proceeded to rule Cyprus as if the Turkish-Cypriots no longer had any constitutional role. All the reserves of the Central Bank were appropriated for the benefit of Greek-Cypriots, and they purported to enact legislation which was in violation of the Constitution, for example the Administration of Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Law 1964, the President of the Republic and Members of the House of Representative (Extension of Term of Office) Law 1965, and the Public Service Law 1967.
Violence and Economic Discrimination
From December 1963 there were serious incidents of violence against Turkish-Cypriots, and since they were only 18% of the population, and lived in scattered communities they were easy targets despite the presence in Cyprus of UN forces. The violence against them became so bad that British troops had to intervene, and the Parachute Regiment in particular is still remembered by Turkish-Cypriots for their bravery in their defense. However, the position of British troops eventually became untenable and they withdrew.
On 28th December 1963 the Daily Express carried the following report from Cyprus: "We went tonight into the sealed-off Turkish Quarter of Nicosia in which 200 to 300 people had been slaughtered in the last five days. We were the first Western reporters there and we have seen sights too frightful to be described in print. Horror so extreme that the people seemed stunned beyond tears."
On 14th January 1964 the Daily Telegraph reported that the Turkish-Cypriot inhabitants of Ayios Vassilios had been massacred on 26th December 1963, and reported their exhumation from a mass grave in the presence of the Red Cross. A further massacre of Turkish-Cypriots, at Limassol, was reported by The Observer on 10th February 1964, and there were many more.
On 8th December 1967 the UN Secretary-General reported to the Security Council (UN doc. S/8286):
"When the disturbances broke out in December 1963 and continued during the first part of 1964 thousands of Turkish-Cypriots fled from their homes, taking with them only what they could drive or carry, and sought refuge in what they considered to be safer Turkish-Cypriot villages and areas."
On 10th September 1964 the Secretary-General reported (UN doc. S/5950):
"UNFICYP carried out a detailed survey of all damage to properties throughout the island during the disturbances . . . it shows that in 109 villages, most of them Turkish-Cypriot or mixed villages, 527 houses have been destroyed while 2,000 others have suffered damage from looting. In Ktima 38 houses and shops have been destroyed totally and 122 partially. In the Orphomita suburb of Nicosia 50 houses have been totally destroyed while a further 240 have been partially destroyed there and in adjacent suburbs."
From 1963 to 1974, and despite the continued presence of UN forces, Greek-Cypriots continued to attack Turkish-Cypriots. They raided isolated Turkish-Cypriot villages, destroying homes, schools and even places of worship, and forcing their former inhabitants to withdraw into enclaves for mutual protection. On 15th February 1964 a shipment of arms for Greek-Cypriots was discovered at Famagusta harbour, which provoked the following statement from the British Government: "We had ample information to show that the import of arms is taking place with the full knowledge and approval of the Cyprus Government, and this is not a matter which is tolerable at a time when we are trying to keep the peace on the island" (Hansard, Vol. 689, Col. 844).
The Turkish-Cypriots formed a militia of their own and did fight back, but there was little they could do against overwhelming numbers. The only power likely to be able and willing to protect them was Turkey, if they could persuade it to act under the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee. On 1st January 1964 Makarios announced his decision to abrogate the Treaty (The Times, Daily Telegraph, 2.1.64).
In September 1964 the Secretary-General reported to the Security Council (UN doc. S/5950):
"In addition to losses incurred in agriculture and in industry during the first part of the year, the Turkish community had lost other sources of its income including the salaries of over 4,000 persons who were employed by the Cyprus Government. The trade of the Turkish community had considerably declined during the period due to the existing situation, and unemployment reached a very high level as approximately 25,000 Turkish-Cypriots had become refugees. Expenditure of the Turkish Communal Chamber had dropped considerably, as a yearly subsidy formerly received from the Government had ceased to be granted in 1964. Furthermore, a large part of its remaining resources had to be used for unemployment relief and other forms of compensation as approximately half the population came to be on relief."
During the period 1963 to 1974 the freedom of movement of Turkish-Cypriots was severely restricted (UN docs. S/5764, S/5950, S/7350); they were denied postal services (UN docs. S/5950, S/7001); their access to building materials, electrical equipment, motor parts, fuel, chemicals and many other commodities was severely restricted (UN docs. S/5950, S/7350); and Turkish-Cypriot refugees had to live in tents and caves at risk to their health.
On 10th September 1964 the UN Secretary-General reported "The economic restrictions being imposed against the Turkish communities in Cyprus, which in some instances has been so severe as to amount to veritable siege, indicated that the Government of Cyprus seeks to force a potential solution by economic pressure." (UN doc. S/5950).
On 21st April 1966 the Greek-Cypriot newspaper Patris published a top secret document which had come into its hands and which it attributed to the Greek-Cypriot leadership. This document was a detailed plan for the achievement of ENOSIS by the forceful suppression of the Turkish-Cypriots, the abrogation of the Treaty of Guarantee, and the management of world opinion. It has become known as the "Akritas Plan". It is impossible to prove that this document is authentic, but if it is not, the actions of the Greek-Cypriot leadership at this time are a remarkable coincidence.
On 26th June 1967 the Greek-Cypriot House of Representatives adopted a very significant resolution as follows:
"Interpreting the age-long aspirations of the Greeks of Cyprus, the House declares that despite any adverse circumstances it will not suspend the struggle conducted with the support of all Greeks, until this struggle succeeds in uniting the whole and undivided Cyprus with the Motherland."
Faced with this attitude toward them on the part of the Greek-Cypriots, there were many in the Turkish-Cypriot community who felt that their only chance for a secure future lay in Union of part of Cyprus with Turkey, and calls for "Taksim" were heard. However this was a reaction to the situation in which they found themselves and was not something which the majority of Turkish-Cypriots preferred. They had secured a perfectly reasonable settlement in 1960 and it was in their interests to make it work.
It is remarkable that the United Nations not only failed to condemn the usurpation of the constitution by force but actually rewarded it by recognising the Greek-Cypriot administration as the Government of Cyprus (S.C. Res. 186 of 4th March 1964).
Cyprus: Two Nations in One Island
BOW EDUCATIONAL BRIEFING No.5
PART II:
Greece Invades Cyprus
In 1967 there were further serious episodes of violence against Turkish-Cypriots, and in 1971 the EOKA leader General George Grivas returned to Cyprus and established the EOKA-B organisation committed, as was EOKA of the 1950s, to ENOSIS. According to a letter dated 2nd July 1974 from Makarios to the Greek Government, the Greek-Cypriot National Guard was from the outset the main supplier of men and materials to EOKA-B. Turkey did not respond to this violence except by way of sporadic air attacks.
However, events moved inevitably into a critical phase, and on 15th July 1974 a large force of Greek-Cypriot and Greek troops deposed Archbishop Makarios and the Greek-Cypriot administration, and killed many Greek-Cypriots in the process. One of the EOKA-B leaders, Nicos Sampson, was installed as President and EOKA-B began systematically to murder the Turkish-Cypriot people of the island, who fled as far as they could to the North. EOKA demonstrated the same brutality as they had employed against British soldiers and their families from 1955-1960. The intention was completely to Hellenise Cyprus and to declare ENOSIS.
Makarios himself fled, and eventually reached the United Nations where, on 19th July 1974 he declared in the Security Council (S.C.O.R. 1780th mtg.) that the coup was an invasion in violation of the independence of the Republic and that it was the work of Greek officers directed by the Military Government in Athens. The coup took place not because Makarios had abandoned ENOSIS but because he was no friend of the Greek military Government, and was not proceeding towards ENOSIS fast enough for their liking.
Turkey's Response, and the Treaty of Guarantee
Five days after the overthrow of Makarios, and one day after his speech to the UN, the Turkish Government (at that time a Social Democrat Government), acted against the Greek invasion, and landed troops in the North of the island. The Greeks and Greek-Cypriots argue that the Turkish military action and subsequent presence is illegal. The Turks and Turkish-Cypriots say it is legal.
By Article 1 on the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee the Republic of Cyprus had agreed:
(a) to ensure the maintenance of its independence, territorial integrity and security, (b) to ensure the maintenance of respect for its Constitution, and (c) not to participate in any political or economic union with any State. Further, the Republic declared prohibited any activity likely to promote, directly or indirectly, either union with any other State or partition of the Island.
By Article II it was agreed that the Guarantor powers would:
(a) recognise and guarantee the independence, territorial integrity and security of the Republic, (b) recognise and guarantee the state of affairs established by the Basic Articles of its Constitution, and (c) prohibit, so far as concerned them, any activity aimed at promoting, directly or indirectly, either union of Cyprus with any other State or partition of the island.
Finally, by Article IV it was agreed that in the event of a breach of the provisions of the Treaty the Guarantor powers: (a) would consult together with respect to representations or measures necessary to ensure observance of those provisions, and (b) reserved the right, insofar as common or concerted action might not prove possible, to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the Treaty.
As at 20th July 1974 the "Republic of Cyprus" had quite clearly failed to maintain its independence, territorial integrity, or security, and had failed to maintain respect for its Constitution, as required by Article I of the Treaty. In particular it had failed to maintain respect for the Human Rights of its people recognised by and embodied in the Constitution. Further, Greece was itself in gross and obvious breach of Article II of the Treaty and accordingly, as required by Article IV, the United Kingdom and Turkey consulted together in London on 17th and 18th July. Greece was invited, but declined to attend.
The House of Commons Select Committee on Cyprus formed the view (HC 331 1975/76 para. 22), that during these consultations Turkey had proposed joint Anglo-Turkish action under the Treaty of Guarantee, and this was confirmed by Prime Minister Ecevit on 14th August 1974 (Daily Telegraph 15th August). However the Labour Government in Britain refused to take any effective action, even though they had troops and aircraft in the Sovereign Bases in Cyprus. They argued that Britain was under no duty to take military action, but Article II provided that Britain would guarantee the independence, territorial integrity and security of the Republic, which it manifestly failed to do. The Select Committee concluded that "Britain had a legal right to intervene, she had a moral obligation to intervene. She did not intervene for reasons which the Government refuses to give."
The responsibility therefore fell upon Turkey, as the only Guarantor willing to act, and on 20th July Turkish forces landed in Cyprus. The legal authority for their action rests not only upon the breaches of the Treaty identified here, but also upon the breaches committed before 1974 by the Republic of Cyprus at the instance of the Greek-Cypriots, and which have already been mentioned.
Violence Continues
After the Turkish landings it was argued by the Greek-Cypriots that even if the first landing was legal the extension of the area under Turkish control from 22nd July to 16th August 1974 was illegal since there was no longer and subsisting breach of the Treaty. However, the facts do not support this view, because large scale murders of Turkish-Cypriot families continued to take place, particularly in the villages of Aloa (Times, Guardian, 21st August), Zyyi, Sandallaris, Mari, Maratha, and Tokhni, and again despite the presence in Cyprus of UN troops. In Tokhni on 14th August 1974 all the Turkish-Cypriot men between the ages of 13 and 74, except for eighteen who managed to escape, were taken away and shot.
