Cyprus-Forum.com

[brother]

We all live in hope.

[insan]

If Talat as negotiator is willing to agree to a strong Federation, that will be the legal continuity of the RoC, that will create conditions for gradual social integration, and that will not cause unnecessary administrative deadlocks, I am sure Tassos would also sign ...

In my opinion the strength or weakness of Central authority have nothing to do with the probable to be appear "unnecessary" administrative deadlocks. The things that are considered "unnecessary" by majority of GCs may considered "necessary" by majority of TCs. These things may be related with everything; even may be related with the things that most of the GC thinks that those matters are none of TCs business. At the points the interests of the majorities of both parties clash; there will be a deadlock at that points; whether the central authority has been "strong" or "weak".

And can you tell me what is your exact definition for "unnecessary" deadlocks and "strong" central authority. If there's "political equality" at the level of central authority; when you strengthen it, you strenghten it as a whole to serve both parties benefits equally. But if the "strong" central authority you imply is the authority taken from TCs and given to the GCs because they constitute the majority of Cyprus; this does not help to prevent the "unnecessary" deadlocks.


Alexandros, can you give me some examples that you think TCs have no right to reject them but should accept them unconditionally?

[Alexandros Lordos]

In my opinion the strength or weakness of Central authority have nothing to do with the probable to be appear "unnecessary" administrative deadlocks. The things that are considered "unnecessary" by majority of GCs may considered "necessary" by majority of TCs. These things may be related with everything; even may be related with the things that most of the GC thinks that those matters are none of TCs business. At the points the interests of the majorities of both parties clash; there will be a deadlock at that points; whether the central authority has been "strong" or "weak".

And can you tell me what is your exact definition for "unnecessary" deadlocks and "strong" central authority. If there's "political equality" at the level of central authority; when you strengthen it, you strenghten it as a whole to serve both parties benefits equally. But if the "strong" central authority you imply is the authority taken from TCs and given to the GCs because they constitute the majority of Cyprus; this does not help to prevent the "unnecessary" deadlocks.


Alexandros, can you give me some examples that you think TCs have no right to reject them but should accept them unconditionally?

Insan,

you are right - and I am aware that this is going to be one of the stickiest issues in a new round of negotiation, especially with Tassos negotiating on the GC side.

You are also pointing out a real problem when you say that the more powers you give to the central authority, the more issues there will be on which a deadlock will be possible.

Now, as to what issues need not require a blocking power, I need to think about your question before answering ...

Two thoughts though:

- TCs will be 50% of the senate anyway. So they are not a minority in the senate. Why then do we need to protect them as if they are a minority? Even simple majority decisions would not pass if TCs disapprove.

- The Presidential Council will only have the authority to put into practice those laws which the senate has ratified. So its maneuvering power will be limited, to the application of laws which are acceptable to both sides. Why then should there be blocking rights in the Presidential Council as well?

Just to get us thinking ...

[michalis5354]

A weak federation will be the recipe for a new disaster in Cyprus! The ex TMT members will get a new opportunity to enhance their partition plan and guide the whole country into a chaos. The same can be said with the ex EOKA members . So either we work towards a strong federation where the Central government exercise FULL control over the whole island or sign nothing . No one wants the events of the 1960s to be repeated again and this is more likely to happen under the umbrella of a weak federation.

[Alexandros Lordos]

Insan, some further thoughts ...

In the Presidential Council, perhaps when we are talking about a "straight implementation" of a law ratified by senate, then there shouldn't be any blocking powers. But when we are talking about "a political decision", made within the framework of the laws without being compulsory under the laws, then there should be blocking powers.

How does this sound? Am I making any sense at all here?


Now concerning how strong the central government should be, I think it should have under its authority all matters which, if handled separately by the constituent states, would either cause disharmony or seperatist tendencies or the violation of minority rights (meaning here the GC minority in the north and the TC minority in the south).

An example in the first category is public borrowing - the Federal government should have the right to limit the borrowing of constituent states otherwise we would end up with economic chaos. An example of the second category is security. The central government should have under its control all security forces and troops on the island, because once we start having separate armies for each constituent state we are only feeding the flame of nationalism - of both nationalisms. An example of the third category is education: The education of GCs in the north and TCs in the south should be the responsibility of the Federal Government, otherwise there is no guarantee that their cultural rights will not be disregarded by the constituent state majority.

