Rejecting Kofi: Long Term Consequences in Cyprus
by John Tirman
The predictable rejection of the Annan Plan in Greek Cyprus, and the less predictable but somewhat encouraging endorsement of it in the north, now must be reckoned with: There will be consequences in keeping the island divided, and doing so at the same time that Cyprus entered the European Union and Turkey's own aspirations for membership are about to reach another crucial test in late 2004. The consequences might very well include a new kind of Cyprus one day, perhaps two decades hence, shaped not by negotiation and reconciliation, but by the harsh momentum of globalization and the Europeanization of the Levant.
In declining the Annan Plan, the government of the Republic of Cyprus in effect declined to acknowledge the looming reality of Turkey's EU membership. During the negotiations, Greek Cypriot leaders insisted on a kind of open borders policy that united Europe has fashioned---one cannot dispute that this is a desirable ideal if the EU is a meaningful concept. The "derogations" from this principle of free movement of people within the EU were being sought by the Turkish side, who sought some assurances that Cyprus would not one day be overwhelmed by the superior numbers and capital of Greek Cypriots seeking their old properties or simply populating the attractive coastline of the north, which, among other attractions, is far less garishly developed than the south. Thus the fundament of the EU experiment---open borders and common citizenship---were upheld by the Greek Cypriot side and proved to be one of the main points of contention in the debate over the Annan/DeSoto design.
Now, look forward to 15-20 years from now. Turkey is about to enter the EU.(Both Greece and Greek Cyprus have said they will not veto Turkey's ascension, mind you, though the proof of that is yet to come, and there's still Germany and France for Ankara to deal with.) Among the impacts of Turkey's need to conform with European economic standards is the disemployment of 12-15 million agrarian workers. Where they will go and what they will do is the crucial question on Turkey's European path. But one thing is almost a certainty: many will go to Cyprus. A million or so could easily be lured to a prosperous Cyprus, which needs cheap foreign labor anyway, now imports nannies and maids from Sri Lanka, the Philippines, and other non-African places, and would surely be a destination of choice for the poor of Anatolia just a few miles away.
By 2035 or so, Cyprus would be a Turkish island in all but name. Citizenship could not be denied these Turks, and soon they would dominate politically. The exodus of wealthy Greek Cypriots to the Greek mainland would quicken as their fate became clear---living in Turkish Cyprus, not the TRNC of the north, but the Republic of Cyprus, in a united Cyprus, in a European Cyprus, in which they might comprise 30-40 percent of the population, speak a minority language, be taught by Turkish teachers and policed by Turkish gendarmes, and all the other imagined or real indignities that are often visited upon minority populations the world over.
Had the Greek Cypriot leadership struck a deal on this 20-30 year problem early in 2004 as part of the Annan-sponsored talks, when their negotiating power was at its height, this spectre---the final and absolute end of Greek Cyprus---might have been averted. There still may be ways it is averted or (at best) attenuated through many years to come of plaintive insistence. But the time to get it right was 2004. And that opportunity, unless they revert to the veto, is probably lost as well for good.