In Zyyi on the same day all the Turkish-Cypriot men aged between 19 and 28 were taken away by Greek-Cypriots and were never seen again. On the same day Greek-Cypriots opened fire in the Turkish-Cypriot neighbourhood of Paphos killing men, women and children indiscriminately. On 23rd July 1974 the Washington Post reported "In a Greek raid on a small Turkish village near Limassol 36 people out of a population of 200 were killed. The Greeks said that they had been given orders to kill the inhabitants of the Turkish villages before the Turkish forces arrived." (See also Times, Guardian, 23rd July).
On 24th July 1974 France Soir reported "The Greeks burned down Turkish mosques and set fire to Turkish homes in the villages around Famagusta. Defenseless Turkish villagers who have no weapons live in an atmosphere of terror and they evacuate their homes and go and live in tents in the forests. The Greeks' actions are a shame to humanity." On 28th July the New York Times reported that 14 Turkish-Cypriot men had been shot in Alaminos.
The "Republic had once again failed to maintain respect for the constitution.
On 22nd July Ecevit called upon the UN to "stop the genocide of Turkish-Cypriots" and declared "Turkey has accepted a cease-fire, but will not allow Turkish-Cypriots to be massacred." (Times 23rd July). On 29th July he was reported by the Daily Telegraph as follows: "Security on paper will not satisfy us. Every Turk in every corner of the island must feel at home. This we regard as an inalienable human right. So called security measures which have left Turkish-Cypriots in fear of attack and massacre are no good." The German newspaper Die Zeit wrote on 30th August 1974 "the massacre of Turks in Paphos and Famagusta is the proof of how justified the Turks were to undertake their second intervention".
In any event military action never really ceased between 20th July and 16th August. The Greeks and Greek-Cypriots continued to lay mines and construct strongpoints around the Turkish positions, and the Turks continued to reinforce their troops and to send out patrols.
In that position Turkish forces were not secure, and could certainly not protect the siege in Famagusta. On 8th August the Guardian reported that they had been under sustained mortar attack for 20 days, and on 17th August the Daily Telegraph reported that in the first three days of the siege an estimated 2,000 mortar bombs had fallen on them. Accordingly the Turkish army moved our of its bridgehead and advanced upon Famagusta with the object of rescuing the Turkish-Cypriot population of Famagusta and of securing a viable defensive position. The siege of Famagusta was lifted on 16th August.
The House of Commons Select Committee on Cyprus reported in 1976 "The second phase of military operations was inevitable in the view of your committee as the position reached by the Turkish forces at the time of the first cease-fire was untenable militarily and they needed tanks and armour to consolidate their position and secure Famagusta."
Since that military action, and following the residual exchange of population by agreement in 1975 between Archbishop Makarios and Rauf Denktas, who had by then become the Turkish-Cypriot leader, Greek-Cypriots have lived in peace in the Southern part of the island and Turkish Cypriots have lived in peace in the Northern part.
Very many innocent people of both communities were killed and went missing in the turmoil of 1974, and in the heat of battle there must have been excesses by individuals on both sides, but the responsibility for this must rest firmly upon the Greeks and the Greek-Cypriots for creating the conditions in which Turkey had no choice but to intervene by force. There is in any event a big difference between excesses or mistakes committed in war, and systematic massacres committed in cold blood.
The population exchanges themselves have also caused hardship to both Greek and Turkish-Cypriots, but people have over the past twelve years adjusted to their new circumstances. It nevertheless remains essential for people on both sides to be properly compensated as part of any overall settlement.
It is further argued that even if the 1974 landings were lawful the Treaty permitted Turkey to intervene with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the Treaty, and that the continuing presence of Turkish forces is not to re-establish the 1960 state of affairs but with intent to annex Cyprus wholly or in part Turkey or to create two separate States. Again the facts do not support the argument, because if such had been Turkey's intention they would never have supported the framework for a new constitution for the whole island proposed by the UN Secretary-General in 1984, and again in 1986, and which excluded both annexation and two separate states.
Having regard to the events of 1960 and 1974 no serious section of Cypriot opinion, whether Greek or Turk, regards re-establishment of the 1960 Constitution itself as practical, and indeed on 12th February 1977 Makarios and Denktas agreed that thenceforth they were seeking a bi-communal federal Republic. This was reaffirmed by Kyprianou, successor to Makarios, in 1979, and was even the view of the British Foreign Secretary, who answered "yes" to the following question from the House of Commons Select Committee on Cyprus (HC. 331 1975/76, page 55 para, 141):
"Would the Foreign Secretary agree that we could hardly restore the 1960 Constitution, since at least two of the provisions which were enshrined in the Constitution, the separate municipalities and the Turkish (Cypriot) share of the police and civil service, were never in fact implemented?"
Although it is impossible to re-establish the 1960 Constitution itself it continues however to be practical to re-establish the 1960 state of affairs in substance, namely respect for the human rights of all Cypriots and respect for the existence of both communities as political entities, and in the meantime for the most basic right of all, namely the right to live in peace, to be guaranteed. It would be absurd to argue that by making it impossible the re-establish the 1960 state of affairs in its entirety, Greeks and Greek-Cypriots could deprive Turkey of its right to guarantee the survival of the Turkish-Cypriot community.
Negotiation for a New Constitution
At the first Geneva Conference on 30th July 1974, Turkey, Greece and the United Kingdom acknowledged the existence in Cyprus of two autonomous administrations representing the Turkish-Cypriots and the Greek-Cypriots respectively, and it was agreed that negotiations should be carried on to secure a workable constitution for Cyprus as a whole. Since then the leaders of the two communities have held frequent talks. In 1978 the Turkish-Cypriots proposed the reopening of the Famagusta suburb of Varosha which contains many hotels and had lain derelict since 1974, provided Nicosia airport was opened to all, but this was rejected.
The Turkish-Cypriots could not live fore long in a state of limbo. They needed a constitution to regulate their political affairs and democratically elected institutions to govern them, and accordingly, on 13th February 1975, they declared Northern Cyprus to be a Federated State, with the intention that it should one day form part of a federal republic for the whole of Cyprus. They did not at that stage declare independence.
However, by November 1983, having failed to reach agreement with the Greek-Cypriots on the creation of a Federal Republic, they declared independence as the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. The Republic functions as a multi-party democracy, with a President, Prime Minister, and Legislative Assembly.
They nevertheless made it clear that establishment of the Republic does not preclude the creation of a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation for the whole of Cyprus, and this was formally reaffirmed by the Legislative Assembly as recently as 12th March 1985.
The framework for a future political solution based on a federal system of government uniquely structured for the circumstances of Cyprus will be found in the Denktas-Makarios accords of 1977, the Denktas-Kyprianou 10 point agreement of 1979, the UN Secretary-General's "Opening Statement of 1980" and the Secretary-General's 1984 and 1986 draft framework agreements.
The UN Plans
The 1984 draft framework agreement had been prepared by an exhaustive series of talks under the auspices of the Secretary General, and the Turkish-Cypriots were assured by him that the document, dated 27th November 1984, was acceptable to the Greek-Cypriots. On that basis the Turkish-Cypriots agreed to go to the UN to sign it, but when Denktas arrived in New York he found that Kyprianou wished to re-negotiate it.
Kyprianou's announcement at the Summit surprised even his own people, and on his return home a motion censure upon him was passed by the Greek-Cypriot House of Representatives. In the course of the debate Mr. Clerides, leader of the Democratic Rally Party said:
"Right from the first day of the meeting, Kypranou asked for the re-negotiation of everything from A to Z. Among the points he asked to re-negotiate were issues that did not fall within the scope of the Summit, and issues which were already discussed and agreed upon. He should not have brought forth again issues already debated and agreed upon with Denktas."
In the same debate Mr. Papaiannou, Secretary-General of the AKEL party, said: "Kyprianou never adopted the basis of the federation, which was agreed upon by Makarios and Denktas, and Kyprianou never exerted any effort for the solution of the Cyprus problem on the basis of a federation. Kyprianou never respected the Summit agreements."
The Secretary-General resolved to try again, and on 12th April 1985 he prepared a document which he described as a "consolidation" of the 1984 draft. It did however contain major differences, and since it had been negotiated with the Greek-Cypriots alone it was a document different in kind from the draft framework agreements of 1984 and 1986. Denktas rejected it in a letter to the Secretary-General on 8th August 1985 and in the same letter expressed surprise that the document had first come to his attention through the Greek-Cypriot press.
However, after the two rounds of intensive technical talks held separately with both sides at official level in November -- December 1985 and February-March 1986, the Secretary-General on 29th March 1986 presented the two sides with a new "Draft Framework Agreement". He had again laid a compromise position on the table after full consultation with both sides. He had again proposed a solution in the belief that it was acceptable to both sides, and that it formed a framework which dealt with the entirety of the Cyprus problem. He fully understood the interrelated nature of all elements involved and offered the plan as an integrated whole.
The Secretary-General's 1986 plan called for the reunification of Cyprus as a bi-national, bi-zonal federal republic with a Greek-Cypriot President and a Turkish-Cypriot Vice-President, each with defined veto powers over a bi-cameral legislature. The proposals would have reduced the land area under Turkish-Cypriot control from 35.8 % of the island to a little over 29% but they were nevertheless accepted by the Turkish-Cypriots on 21st April 1986.
Kyprianou on the other hand, after consultation with Athens, refused to accept it and rejected the entire draft saying that it had "negative points," and he is once again seeking to re-negotiate. However, the UN Secretary-General made it clear on 11th June 1986 that his proposals took fully into account the concerns of all parties and that he did not intend to take up counter-proposals put forward by Mr. Kyprianou. He called on the Greek-Cypriots to think again.
Cyprus: Two Nations in One Island
BOW EDUCATIONAL BRIEFING No.5
PART III:
Greek-Cypriot Objections
The Greek-Cypriots demand the withdrawal of Turkish troops as a precondition to any settlement, and label them an army of occupation. Turkish troops are not however an army of occupation but are in Northern Cyprus at the request of the inhabitants for their protection; and in view of the treatment which Turkish-Cypriots have received from 1963 to 1974 they would be foolish to ask Turkey to withdraw its troops before trust and confidence had been established between the two communities. They nevertheless made the rather surprising concession (Draft Framework Agreement 1986 art. 8.1) that a timetable for withdrawal should be agreed. It is true that Greece is no longer ruled by the military government which invaded Cyprus in 1974, but no one can yet tell whether ENOSÝS is finally dead in both Greece and Cyprus, nor whether the era of political instability in Greece is at an end, nor whether the Greek-Cypriots would not again use their superior numbers to threaten the existence of the Turkish-Cypriot community. Certainly the Turkish-Cypriots are not yet ready to take that risk and should not be expected to do so.
Greek-Cypriots also demand that they should be completely free to move about, to establish themselves, and to own property, in the Turkish-Cypriot area. And these have become known as the "three freedoms". However, this would expose Turkish-Cypriots to risk of terrorists attacks, to being overrun by superior numbers again, and to being overwhelmed by the superior economic power of the Greek-Cypriots.