[insan]

- TCs will be 50% of the senate anyway. So they are not a minority in the senate. Why then do we need to protect them as if they are a minority? Even simple majority decisions would not pass if TCs disapprove.

According to many of the Hellenic sources the majority of GCs do not think it is fair to share power 50/50 in Senate as it was envisaged in the fianl version of Annan Plan. Majority of TCs have accepted the 50/50 power sharing in Senate, as it was envisaged in final version of Annan Plan.

- The Presidential Council will only have the authority to put into practice those laws which the senate has ratified. So its maneuvering power will be limited, to the application of laws which are acceptable to both sides. Why then should there be blocking rights in the Presidential Council as well?

Actually the executive authorities of presidential council should be the executive authorities of President and Vice President. I think the experts thought, it would be more functional to grant the executive authorities of
President and Vice President to the Presidential council as it was envisaged in Annan Plan; comprised of 2 TCs and 4 GC. According to Annan Plan, President and vice-president would be the chairmen of the Presidential council as two non-voting members of this council. The question is would or wouldn't be more apprpriate to grant the executive authorities of President and Vice President to the Presidential Council as it was envisaged in Annan Plan.


According to the Hellenic sources which are against almost all provisions of Annan Plan; TCs as a minority constituting %18 of the population of Cyprus should never have a right to reject about these key legislative issues as follows:


1. Adoption of laws concerning taxation, citizenship and immigration;
2. Approval of the budget; and
3. Election of the Presidential Council.


I strongly believe that the core of the problem is; the Hellenic Ruling Elite cannot digest the political equality of two communities and cannot acknowledge TC community as an equal constituent partner of state of Cyprus. And I'm afraid they injected this political stance almost all of the Hellenes brains living worldwide.

[insan]

Alexandros, I'm not against a stronger central authority. Even I support the idea of a stronger Central Authority, too; because of the same rational reasons, you have concerns about. But I don't think that the basis of the concerns of Hellenic Ruling Elite is only to make central authority above the constituent states but they are also against the "political equality" in this "strong" central government. I'm sure of this, but if I'm mistaken please enlighten me.

[Alexandros Lordos]

Insan,

Personally, I do not much care what the "hellenic ruling elite" thinks about these issues ... as I said before, I consider them irrelevant, and, may I add, they will not much influence the final negotiating position of the GC side. Tassos is going to bargain hard, but within the domain of realism, not fantasy.

No one is seriously going to contest that the senate should be 50 - 50. This is a standard feature of all Federal Systems. Some people might contest that the senate should be voted according to ethnicity, but even if their position prevails - something I consider unlikely - TC interests will not be particularly hurt: You would still elect TCs as your 24 senators, even if 20% of your voters are GCs ...

What is going to be seriously contested, is the "qualified majority" system of the Senate ... firstly, because it doesn't exist in other Federal systems, and secondly, because some will convincingly argue that it is unnecessary for your protection ... as I said before, the fact that the senate is 50 - 50 will mean that no law can pass without your approval also. Of course, someone may argue here that the GCs could collude as a block with one TC party and thus exclude the majority of the TCs, but I think this scenario is far-fetched given that such collusion would be severely punished by the TC voters in the next election.

Now, concerning the Presidential Council, I doubt that Tassos would seek to bring back a President - Vice-President system: The Presidential Council system is one of the very few provisions of the Annan Plan that he actually liked. All he wanted for the Presidential Council was for just two of the members to rotate as President - VP, and he has already got that. What Tassos will contest, is the requirement that each decision must have the approval of at least one council member from each side.

[Piratis]

No one is seriously going to contest that the senate should be 50 - 50. This is a standard feature of all Federal Systems. Some people might contest that the senate should be voted according to ethnicity, but even if their position prevails - something I consider unlikely - TC interests will not be particularly hurt: You would still elect TCs as your 24 senators, even if 20% of your voters are GCs ...

What we have in all Federation is that each state has equal number of senators, but nobody can restrict based on racial discrimination the citizens of the country to choose which state they wish to live in (with full political rights of course). Do you know any state in the US that can say "We accept only 30% blacks in our state"?

[-mikkie2-]

Alexandre,

Yours is the voice of reason. One thing that many people fail to realise is that Tassos is a pragmatist and a realist. To many this may seem far fetched, but I think he knows what is possible and what isn't. The thing I like about him is that he is prepared to stand up and actually fight his corner.

As for the 'Hellenic Ruling Elite' that Insan goes on about, well you know what I think of that!