In view of their past experience Turkish-Cypriots cannot be expected to agree to this until much greater confidence between the two communities has been established, for where a choice has to be made between these freedoms and freedom to live in peace, the latter must clearly prevail. They did however accept (Draft Framework Agreement 1986 art. 6.17) that these three issues will be discussed within that framework.
Greek-Cypriots complain that people from Turkey have been allowed to make their homes in Northern Cyprus since 1974, but they forget that large numbers of Turkish-Cypriots emigrated to Turkey, Britain, the United States and the other countries during the period 1963 to 1974 when life in Cyprus was made very difficult for Turkish-Cypriots. In fact during this period emigration of Turkish-Cypriots was actively encouraged by the Greek-Cypriot administration. In any event the 1960 Constitution did not prohibit immigration.
Greek-Cypriots also complain that the names of towns and villages in the North have been changed, but settlements with both Greek and Turkish-Cypriot inhabitants have had both Greek and Turkish names for as long as anyone can remember.
Greek-Cypriots say it is an injustice that Turkish Cypriots occupy 35.8% of the land area of the island although they are only 21% of the population today. However, there are four answers to this. First, it is not an internationally accepted principle that ethnic groups occupy such proportion of the land areas as their numbers bear to the total population, and there are very few, if any places in the world where such is the case.
In Cyprus, Turks and Turkish-Cypriots owned almost 100% of the land when the British arrived. During the period of British colonial rule their holdings were gradually reduced so that by the time of independence in 1960 they were registered owners of only about 30% of the land. It is therefore true that today they occupy more land than they owned at the time of independence but land areas are meaningless in themselves.
In 1974 Turkish-Cypriot owned large areas vineyards in the South and they have acquired in exchange large areas of land which is unsuitable for cultivation due to scarcity of water and due to salination. They have also have acquired in exchange some good beaches and hotels but the main hotel complex at Varosha is an unusable ruin as a result of the Greek-initiated war of 1974, and it is extremely difficult for Turkish-Cypriots to develop their tourist industry in view of boycotts practiced against them, particularly in the field of air transport, which are mentioned low below.
Second, the area in which the Turkish-Cypriots live is the minimum necessary to establish a viable defensive position and to ensure reasonable economic viability. The Turkish-Cypriots did not wish to live in a divided island, and are well aware of the benefits of a larger economy, but for Greeks and Greek-Cypriots to complain about the division, having caused it to occur, is rather like a boy who kills both his parents complaining about being an orphan.
Third, the Turkish-Cypriots have, by accepting the UN draft framework agreement, agreed to negotiate a reduction of the land area under their control.
Fourth, the Turkish-Cypriots have accepted that as part of an oral settlement compensation will be paid to those on both sides who have lost their land and other possessions
Some Greek-Cypriots even call for one-man-one-vote in Cyprus as a whole, but for the same practical reasons Turkish-Cypriots cannot be expected to agree to that at the present time. In any event, as already mentioned, when Cyprus became independent Turkish-Cypriots did not become citizens of the Republic as individuals, having no more than minority status, and it was agreed by Archbishop Makarios in 1977, and reaffirmed by his successor in 1979 that the future of Cyprus demanded a bi-communal federation and not a unitary state.
The Turkish-Republic of Northern Cyprus is labeled a breakaway state, but in fact it was the Greek-Cypriots who broke away from the Republic established by the 1960 Constitution and established unilaterally a Greek-Cypriot state which they continue to call the Republic of Cyprus.
Is There a "Government of Cyprus" Today?
For the time being the Greek-Cypriots occupy the Cyprus seat at the UN. They claim to represent Cyprus at Common-wealth Heads of Government meetings, and all Ambassadors and High Commissioners of Cyprus throughout the world are Greek-Cypriots enjoying full diplomatic privileges, although no Turkish-Cypriots Vice-President of Cyprus has had any say in their appointment. They do their utmost to prevent the Turkish-Cyprus case being heard in any international forum.
It is quite astonishing that the world is prepared to recognize the claim of the Greek-Cypriot administration to be the Government of the whole of Cyprus, for not only is it clear that they do not speak for the Turkish-Cypriots nor control the northern part of the island but there is no legal basis to their claim. Their case could at first sight rest on one of two alternative bases, either the 1960 Constitution or general international law.
When Cyprus became independent its Government derived its authority the Constitution, but that Constitution gave the Turkish-Cypriots an absolute rights to a place in the institutions of Government. It was declared, as already mentioned, that the Vice-President must be a Turkish-Cypriot, with defined veto powers, and Turkish-Cypriots were entitled to membership in the prescribed proportions of the Council of Ministers, the Legislative Assembly, the Civil Service, the Courts of Justice, and the Security Forces.
The Turkish-Cypriots having been excluded from their positions, and the Vice-President having been denied the right to exercise his constitutional powers it cannot possibly be said that the 1960 Constitution is still functioning. It is alleged that the Turkish-Cypriots voluntarily withdrew, but it is quite clear from the history of the period since 1960 that they did not. Even if they had withdrawn voluntarily it does not follow that the 1960 Constitution would have continued to function; because it was designed to operate, and could only operate, on a basis of partnership between the communities.
International law defines an independent state as a territory with defined boundaries, with a government to which the inhabitants are habitually obedient, and which is free from political control by any other state (Lauterpacht, "Recognition in International Law" paras. 10-13). Applying this definition to Cyprus it is apparent that the Southern part is a separate state, having a Greek-Cypriot government to whom the inhabitants are habitually obedient. The Greek-Cypriot people are free to choose, and have in fact chosen their own constitution. They say that it is the 1960 Constitution, but it is in reality a modified version excluding Turkish-Cypriot participation. It is notable that on his re-election in 1973 Makarios took a modified form of oath which avoided a declaration of respect for the 1960 Constitution.
Applying the same principles, a separate state also exists in the North, with a government deriving its authority from a constitution enacted by the Turkish-Cypriot people, which excludes Greek-Cypriot participation.
It is arguable that neither is a separate state because they are under political control of Greece and Turkey respectively. It is true that each of those countries has a significant military presence in the island, and that they have enormous political influence, but it is doubtful whether it amounts to control sufficient for the purposes of international law. If it did, there would be many countries, particularly in Eastern Europe which would not be independent states.
Economic Discrimination
Whether they are the lawful government of Cyprus or not, the Greek-Cypriot administration have obtained for Southern Cyprus almost all the EEC aid allocated for the whole of Cyprus. Under the first financial protocol of 1979, 30 million ECU were allocated to Cyprus, and a further 44 million under the Second Financial Protocol of 1984.
It is said that these funds have been applied for the benefit of both communities and this may be true in theory, but the overwhelming benefit has accrued to the Greek-Cypriots. If a customs union were established between the EEC and Cyprus before a settlement had been achieved between the two communities the Greek-Cypriots would benefit even more and the Turkish-Cypriots in all probability be excluded entirely.
The Greeks and Greek-Cypriots have succeeded in constructing an international boycott against the Turkish-Cypriots. Their own economy has prospered, and they have profited considerably from the economic displacement which has occurred in nearby Lebanon. By contrast it is impossible to post a letter to Northern Cyprus directly, nor to fly nor send goods or passengers by sea directly anywhere other than Turkey, nor communicate directly by telex or telephone. In a highly competitive world economy these disadvantages are serious, and it is therefore hardly surprising that Turkish-Cypriots enjoy a lower standard of living than those in the South, that their tourist industry is handicapped and that they are forced to accept subsidies from Turkey.
International Attitudes
In view of the history of the Cyprus question from 1960 to the present day it is surprising that the world continues to refuse recognition to the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, continues to practice a partial boycott against them, and continues to accord unequal political treatment to Greek and Turkish-Cypriots. Why should this be?
Most of the of the world do not really care whether the Turkish-Cypriots are treated fairly or not. The Islamic countries would probably recognize them tomorrow, but the matter is marginal to their interests and the slightest pressure from Britain or the United States is sufficient to keep it off their agenda.
Turkey's interest in Cyprus is not entirely altruistic for, as long as tension exists between Greece and Turkey, Greek control of Cyprus, is not something Turkey would find acceptable since it lies only 40 miles from the Turkish mainland. Turkey has of course granted recognition to the TRNC, and has provided economic and military assistance at considerable cost to its economy, but Turkey has not until recently been willing to bring economic and political pressure to bear in support of the Turkish-Cypriots to anything like the same extent as Greece has done for the Greek-Cypriots.
This appears to be changing.
In Greece there appears to be a romantic attachment toward Cyprus rather similar to that of Argentina toward the Falkland Islands, and internal political capital is to be made in Greece by taking a hard line on Cyprus. It is seen in Athens as part of the wider questions of the Aegean, which has soured relations between Greece and Turkey for so long.
On 22nd September 1986 the Wall Street Journal expressed the view in an editorial that "the problem of Cyprus can be summed up in two words, Andreas Papandreou. The last thing the socialist leader wants is a resolution of the island's differences. He would lost his opportunity to accuse Turkey of devious intentions which he does to distract the Greeks from their decrepit economy. Just as important he would lost the collusion of the US Congress. Since Turkey's 1974 military intervention US said has been held to a 10:7 ratio for Turkey and Greece. That allows Mr. Papandreou to influence military aid to Turkey by not making full use of his own."
However, in view of the extremely poor results obtained by Mr. Papandreou's socialist party, PASOK, in the October 1986 local elections in Greece it remains to be seen how long he will continue to conduct international affairs of that country.
Greece has capitalized upon romantic notions of ancient Greece as the home of democracy, and has powerful interests in international shipping, finance, and tourism. Its influence in these areas has been used to the full to apply pressure in support of the Greek-Cypriots. Greeks will not hesitate, in any international economic or political form, to cause an unpleasant scene if there is the slightest softening of attitudes toward the Turkish-Cypriots. They will even go so far as to make an implied threat to withdraw from the Western Alliance.
One country in which the efforts of Greece have been particularly successful is the United States, for not only is there scope for economic pressure, but there is a powerful Greek-American lobby in United States politics, which has been used to the full. The United States is also interested in facilities offered by the British military basis which exists in the Southern part of Cyprus.
The Soviet Union is naturally interested in Cyprus, by virtue of its proximity to the Middle East and to the exit from the Black Sea. They have a considerable diplomatic presence in Southern Cyprus, and they have recently proposed an international conference, the centerpiece of which is the proposition that all foreign troops, should depart from the island. Andreas Papandreou is a supporter of this proposal.
It is no secret that the Soviet Union, via Bulgaria, is supporting the far-left Republican Turkish Party in Northern Cyprus. It is already a significant force in Turkish-Cypriot politics and its appeal, as in all other countries, is to those who perceive themselves to be poor and disadvantaged. The longer Northern Cyprus continues to suffer economic discrimination the stronger will the far-left become.
The Secretary-General of the United States has been helpful, but the General Assembly has not. It has shown bias towards one party to the dispute, and year after year it has adopted totally unrealistic resolutions sponsored by the Greeks and Greek-Cypriots with unquestioning support from the Soviet bloc and the "non-aligned movement". These resolutions have served only to polarise the situation.
Legal Arguments
The legal argument which is usually deployed against Britain runs as follows. Britain is a party to the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, Article II of which provides, as indicated above, that Britain will recognize and guarantee the independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus and the state of affairs established by the basic articles of its constitution, and that Britain will prohibit, insofar as it concerns her, any activity aimed at promoting directly or indirectly union with any other state or partition.
It is therefore argued by Greece and the Greek-Cypriots that if Britain were to recognize the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus she would be failing to recognize the territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus and the state of affairs established by the basic articles of its constitution, and would be failing to prohibit activity aimed at promoting partition.
It is surprising that this charge should be maid by a country which, for most of the period from 1960 to 1974, had itself ignored the Treaty by failing to respect the independence of Cyprus and by not only failing to prohibit activity aimed at promoting union with itself but by actually engaging in it; and by a community by which for most of the same period had failed to maintain respect for the constitution of the Republic. Moreover, when it suited their purposes from 1964 to 1974 the Greek-Cypriots repeatedly declared the Treaty to be invalid (Cmnd. 6579 para. 4(c)).
However, whether valid or not the above-mentioned provisions of the Treaty of Guarantee do not preclude Britain if she so wishes from recognising neither the Greek-Cypriot nor the Turkish-Cypriot administration as the government of Cyprus and adopting an entirely neutral position.
Further, British recognition of the Greek-Cypriot administration as the Government of Cyprus is inconsistent with Britain's obligation to recognize and guarantee the state of affairs established by the basic articles of the constitution.
That state of affairs was one in which the Turkish-Cypriots were entitled to participate in all the decision-making processes of government and to exercise veto powers in clearly defined circumstances.
For Britain to deal with officials in whose appointment Turkish-Cypriots have been denied their constitutional role, and for Britain to recognize as the acts of a "Government of Cyprus" decisions in which Turkish Cypriots have had no part, is not only a failure to recognize and guarantee, but it is actually to assist the continued violation by Greek Cypriots of the state of affairs established by the constitution.
British Interests
The main focus of Greek and Greek-Cypriot pressure has been Britain, not only because of its historic connection with the island and its residual legal role, but because the presence of the basis in the South of Cyprus causes, or used to cause, a particular vulnerability.
Over the years since 1960 there has been an implied threat to British economic and political interests, directly and via the Greek lobby in the United States. However, in 1963 when the breakdown of the Republic of Cyprus became evident, the military bases in Cyprus were of greater significance than they are today. It is always convenient to have bases where aircraft can land and where troops can be stationed, but the increased range of aircraft and the realignment of British Defence strategy have rendered the bases largely redundant as garrisons. There are some training areas which are still useful, but they are not indispensable.
The strategic importance of Cyprus today lies more as a location for radio and electronic intelligence stations, important parts of which are not even in the sovereign base areas. However, these facilities do not require large military basis and could if necessary be located in Turkey, where other such facilities exist, or even in Northern Cyprus. In both those places the installations and personnel would be more secure than in Southern Cyprus, as the recent terrorist attack on the Akrotiri base has shown.
On the economic and political scene too, times have changed. Turkey is awakening as an economic power, and the potential there for British industry and commerce is of major importance. Politically Turkey is finding its way back form military rule to democracy, and the present Prime Minister, Turgut Ozal is a politician of the center-right. His recent visit to Cyprus, well knowing the Greek protest which was likely to, and did, echo around the world is a strong indication that Turkey is no longer prepared to accept the treatment which the world has so far been disposed to accord to the Turkish-Cypriots. In the strategic dimension too, Turkey is far more important to NATO than is Greece.
Time for Change
For so long as the status quo continues the Greek-Cypriots will be no more likely to conclude an agreement with the Turkish-Cypriots than they were when they rejected the Secretary-General's plan in 1984 and 1986. If a settlement is to be achieved , there have to be a change in the balance of costs and benefits. It is time for signals to be given by the United Kingdom and the United States that the Secretary-General's efforts to achieve a settlement cannot go on forever, that the Turkish-Cypriots in twice accepting the UN plan have done enough, and equal treatment is likely to be accorded to them soon. If no progress is made, equal treatment should in fact be accorded.
Recent Cyprus History
From a perspective Within the United Kingdom
Source:
Stephen, Michael. 1987[?]. "Cyprus: Two Nations in One Island." Bow Educational Briefing No.5. London. Pages 1-7.
Permission to reproduce this report granted by Bow Publications Limited. Copyright Bow Publications Limited.
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About the Bow Group.
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About the Views expressed in Bow Papers.
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ABOUT THE BOW GROUP
Established in 1951 as the Conservative answer to "Intellectual Socialism" and the Fabian Society, the Bow Group took its name from the Bow and Bromley Constitutional Club in London where the first meeting was held. Founder-members were included Sir Geoffrey Howe, Britain's present Foreign Secretary.
Now in its 35th year, the Bow Group has approximately 900 members, mainly graduates and all selected by interview. Today nearly 100 members are in Parliament, including the Leader of the House of Commons, John Biffen; Energy Secretary Peter Walker; former Home Secretary Leon Brittan and former Defence Secretary Michael Heseltine. The Bow Group is considered somewhat of a proving ground for prospective MPs and rising Parliamentary stars.
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Much of the research work of the Group is undertaken by a network of Standing Committees on such subjects as Defence, Foreign Affairs, Employment, Industry, Economic Affairs, and the Environment. Each Committee brings expert and informed opinion to bear on the main political issues of the day. This paper was commissioned by the Foreign Affairs Standing Committee, the Chairman of which is Robert Jackson, Member of Parliament for Wantage, and a former Member of the European Parliament.
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ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Michael Stephen is a Barrister and International Lawyer. He was seconded to the British Delegation to the United Nations, and is Secretary of the Bow Group's Foreign Affairs Committee. He was Parliamentary Candidate for Doncaster North in the 1983 General Election.
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BOW EDUCATIONAL BRIEFING No.5
PART I:
British foreign policy has two principal aims; to maintain the security of the British Isles, and to protect and enhance British trading interests. Allied to these aims, and indirectly supportive of them, is concern beyond our shores for justice and the rule of law, protection of human rights, and the promotion of mutual respect and understanding between peoples.
Each of these factors applies in a greater or lesser degree to the island of Cyprus. The Eastern Mediterranean is important to Britain's security, in relation both to the Southern flank of NATO and to the situation in Iran and the Middle East. British trading interests, whilst small in Cyprus itself, require stability in the Region. Violations of human rights and breakdown of respect and understanding between peoples in the Region threaten both of Britain's principal foreign policy interests. Finally, Britain has residual legal rights and obligations relating to the island.
A Prisoner of History
Like that other island across the Irish Sea, Cyprus is a prisoner of its history. Its present is conditioned by its past, and there is a grave danger that unless there is wisdom and imagination in the management of its affairs its future will be fettered too. Everyone who wishes the people of Cyprus well prefers to look to the future, but the past is littered with well-intentioned mistakes, and they will be repeated yet again if account is not taken of the lessons of past failures. It is therefore necessary to look in some detail at the reasons why the present situation has arisen.
There is a popular belief that the Cyprus problem was caused by the landing of the Turkish troops in 1974, and if only they would withdraw the problem would be solved. This is a serious misconception, for the modern Cyprus problem began in 1960, and the landing of Turkish troops was the consequence, not the cause. Moreover, there were in fact two military interventions in 1974; the first was by Greece and the second was by Turkey.
For the time being Greek and Turkish Cypriots live apart. Does their future lie in political association on the same basis as before, or are their interests better served by secure geographical foundations from which each community can deal with the other on the basis of mutual respect?
The inhabitants of Cyprus have no common language (except English), and no common religion, nor have they, except at the surface, any common culture. This being so, any approach to the Cyprus question which regards Cypriots as a nation is fundamentally flawed. It is true that on a personal basis Greek and Turkish Cypriots can enjoy friendly relations with each other, but the history of the island shows clearly that their relationship is fragile when they deal with each other collectively.
Cyprus became part of the Turkish Empire in 1571, at which time the population was a mixture of people whose origins were in many different parts of the Eastern Mediterranean and Europe. Three hundred years later the island became part of the British Empire. During the second half of the 1950s a skillful and determined guerrilla campaign was waged against the British in Cyprus by EOKA, and organisation consisting of Greeks and Greek-Cypriots committed not to independence but to ENOSIS, or political union of Cyprus with Greece.
EOKA did not succeed in achieving ENOSIS, but the British Government eventually reached the conclusion that its security requirements could be met by withdrawing to two Sovereign Bases. Accordingly in 1959 a series of conferences took place in London and Zurich with a view to granting independence to the remainder of the island, at which the five interested parties were represented, namely Britain, Greece, Turkey, the Greek-Cypriots and the Turkish-Cypriots. The Greek-Cypriots were represented by Archbishop Makarios, and the Turkish Cypriots by Dr. Kutchuk. The two Cypriot leaders were accorded equal status.
Negotiations were long and difficult, but eventually agreement was reached upon the basic constitutional structure of a new Republic of Cyprus. Agreement was also reached upon the terms of a Treaty of Guarantee between Britain, Greece, Turkey and the new Republic.
The 1960 Constitution
The Constitution (Cmd. 1093) represented a compromise between the rights and aspirations of Greek and of Turkish-Cypriots. Although the Greek-Cypriots were more numerous the Turkish-Cypriots had lived in Cyprus for 400 years as a distinct community, and were willing to join the new Republic in exercise of their right of self-determination only if that basic fact of political life in Cyprus was formally recognized. The alternatives were two separate states, a condominium division of the island between Greece and Turkey, or continued British rule. It was eventually agreed upon that the new state would be a bi-communal Republic. Its structure was therefore unique because it was a quasi-federation in which there were two political entities within only one geographical area.
The bi-communal nature of the Republic is fundamental to the state of affairs created by the 1960 Treaties, and from its very inception the Republic of Cyprus had never been a unitary state in which decisions are made solely on the basis of one-man-one-vote. The two communities were political equals; not in the sense that each had the same legislative or executive powers, for those accorded to the Greek-Cypriots by the Constitution were greater by virtue of their numbers; but in the sense that each existed as a political entity, just as both large and small states exist as political entities within the structure of the European Community.
At the conclusion of the negotiations the Prime Minister of Greece made the following declaration (Cmd 680):
'From the very outset of these negotiations our main preoccupation was that there should be no victor in them, except the people of Cyprus themselves. I am certain we have achieved this. It is the best solution because its main foundation is co-operation between Greeks and Turks in the island, and in our two countries. And it is the best solution because it leaves to the island's majority the rights enabling it to develop in the most appropriate manner all aspects of its life, while it secures for the minority a splendid opportunity for maintaining its character and institutions, as well as for enjoying their generous share of common authority and responsibilities.'
The means by which the Constitution gave effect to the agreement were fourfold; political, legal, administrative, and military. The President was to be a Greek-Cypriot and the Vice-President a Turkish-Cypriot. Legislative authority was vested in a House of Representatives, of whom 70% would be Greek-Cypriots and 30% Turkish-Cypriots, but legislation was subject to the veto of the President and / or Vice-President in certain specified circumstances. Moreover, legislation relating to certain matters of sensitivity as between the two communities required a separate majority of the representatives from each community.
The interpretation and enforcement of the Constitution was entrusted to a Supreme Constitutional Court, which consisted of three judges, a Greek-Cypriot, a Turkish-Cypriot and a neutral as President of the Court. The Council of Ministers was to consist of seven Greek-Cypriots and three Turkish-Cypriots. The Civil Service was to consist of 70% Greek-Cypriots and 30% Turkish-Cypriots. Further, by Article 173 (1) it was provided that separate municipalities were to be established in the five largest towns, subject to transitional provisions and to review within four years.
Underpinning the Constitution were the armed forces of the Republic and, in the last resort, the three Guarantor Powers. By Article 129 it was provided that the Army should consist of 2,000 men of whom (subject to transitional provisions) 70% would be Greek-Cypriots and 30% would be Turkish-Cypriots. The strength of the Police and Gendarmerie could be varied, but only with the agreement of the Vice-President.
By Article 185 it was declared that the territory of the Republic could not be divided, nor integrated wholly or in part with the territory of any other State. Finally, Article 182 provided that the basic Articles (listed in Annex III to the Constitution) and which had been agreed at Zurich; could not be amended.
The Republic of Cyprus Breaks Down
Sadly, and with the benefit of hindsight it now appears that the Greek-Cypriot leadership never intended to operate the Constitution to which they had agreed, and on the basis of which independence had been granted and international recognition accorded. As early as September 1960 Archbishop Makarios said: "The Cause of ENOSIS has not died. I cannot say that ENOSIS has been forgotten." (New York Tribune, 27.9.60).
From the beginning, before the Turkish-Cypriots had exercised any powers, the Greek-Cypriots failed to implement constitutional provisions which did not suit them. They failed for example to implement Article 129(1) for the establishment of the national army in the ratio 60 / 40, which was regarded by the Turkish-Cypriots as an essential practical safeguard; but they did discharge large numbers of Turkish-Cypriot police auxiliaries and recruited Greek-Cypriots in excess of the numbers permitted by Article 130. They also instituted compulsory military service for Greek-Cypriots alone, contrary to Article 129(2).
They also failed to establish the ratio 70 / 30 in the Civil Service as required by Article 123 on the pretext that suitable Turkish-Cypriots could not be found. Further, they failed to implement Article 173 which provided for separate municipalities. The Turkish-Cypriots regarded this too as an important practical safeguard, and responded by creating their own municipalities and by taking the issue to the Supreme Constitutional Court of Cyprus.
On 25th April 1963 the Court ruled that Article 173 had not been complied with, but Archbishop Makarios declared that he would ignore the judgment, and did ignore it (Cyprus Mail 12.2.63). The neutral President of the Court, a West German citizen, resigned on 21st May 1963 and thereafter the Turkish-Cypriots were excluded, sometimes by actual physical force; from most of their positions in the Institutions of the Republic. The United Nations tried to mediate, but the Greek-Cypriots would not allow the Turkish-Cypriots to return unless they accepted fundamental changes to the Constitution (UN docs. S/5950, S/6569, S/7350).
On 30th November 1963 Makarios demanded that the Turkish-Cypriots accept 13 amendments to the Constitution, which included no less than eight of the basic articles enacted for their protection; and which only three years before it had been expressly agreed could not be amended. It is said that these demands were prompted by frustration caused by the exercise by Turkish-Cypriots of the rights conferred upon them by the Constitution. However, the history of the period 1960 to 1963 shows that it was the very existence of those safeguards to which the Greek-Cypriots objected, for they prevented them from ruling Cyprus in the interests of Greek-Cypriots alone, and were an obstacle to ENOSIS.
The Greek-Cypriots has agreed to a bicommunal republic but now wanted to change it unilaterally into a unitary state in which their voting power would be paramount. On 2nd January 1964 the Daily Telegraph wrote "The Greek-Cypriot community should not assume that the British military presence can or should secure them against Turkish intervention if they persecute the minority. We must not be a shelter for double-crossers."
However, the Greek-Cypriots then proceeded to rule Cyprus as if the Turkish-Cypriots no longer had any constitutional role. All the reserves of the Central Bank were appropriated for the benefit of Greek-Cypriots, and they purported to enact legislation which was in violation of the Constitution, for example the Administration of Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Law 1964, the President of the Republic and Members of the House of Representative (Extension of Term of Office) Law 1965, and the Public Service Law 1967.
Violence and Economic Discrimination
From December 1963 there were serious incidents of violence against Turkish-Cypriots, and since they were only 18% of the population, and lived in scattered communities they were easy targets despite the presence in Cyprus of UN forces. The violence against them became so bad that British troops had to intervene, and the Parachute Regiment in particular is still remembered by Turkish-Cypriots for their bravery in their defense. However, the position of British troops eventually became untenable and they withdrew.
On 28th December 1963 the Daily Express carried the following report from Cyprus: "We went tonight into the sealed-off Turkish Quarter of Nicosia in which 200 to 300 people had been slaughtered in the last five days. We were the first Western reporters there and we have seen sights too frightful to be described in print. Horror so extreme that the people seemed stunned beyond tears."
On 14th January 1964 the Daily Telegraph reported that the Turkish-Cypriot inhabitants of Ayios Vassilios had been massacred on 26th December 1963, and reported their exhumation from a mass grave in the presence of the Red Cross. A further massacre of Turkish-Cypriots, at Limassol, was reported by The Observer on 10th February 1964, and there were many more.
On 8th December 1967 the UN Secretary-General reported to the Security Council (UN doc. S/8286):
"When the disturbances broke out in December 1963 and continued during the first part of 1964 thousands of Turkish-Cypriots fled from their homes, taking with them only what they could drive or carry, and sought refuge in what they considered to be safer Turkish-Cypriot villages and areas."
On 10th September 1964 the Secretary-General reported (UN doc. S/5950):
"UNFICYP carried out a detailed survey of all damage to properties throughout the island during the disturbances . . . it shows that in 109 villages, most of them Turkish-Cypriot or mixed villages, 527 houses have been destroyed while 2,000 others have suffered damage from looting. In Ktima 38 houses and shops have been destroyed totally and 122 partially. In the Orphomita suburb of Nicosia 50 houses have been totally destroyed while a further 240 have been partially destroyed there and in adjacent suburbs."
From 1963 to 1974, and despite the continued presence of UN forces, Greek-Cypriots continued to attack Turkish-Cypriots. They raided isolated Turkish-Cypriot villages, destroying homes, schools and even places of worship, and forcing their former inhabitants to withdraw into enclaves for mutual protection. On 15th February 1964 a shipment of arms for Greek-Cypriots was discovered at Famagusta harbour, which provoked the following statement from the British Government: "We had ample information to show that the import of arms is taking place with the full knowledge and approval of the Cyprus Government, and this is not a matter which is tolerable at a time when we are trying to keep the peace on the island" (Hansard, Vol. 689, Col. 844).
The Turkish-Cypriots formed a militia of their own and did fight back, but there was little they could do against overwhelming numbers. The only power likely to be able and willing to protect them was Turkey, if they could persuade it to act under the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee. On 1st January 1964 Makarios announced his decision to abrogate the Treaty (The Times, Daily Telegraph, 2.1.64).
In September 1964 the Secretary-General reported to the Security Council (UN doc. S/5950):
"In addition to losses incurred in agriculture and in industry during the first part of the year, the Turkish community had lost other sources of its income including the salaries of over 4,000 persons who were employed by the Cyprus Government. The trade of the Turkish community had considerably declined during the period due to the existing situation, and unemployment reached a very high level as approximately 25,000 Turkish-Cypriots had become refugees. Expenditure of the Turkish Communal Chamber had dropped considerably, as a yearly subsidy formerly received from the Government had ceased to be granted in 1964. Furthermore, a large part of its remaining resources had to be used for unemployment relief and other forms of compensation as approximately half the population came to be on relief."
During the period 1963 to 1974 the freedom of movement of Turkish-Cypriots was severely restricted (UN docs. S/5764, S/5950, S/7350); they were denied postal services (UN docs. S/5950, S/7001); their access to building materials, electrical equipment, motor parts, fuel, chemicals and many other commodities was severely restricted (UN docs. S/5950, S/7350); and Turkish-Cypriot refugees had to live in tents and caves at risk to their health.
On 10th September 1964 the UN Secretary-General reported "The economic restrictions being imposed against the Turkish communities in Cyprus, which in some instances has been so severe as to amount to veritable siege, indicated that the Government of Cyprus seeks to force a potential solution by economic pressure." (UN doc. S/5950).
On 21st April 1966 the Greek-Cypriot newspaper Patris published a top secret document which had come into its hands and which it attributed to the Greek-Cypriot leadership. This document was a detailed plan for the achievement of ENOSIS by the forceful suppression of the Turkish-Cypriots, the abrogation of the Treaty of Guarantee, and the management of world opinion. It has become known as the "Akritas Plan". It is impossible to prove that this document is authentic, but if it is not, the actions of the Greek-Cypriot leadership at this time are a remarkable coincidence.
On 26th June 1967 the Greek-Cypriot House of Representatives adopted a very significant resolution as follows:
"Interpreting the age-long aspirations of the Greeks of Cyprus, the House declares that despite any adverse circumstances it will not suspend the struggle conducted with the support of all Greeks, until this struggle succeeds in uniting the whole and undivided Cyprus with the Motherland."
Faced with this attitude toward them on the part of the Greek-Cypriots, there were many in the Turkish-Cypriot community who felt that their only chance for a secure future lay in Union of part of Cyprus with Turkey, and calls for "Taksim" were heard. However this was a reaction to the situation in which they found themselves and was not something which the majority of Turkish-Cypriots preferred. They had secured a perfectly reasonable settlement in 1960 and it was in their interests to make it work.
It is remarkable that the United Nations not only failed to condemn the usurpation of the constitution by force but actually rewarded it by recognising the Greek-Cypriot administration as the Government of Cyprus (S.C. Res. 186 of 4th March 1964).
Cyprus: Two Nations in One Island
BOW EDUCATIONAL BRIEFING No.5
PART II:
Greece Invades Cyprus
In 1967 there were further serious episodes of violence against Turkish-Cypriots, and in 1971 the EOKA leader General George Grivas returned to Cyprus and established the EOKA-B organisation committed, as was EOKA of the 1950s, to ENOSIS. According to a letter dated 2nd July 1974 from Makarios to the Greek Government, the Greek-Cypriot National Guard was from the outset the main supplier of men and materials to EOKA-B. Turkey did not respond to this violence except by way of sporadic air attacks.
However, events moved inevitably into a critical phase, and on 15th July 1974 a large force of Greek-Cypriot and Greek troops deposed Archbishop Makarios and the Greek-Cypriot administration, and killed many Greek-Cypriots in the process. One of the EOKA-B leaders, Nicos Sampson, was installed as President and EOKA-B began systematically to murder the Turkish-Cypriot people of the island, who fled as far as they could to the North. EOKA demonstrated the same brutality as they had employed against British soldiers and their families from 1955-1960. The intention was completely to Hellenise Cyprus and to declare ENOSIS.
Makarios himself fled, and eventually reached the United Nations where, on 19th July 1974 he declared in the Security Council (S.C.O.R. 1780th mtg.) that the coup was an invasion in violation of the independence of the Republic and that it was the work of Greek officers directed by the Military Government in Athens. The coup took place not because Makarios had abandoned ENOSIS but because he was no friend of the Greek military Government, and was not proceeding towards ENOSIS fast enough for their liking.
Turkey's Response, and the Treaty of Guarantee
Five days after the overthrow of Makarios, and one day after his speech to the UN, the Turkish Government (at that time a Social Democrat Government), acted against the Greek invasion, and landed troops in the North of the island. The Greeks and Greek-Cypriots argue that the Turkish military action and subsequent presence is illegal. The Turks and Turkish-Cypriots say it is legal.
By Article 1 on the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee the Republic of Cyprus had agreed:
(a) to ensure the maintenance of its independence, territorial integrity and security, (b) to ensure the maintenance of respect for its Constitution, and (c) not to participate in any political or economic union with any State. Further, the Republic declared prohibited any activity likely to promote, directly or indirectly, either union with any other State or partition of the Island.
By Article II it was agreed that the Guarantor powers would:
(a) recognise and guarantee the independence, territorial integrity and security of the Republic, (b) recognise and guarantee the state of affairs established by the Basic Articles of its Constitution, and (c) prohibit, so far as concerned them, any activity aimed at promoting, directly or indirectly, either union of Cyprus with any other State or partition of the island.
Finally, by Article IV it was agreed that in the event of a breach of the provisions of the Treaty the Guarantor powers: (a) would consult together with respect to representations or measures necessary to ensure observance of those provisions, and (b) reserved the right, insofar as common or concerted action might not prove possible, to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the Treaty.
As at 20th July 1974 the "Republic of Cyprus" had quite clearly failed to maintain its independence, territorial integrity, or security, and had failed to maintain respect for its Constitution, as required by Article I of the Treaty. In particular it had failed to maintain respect for the Human Rights of its people recognised by and embodied in the Constitution. Further, Greece was itself in gross and obvious breach of Article II of the Treaty and accordingly, as required by Article IV, the United Kingdom and Turkey consulted together in London on 17th and 18th July. Greece was invited, but declined to attend.
The House of Commons Select Committee on Cyprus formed the view (HC 331 1975/76 para. 22), that during these consultations Turkey had proposed joint Anglo-Turkish action under the Treaty of Guarantee, and this was confirmed by Prime Minister Ecevit on 14th August 1974 (Daily Telegraph 15th August). However the Labour Government in Britain refused to take any effective action, even though they had troops and aircraft in the Sovereign Bases in Cyprus. They argued that Britain was under no duty to take military action, but Article II provided that Britain would guarantee the independence, territorial integrity and security of the Republic, which it manifestly failed to do. The Select Committee concluded that "Britain had a legal right to intervene, she had a moral obligation to intervene. She did not intervene for reasons which the Government refuses to give."
The responsibility therefore fell upon Turkey, as the only Guarantor willing to act, and on 20th July Turkish forces landed in Cyprus. The legal authority for their action rests not only upon the breaches of the Treaty identified here, but also upon the breaches committed before 1974 by the Republic of Cyprus at the instance of the Greek-Cypriots, and which have already been mentioned.
Violence Continues
After the Turkish landings it was argued by the Greek-Cypriots that even if the first landing was legal the extension of the area under Turkish control from 22nd July to 16th August 1974 was illegal since there was no longer and subsisting breach of the Treaty. However, the facts do not support this view, because large scale murders of Turkish-Cypriot families continued to take place, particularly in the villages of Aloa (Times, Guardian, 21st August), Zyyi, Sandallaris, Mari, Maratha, and Tokhni, and again despite the presence in Cyprus of UN troops. In Tokhni on 14th August 1974 all the Turkish-Cypriot men between the ages of 13 and 74, except for eighteen who managed to escape, were taken away and shot.
In Zyyi on the same day all the Turkish-Cypriot men aged between 19 and 28 were taken away by Greek-Cypriots and were never seen again. On the same day Greek-Cypriots opened fire in the Turkish-Cypriot neighbourhood of Paphos killing men, women and children indiscriminately. On 23rd July 1974 the Washington Post reported "In a Greek raid on a small Turkish village near Limassol 36 people out of a population of 200 were killed. The Greeks said that they had been given orders to kill the inhabitants of the Turkish villages before the Turkish forces arrived." (See also Times, Guardian, 23rd July).
On 24th July 1974 France Soir reported "The Greeks burned down Turkish mosques and set fire to Turkish homes in the villages around Famagusta. Defenseless Turkish villagers who have no weapons live in an atmosphere of terror and they evacuate their homes and go and live in tents in the forests. The Greeks' actions are a shame to humanity." On 28th July the New York Times reported that 14 Turkish-Cypriot men had been shot in Alaminos.
The "Republic had once again failed to maintain respect for the constitution.
On 22nd July Ecevit called upon the UN to "stop the genocide of Turkish-Cypriots" and declared "Turkey has accepted a cease-fire, but will not allow Turkish-Cypriots to be massacred." (Times 23rd July). On 29th July he was reported by the Daily Telegraph as follows: "Security on paper will not satisfy us. Every Turk in every corner of the island must feel at home. This we regard as an inalienable human right. So called security measures which have left Turkish-Cypriots in fear of attack and massacre are no good." The German newspaper Die Zeit wrote on 30th August 1974 "the massacre of Turks in Paphos and Famagusta is the proof of how justified the Turks were to undertake their second intervention".
In any event military action never really ceased between 20th July and 16th August. The Greeks and Greek-Cypriots continued to lay mines and construct strongpoints around the Turkish positions, and the Turks continued to reinforce their troops and to send out patrols.
In that position Turkish forces were not secure, and could certainly not protect the siege in Famagusta. On 8th August the Guardian reported that they had been under sustained mortar attack for 20 days, and on 17th August the Daily Telegraph reported that in the first three days of the siege an estimated 2,000 mortar bombs had fallen on them. Accordingly the Turkish army moved our of its bridgehead and advanced upon Famagusta with the object of rescuing the Turkish-Cypriot population of Famagusta and of securing a viable defensive position. The siege of Famagusta was lifted on 16th August.
The House of Commons Select Committee on Cyprus reported in 1976 "The second phase of military operations was inevitable in the view of your committee as the position reached by the Turkish forces at the time of the first cease-fire was untenable militarily and they needed tanks and armour to consolidate their position and secure Famagusta."
Since that military action, and following the residual exchange of population by agreement in 1975 between Archbishop Makarios and Rauf Denktas, who had by then become the Turkish-Cypriot leader, Greek-Cypriots have lived in peace in the Southern part of the island and Turkish Cypriots have lived in peace in the Northern part.
Very many innocent people of both communities were killed and went missing in the turmoil of 1974, and in the heat of battle there must have been excesses by individuals on both sides, but the responsibility for this must rest firmly upon the Greeks and the Greek-Cypriots for creating the conditions in which Turkey had no choice but to intervene by force. There is in any event a big difference between excesses or mistakes committed in war, and systematic massacres committed in cold blood.
The population exchanges themselves have also caused hardship to both Greek and Turkish-Cypriots, but people have over the past twelve years adjusted to their new circumstances. It nevertheless remains essential for people on both sides to be properly compensated as part of any overall settlement.
It is further argued that even if the 1974 landings were lawful the Treaty permitted Turkey to intervene with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the Treaty, and that the continuing presence of Turkish forces is not to re-establish the 1960 state of affairs but with intent to annex Cyprus wholly or in part Turkey or to create two separate States. Again the facts do not support the argument, because if such had been Turkey's intention they would never have supported the framework for a new constitution for the whole island proposed by the UN Secretary-General in 1984, and again in 1986, and which excluded both annexation and two separate states.
Having regard to the events of 1960 and 1974 no serious section of Cypriot opinion, whether Greek or Turk, regards re-establishment of the 1960 Constitution itself as practical, and indeed on 12th February 1977 Makarios and Denktas agreed that thenceforth they were seeking a bi-communal federal Republic. This was reaffirmed by Kyprianou, successor to Makarios, in 1979, and was even the view of the British Foreign Secretary, who answered "yes" to the following question from the House of Commons Select Committee on Cyprus (HC. 331 1975/76, page 55 para, 141):
"Would the Foreign Secretary agree that we could hardly restore the 1960 Constitution, since at least two of the provisions which were enshrined in the Constitution, the separate municipalities and the Turkish (Cypriot) share of the police and civil service, were never in fact implemented?"
Although it is impossible to re-establish the 1960 Constitution itself it continues however to be practical to re-establish the 1960 state of affairs in substance, namely respect for the human rights of all Cypriots and respect for the existence of both communities as political entities, and in the meantime for the most basic right of all, namely the right to live in peace, to be guaranteed. It would be absurd to argue that by making it impossible the re-establish the 1960 state of affairs in its entirety, Greeks and Greek-Cypriots could deprive Turkey of its right to guarantee the survival of the Turkish-Cypriot community.
Negotiation for a New Constitution
At the first Geneva Conference on 30th July 1974, Turkey, Greece and the United Kingdom acknowledged the existence in Cyprus of two autonomous administrations representing the Turkish-Cypriots and the Greek-Cypriots respectively, and it was agreed that negotiations should be carried on to secure a workable constitution for Cyprus as a whole. Since then the leaders of the two communities have held frequent talks. In 1978 the Turkish-Cypriots proposed the reopening of the Famagusta suburb of Varosha which contains many hotels and had lain derelict since 1974, provided Nicosia airport was opened to all, but this was rejected.
The Turkish-Cypriots could not live fore long in a state of limbo. They needed a constitution to regulate their political affairs and democratically elected institutions to govern them, and accordingly, on 13th February 1975, they declared Northern Cyprus to be a Federated State, with the intention that it should one day form part of a federal republic for the whole of Cyprus. They did not at that stage declare independence.
However, by November 1983, having failed to reach agreement with the Greek-Cypriots on the creation of a Federal Republic, they declared independence as the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. The Republic functions as a multi-party democracy, with a President, Prime Minister, and Legislative Assembly.
They nevertheless made it clear that establishment of the Republic does not preclude the creation of a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation for the whole of Cyprus, and this was formally reaffirmed by the Legislative Assembly as recently as 12th March 1985.
The framework for a future political solution based on a federal system of government uniquely structured for the circumstances of Cyprus will be found in the Denktas-Makarios accords of 1977, the Denktas-Kyprianou 10 point agreement of 1979, the UN Secretary-General's "Opening Statement of 1980" and the Secretary-General's 1984 and 1986 draft framework agreements.
The UN Plans
The 1984 draft framework agreement had been prepared by an exhaustive series of talks under the auspices of the Secretary General, and the Turkish-Cypriots were assured by him that the document, dated 27th November 1984, was acceptable to the Greek-Cypriots. On that basis the Turkish-Cypriots agreed to go to the UN to sign it, but when Denktas arrived in New York he found that Kyprianou wished to re-negotiate it.
Kyprianou's announcement at the Summit surprised even his own people, and on his return home a motion censure upon him was passed by the Greek-Cypriot House of Representatives. In the course of the debate Mr. Clerides, leader of the Democratic Rally Party said:
"Right from the first day of the meeting, Kypranou asked for the re-negotiation of everything from A to Z. Among the points he asked to re-negotiate were issues that did not fall within the scope of the Summit, and issues which were already discussed and agreed upon. He should not have brought forth again issues already debated and agreed upon with Denktas."
In the same debate Mr. Papaiannou, Secretary-General of the AKEL party, said: "Kyprianou never adopted the basis of the federation, which was agreed upon by Makarios and Denktas, and Kyprianou never exerted any effort for the solution of the Cyprus problem on the basis of a federation. Kyprianou never respected the Summit agreements."
The Secretary-General resolved to try again, and on 12th April 1985 he prepared a document which he described as a "consolidation" of the 1984 draft. It did however contain major differences, and since it had been negotiated with the Greek-Cypriots alone it was a document different in kind from the draft framework agreements of 1984 and 1986. Denktas rejected it in a letter to the Secretary-General on 8th August 1985 and in the same letter expressed surprise that the document had first come to his attention through the Greek-Cypriot press.
However, after the two rounds of intensive technical talks held separately with both sides at official level in November -- December 1985 and February-March 1986, the Secretary-General on 29th March 1986 presented the two sides with a new "Draft Framework Agreement". He had again laid a compromise position on the table after full consultation with both sides. He had again proposed a solution in the belief that it was acceptable to both sides, and that it formed a framework which dealt with the entirety of the Cyprus problem. He fully understood the interrelated nature of all elements involved and offered the plan as an integrated whole.
The Secretary-General's 1986 plan called for the reunification of Cyprus as a bi-national, bi-zonal federal republic with a Greek-Cypriot President and a Turkish-Cypriot Vice-President, each with defined veto powers over a bi-cameral legislature. The proposals would have reduced the land area under Turkish-Cypriot control from 35.8 % of the island to a little over 29% but they were nevertheless accepted by the Turkish-Cypriots on 21st April 1986.
Kyprianou on the other hand, after consultation with Athens, refused to accept it and rejected the entire draft saying that it had "negative points," and he is once again seeking to re-negotiate. However, the UN Secretary-General made it clear on 11th June 1986 that his proposals took fully into account the concerns of all parties and that he did not intend to take up counter-proposals put forward by Mr. Kyprianou. He called on the Greek-Cypriots to think again.
Cyprus: Two Nations in One Island
BOW EDUCATIONAL BRIEFING No.5
PART III:
Greek-Cypriot Objections
The Greek-Cypriots demand the withdrawal of Turkish troops as a precondition to any settlement, and label them an army of occupation. Turkish troops are not however an army of occupation but are in Northern Cyprus at the request of the inhabitants for their protection; and in view of the treatment which Turkish-Cypriots have received from 1963 to 1974 they would be foolish to ask Turkey to withdraw its troops before trust and confidence had been established between the two communities. They nevertheless made the rather surprising concession (Draft Framework Agreement 1986 art. 8.1) that a timetable for withdrawal should be agreed. It is true that Greece is no longer ruled by the military government which invaded Cyprus in 1974, but no one can yet tell whether ENOSÝS is finally dead in both Greece and Cyprus, nor whether the era of political instability in Greece is at an end, nor whether the Greek-Cypriots would not again use their superior numbers to threaten the existence of the Turkish-Cypriot community. Certainly the Turkish-Cypriots are not yet ready to take that risk and should not be expected to do so.
Greek-Cypriots also demand that they should be completely free to move about, to establish themselves, and to own property, in the Turkish-Cypriot area. And these have become known as the "three freedoms". However, this would expose Turkish-Cypriots to risk of terrorists attacks, to being overrun by superior numbers again, and to being overwhelmed by the superior economic power of the Greek-Cypriots.
In view of their past experience Turkish-Cypriots cannot be expected to agree to this until much greater confidence between the two communities has been established, for where a choice has to be made between these freedoms and freedom to live in peace, the latter must clearly prevail. They did however accept (Draft Framework Agreement 1986 art. 6.17) that these three issues will be discussed within that framework.
Greek-Cypriots complain that people from Turkey have been allowed to make their homes in Northern Cyprus since 1974, but they forget that large numbers of Turkish-Cypriots emigrated to Turkey, Britain, the United States and the other countries during the period 1963 to 1974 when life in Cyprus was made very difficult for Turkish-Cypriots. In fact during this period emigration of Turkish-Cypriots was actively encouraged by the Greek-Cypriot administration. In any event the 1960 Constitution did not prohibit immigration.
Greek-Cypriots also complain that the names of towns and villages in the North have been changed, but settlements with both Greek and Turkish-Cypriot inhabitants have had both Greek and Turkish names for as long as anyone can remember.
Greek-Cypriots say it is an injustice that Turkish Cypriots occupy 35.8% of the land area of the island although they are only 21% of the population today. However, there are four answers to this. First, it is not an internationally accepted principle that ethnic groups occupy such proportion of the land areas as their numbers bear to the total population, and there are very few, if any places in the world where such is the case.
In Cyprus, Turks and Turkish-Cypriots owned almost 100% of the land when the British arrived. During the period of British colonial rule their holdings were gradually reduced so that by the time of independence in 1960 they were registered owners of only about 30% of the land. It is therefore true that today they occupy more land than they owned at the time of independence but land areas are meaningless in themselves.
In 1974 Turkish-Cypriot owned large areas vineyards in the South and they have acquired in exchange large areas of land which is unsuitable for cultivation due to scarcity of water and due to salination. They have also have acquired in exchange some good beaches and hotels but the main hotel complex at Varosha is an unusable ruin as a result of the Greek-initiated war of 1974, and it is extremely difficult for Turkish-Cypriots to develop their tourist industry in view of boycotts practiced against them, particularly in the field of air transport, which are mentioned low below.
Second, the area in which the Turkish-Cypriots live is the minimum necessary to establish a viable defensive position and to ensure reasonable economic viability. The Turkish-Cypriots did not wish to live in a divided island, and are well aware of the benefits of a larger economy, but for Greeks and Greek-Cypriots to complain about the division, having caused it to occur, is rather like a boy who kills both his parents complaining about being an orphan.
Third, the Turkish-Cypriots have, by accepting the UN draft framework agreement, agreed to negotiate a reduction of the land area under their control.
Fourth, the Turkish-Cypriots have accepted that as part of an oral settlement compensation will be paid to those on both sides who have lost their land and other possessions
Some Greek-Cypriots even call for one-man-one-vote in Cyprus as a whole, but for the same practical reasons Turkish-Cypriots cannot be expected to agree to that at the present time. In any event, as already mentioned, when Cyprus became independent Turkish-Cypriots did not become citizens of the Republic as individuals, having no more than minority status, and it was agreed by Archbishop Makarios in 1977, and reaffirmed by his successor in 1979 that the future of Cyprus demanded a bi-communal federation and not a unitary state.
The Turkish-Republic of Northern Cyprus is labeled a breakaway state, but in fact it was the Greek-Cypriots who broke away from the Republic established by the 1960 Constitution and established unilaterally a Greek-Cypriot state which they continue to call the Republic of Cyprus.
Is There a "Government of Cyprus" Today?
For the time being the Greek-Cypriots occupy the Cyprus seat at the UN. They claim to represent Cyprus at Common-wealth Heads of Government meetings, and all Ambassadors and High Commissioners of Cyprus throughout the world are Greek-Cypriots enjoying full diplomatic privileges, although no Turkish-Cypriots Vice-President of Cyprus has had any say in their appointment. They do their utmost to prevent the Turkish-Cyprus case being heard in any international forum.
It is quite astonishing that the world is prepared to recognize the claim of the Greek-Cypriot administration to be the Government of the whole of Cyprus, for not only is it clear that they do not speak for the Turkish-Cypriots nor control the northern part of the island but there is no legal basis to their claim. Their case could at first sight rest on one of two alternative bases, either the 1960 Constitution or general international law.
When Cyprus became independent its Government derived its authority the Constitution, but that Constitution gave the Turkish-Cypriots an absolute rights to a place in the institutions of Government. It was declared, as already mentioned, that the Vice-President must be a Turkish-Cypriot, with defined veto powers, and Turkish-Cypriots were entitled to membership in the prescribed proportions of the Council of Ministers, the Legislative Assembly, the Civil Service, the Courts of Justice, and the Security Forces.
The Turkish-Cypriots having been excluded from their positions, and the Vice-President having been denied the right to exercise his constitutional powers it cannot possibly be said that the 1960 Constitution is still functioning. It is alleged that the Turkish-Cypriots voluntarily withdrew, but it is quite clear from the history of the period since 1960 that they did not. Even if they had withdrawn voluntarily it does not follow that the 1960 Constitution would have continued to function; because it was designed to operate, and could only operate, on a basis of partnership between the communities.
International law defines an independent state as a territory with defined boundaries, with a government to which the inhabitants are habitually obedient, and which is free from political control by any other state (Lauterpacht, "Recognition in International Law" paras. 10-13). Applying this definition to Cyprus it is apparent that the Southern part is a separate state, having a Greek-Cypriot government to whom the inhabitants are habitually obedient. The Greek-Cypriot people are free to choose, and have in fact chosen their own constitution. They say that it is the 1960 Constitution, but it is in reality a modified version excluding Turkish-Cypriot participation. It is notable that on his re-election in 1973 Makarios took a modified form of oath which avoided a declaration of respect for the 1960 Constitution.
Applying the same principles, a separate state also exists in the North, with a government deriving its authority from a constitution enacted by the Turkish-Cypriot people, which excludes Greek-Cypriot participation.
It is arguable that neither is a separate state because they are under political control of Greece and Turkey respectively. It is true that each of those countries has a significant military presence in the island, and that they have enormous political influence, but it is doubtful whether it amounts to control sufficient for the purposes of international law. If it did, there would be many countries, particularly in Eastern Europe which would not be independent states.
Economic Discrimination
Whether they are the lawful government of Cyprus or not, the Greek-Cypriot administration have obtained for Southern Cyprus almost all the EEC aid allocated for the whole of Cyprus. Under the first financial protocol of 1979, 30 million ECU were allocated to Cyprus, and a further 44 million under the Second Financial Protocol of 1984.
It is said that these funds have been applied for the benefit of both communities and this may be true in theory, but the overwhelming benefit has accrued to the Greek-Cypriots. If a customs union were established between the EEC and Cyprus before a settlement had been achieved between the two communities the Greek-Cypriots would benefit even more and the Turkish-Cypriots in all probability be excluded entirely.
The Greeks and Greek-Cypriots have succeeded in constructing an international boycott against the Turkish-Cypriots. Their own economy has prospered, and they have profited considerably from the economic displacement which has occurred in nearby Lebanon. By contrast it is impossible to post a letter to Northern Cyprus directly, nor to fly nor send goods or passengers by sea directly anywhere other than Turkey, nor communicate directly by telex or telephone. In a highly competitive world economy these disadvantages are serious, and it is therefore hardly surprising that Turkish-Cypriots enjoy a lower standard of living than those in the South, that their tourist industry is handicapped and that they are forced to accept subsidies from Turkey.
International Attitudes
In view of the history of the Cyprus question from 1960 to the present day it is surprising that the world continues to refuse recognition to the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, continues to practice a partial boycott against them, and continues to accord unequal political treatment to Greek and Turkish-Cypriots. Why should this be?
Most of the of the world do not really care whether the Turkish-Cypriots are treated fairly or not. The Islamic countries would probably recognize them tomorrow, but the matter is marginal to their interests and the slightest pressure from Britain or the United States is sufficient to keep it off their agenda.
Turkey's interest in Cyprus is not entirely altruistic for, as long as tension exists between Greece and Turkey, Greek control of Cyprus, is not something Turkey would find acceptable since it lies only 40 miles from the Turkish mainland. Turkey has of course granted recognition to the TRNC, and has provided economic and military assistance at considerable cost to its economy, but Turkey has not until recently been willing to bring economic and political pressure to bear in support of the Turkish-Cypriots to anything like the same extent as Greece has done for the Greek-Cypriots.
This appears to be changing.
In Greece there appears to be a romantic attachment toward Cyprus rather similar to that of Argentina toward the Falkland Islands, and internal political capital is to be made in Greece by taking a hard line on Cyprus. It is seen in Athens as part of the wider questions of the Aegean, which has soured relations between Greece and Turkey for so long.
On 22nd September 1986 the Wall Street Journal expressed the view in an editorial that "the problem of Cyprus can be summed up in two words, Andreas Papandreou. The last thing the socialist leader wants is a resolution of the island's differences. He would lost his opportunity to accuse Turkey of devious intentions which he does to distract the Greeks from their decrepit economy. Just as important he would lost the collusion of the US Congress. Since Turkey's 1974 military intervention US said has been held to a 10:7 ratio for Turkey and Greece. That allows Mr. Papandreou to influence military aid to Turkey by not making full use of his own."
However, in view of the extremely poor results obtained by Mr. Papandreou's socialist party, PASOK, in the October 1986 local elections in Greece it remains to be seen how long he will continue to conduct international affairs of that country.
Greece has capitalized upon romantic notions of ancient Greece as the home of democracy, and has powerful interests in international shipping, finance, and tourism. Its influence in these areas has been used to the full to apply pressure in support of the Greek-Cypriots. Greeks will not hesitate, in any international economic or political form, to cause an unpleasant scene if there is the slightest softening of attitudes toward the Turkish-Cypriots. They will even go so far as to make an implied threat to withdraw from the Western Alliance.
One country in which the efforts of Greece have been particularly successful is the United States, for not only is there scope for economic pressure, but there is a powerful Greek-American lobby in United States politics, which has been used to the full. The United States is also interested in facilities offered by the British military basis which exists in the Southern part of Cyprus.
The Soviet Union is naturally interested in Cyprus, by virtue of its proximity to the Middle East and to the exit from the Black Sea. They have a considerable diplomatic presence in Southern Cyprus, and they have recently proposed an international conference, the centerpiece of which is the proposition that all foreign troops, should depart from the island. Andreas Papandreou is a supporter of this proposal.
It is no secret that the Soviet Union, via Bulgaria, is supporting the far-left Republican Turkish Party in Northern Cyprus. It is already a significant force in Turkish-Cypriot politics and its appeal, as in all other countries, is to those who perceive themselves to be poor and disadvantaged. The longer Northern Cyprus continues to suffer economic discrimination the stronger will the far-left become.
The Secretary-General of the United States has been helpful, but the General Assembly has not. It has shown bias towards one party to the dispute, and year after year it has adopted totally unrealistic resolutions sponsored by the Greeks and Greek-Cypriots with unquestioning support from the Soviet bloc and the "non-aligned movement". These resolutions have served only to polarise the situation.
Legal Arguments
The legal argument which is usually deployed against Britain runs as follows. Britain is a party to the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, Article II of which provides, as indicated above, that Britain will recognize and guarantee the independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus and the state of affairs established by the basic articles of its constitution, and that Britain will prohibit, insofar as it concerns her, any activity aimed at promoting directly or indirectly union with any other state or partition.
It is therefore argued by Greece and the Greek-Cypriots that if Britain were to recognize the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus she would be failing to recognize the territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus and the state of affairs established by the basic articles of its constitution, and would be failing to prohibit activity aimed at promoting partition.
It is surprising that this charge should be maid by a country which, for most of the period from 1960 to 1974, had itself ignored the Treaty by failing to respect the independence of Cyprus and by not only failing to prohibit activity aimed at promoting union with itself but by actually engaging in it; and by a community by which for most of the same period had failed to maintain respect for the constitution of the Republic. Moreover, when it suited their purposes from 1964 to 1974 the Greek-Cypriots repeatedly declared the Treaty to be invalid (Cmnd. 6579 para. 4(c)).
However, whether valid or not the above-mentioned provisions of the Treaty of Guarantee do not preclude Britain if she so wishes from recognising neither the Greek-Cypriot nor the Turkish-Cypriot administration as the government of Cyprus and adopting an entirely neutral position.
Further, British recognition of the Greek-Cypriot administration as the Government of Cyprus is inconsistent with Britain's obligation to recognize and guarantee the state of affairs established by the basic articles of the constitution.
That state of affairs was one in which the Turkish-Cypriots were entitled to participate in all the decision-making processes of government and to exercise veto powers in clearly defined circumstances.
For Britain to deal with officials in whose appointment Turkish-Cypriots have been denied their constitutional role, and for Britain to recognize as the acts of a "Government of Cyprus" decisions in which Turkish Cypriots have had no part, is not only a failure to recognize and guarantee, but it is actually to assist the continued violation by Greek Cypriots of the state of affairs established by the constitution.
British Interests
The main focus of Greek and Greek-Cypriot pressure has been Britain, not only because of its historic connection with the island and its residual legal role, but because the presence of the basis in the South of Cyprus causes, or used to cause, a particular vulnerability.
Over the years since 1960 there has been an implied threat to British economic and political interests, directly and via the Greek lobby in the United States. However, in 1963 when the breakdown of the Republic of Cyprus became evident, the military bases in Cyprus were of greater significance than they are today. It is always convenient to have bases where aircraft can land and where troops can be stationed, but the increased range of aircraft and the realignment of British Defence strategy have rendered the bases largely redundant as garrisons. There are some training areas which are still useful, but they are not indispensable.
The strategic importance of Cyprus today lies more as a location for radio and electronic intelligence stations, important parts of which are not even in the sovereign base areas. However, these facilities do not require large military basis and could if necessary be located in Turkey, where other such facilities exist, or even in Northern Cyprus. In both those places the installations and personnel would be more secure than in Southern Cyprus, as the recent terrorist attack on the Akrotiri base has shown.
On the economic and political scene too, times have changed. Turkey is awakening as an economic power, and the potential there for British industry and commerce is of major importance. Politically Turkey is finding its way back form military rule to democracy, and the present Prime Minister, Turgut Ozal is a politician of the center-right. His recent visit to Cyprus, well knowing the Greek protest which was likely to, and did, echo around the world is a strong indication that Turkey is no longer prepared to accept the treatment which the world has so far been disposed to accord to the Turkish-Cypriots. In the strategic dimension too, Turkey is far more important to NATO than is Greece.
Time for Change
For so long as the status quo continues the Greek-Cypriots will be no more likely to conclude an agreement with the Turkish-Cypriots than they were when they rejected the Secretary-General's plan in 1984 and 1986. If a settlement is to be achieved , there have to be a change in the balance of costs and benefits. It is time for signals to be given by the United Kingdom and the United States that the Secretary-General's efforts to achieve a settlement cannot go on forever, that the Turkish-Cypriots in twice accepting the UN plan have done enough, and equal treatment is likely to be accorded to them soon. If no progress is made, equal treatment should in fact be accorded.
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by Piratis » Mon May 21, 2007 10:03 pm
Thanks for the proof of what I said: "their position is so weak that can be supported only by resorting to lies, gross exaggerations and half truths." As I asked you in another thread, maybe you could just give us the links of your bookmarks, in the same way that it was provided to you and save yourself from the useless copy/paste?
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by cypezokyli » Mon May 21, 2007 10:10 pm
second time today that views from the same source are posted. and it is clearly stated there
The views expressed in Bow Papers are those of the authors. They do not represent a collective view of the Bow Group, nor do they represent a statement of the view of either of the Conservative Party or of the Government.
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by zan » Mon May 21, 2007 10:12 pm
Piratis wrote:Thanks for the proof of what I said: "their position is so weak that can be supported only by resorting to lies, gross exaggerations and half truths." As I asked you in another thread, maybe you could just give us the links of your bookmarks, in the same way that it was provided to you and save yourself from the useless copy/paste?
Of course you are going to say that. I would not expecty anyting else. Who cares where the evidence comes from. You have no counter proof to those dates. Infact you know them to be true and you come up with LAME excuses to cover up what really happened. Those events are why Turkey is still on the island and why they will stay for as long as it takes. You can come up with all the false accusations you lke but I have not seen one date that you can give me that says those are not true. You are hanging on by a string my friend and the world is beginning to realise t. Not long now Piratis...Not long.
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by RichardB » Mon May 21, 2007 10:38 pm
I must say I agree with Pirates on this
Part of my job includes delivering courses in which students have to write assignments
If they are going to give references sources of information etc and appendecies then they should only be from offcial reliable sources
By that I mean that the source quoted should be able to supply correct information based on Legiislation /Regulation which is current
There are many sources of information on the Internet most of whch are personal opinions and have no subtance in an official capacity
Part of my job includes delivering courses in which students have to write assignments
If they are going to give references sources of information etc and appendecies then they should only be from offcial reliable sources
By that I mean that the source quoted should be able to supply correct information based on Legiislation /Regulation which is current
There are many sources of information on the Internet most of whch are personal opinions and have no subtance in an official capacity
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by zan » Mon May 21, 2007 10:45 pm
RichardB wrote:I must say I agree with Pirates on this
Part of my job includes delivering courses in which students have to write assignments
If they are going to give references sources of information etc and appendecies then they should only be from offcial reliable sources
By that I mean that the source quoted should be able to supply correct information based on Legiislation /Regulation which is current
There are many sources of information on the Internet most of whch are personal opinions and have no subtance in an official capacity
Can you be accused of throwing out the baby with the bath water on this one. The dates have been used time and again. The reason I used that particular one is because it is all in one place. How can any article be seen as subjective any where. I think this is just more spin from Piratis that has lost he case.
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by RichardB » Mon May 21, 2007 10:50 pm
Zan I was'nt looking at your posting when I posted my comments
All I was saying was that when we quote sources from the Internet then we should be careful of the reliabilty of the source.
Regards
richard
All I was saying was that when we quote sources from the Internet then we should be careful of the reliabilty of the source.
Regards
richard
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